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Abstract
This study examines relative adjustment costs associated with resource relocation 
under inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade patterns in the face of trade 
liberalisation.
Adjustment costs arise as a result of greater import penetration leading to a 
contraction in domestic production. The hypothesis that adjustment costs under intra­
industry trade are lower than adjustment costs under inter-industry trade is supported 
theoretically. Firstly, in a specific-factor model, there are lower adjustment costs 
associated with intra-industry trade because of both labour market segmentation and 
price differentials. Secondly, the linkage between foreign direct investment and IIT 
through intra-firm trade reduces the costs of dislocation and unemployment and 
lessens the need for government assistance to smooth the transition process. Thirdly, 
it is possible for both factors to gain from trade liberalisation under intra-industry 
trade, and therefore, there is a greater willingness to adjust.
Previous empirical studies of adjustment costs are subject to one or both two 
limitations in measuring adjustment costs: lack of dynamic features and indirect
vii
measurement.
The hypothesis that adjustment costs associated with intra-industry trade 
specialisation are lower than those under inter-industry trade is also supported by 
empirical evidence. Based on the dynamic adjustment costs model, intra-industry 
factor adjustment is found to be associated with industries with high levels of intra­
industry trade. Measured in terms of six adjustment cost indicators, labour adjustment 
costs associated with an industry with a high degree of intra-industry trade 
specialisation are found to be lower than those associated with an inter-industry trade 
specialisation. Assessment of the linkage between foreign direct investment and intra­
industry trade both theoretically and empirically also provides support for the central 
hypothesis.
The policy implications of trade liberalisation depend on the determinants of the 
growth of intra-industry trade. The main theoretical framework which is generally 
believed to be applicable to trade among developed countries is also found to be 
applicable to trade in the APEC region with developed, newly industrialising and 
developing economies. APEC economies have experienced and are experiencing 
painful stuctural adjustment from regional trade liberalisation compared with 
European economies, since their levels of intra-industry trade in total trade are still 
low. There are challenges and opportunities for the further growth of intra-industry 
trade so that adjustment costs associated with further trade liberalisation may be lower 
for APEC economies in the future.
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t1 Trade Liberalisation, Intra-industry Trade and
Adjustment Costs: The Issues
World trade is ‘managed’ by a vast array of interventions. These range from customs 
manipulation to open quantitative restrictions and tariff measures. But these trade 
distortions are being liberalised through GATT negotiation and by other processes. 
The basis of the movement towards trade liberalisation is that there are substantial 
gains to be made from the dismantling of trade protection, entailing the removal of 
both production and consumption inefficiencies for economies.
The theory of trade policy encompasses a new range of interests as a result of changes 
to the trading environment in the last two decades. The relationship between trade 
liberalisation and intra-industry trade is one such important issue. Many have argued 
that trade liberalisation will lead to increased international trade, with growth of intra­
industry trade relative to inter-industry trade (Balassa 1967; Pagoulatos and Sorensen 
1975; Lundberg and Gavelin 1986; Greenaway 1987; Ray 1987; Chen 1994). Some 
economists (Cox and Harris 1985; Rodrik 1988; and Richardson 1989) suggest that 
the gains from trade liberalisation are more significant if imperfect competition and 
scale economies prevail than is the case when an economy operates under perfect 
competition: Even though the easy presumption of gains from trade liberalisation in a 
perfectly competitive environment vanishes under imperfect competition, empirical 
research to date has generated a replacement presumption: as a rule, trade 
liberalisation leads to gains, which may be two or three times larger than those 
estimated under perfect competition (Richardson 1989).
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Although it is widely believed that there are gains from trade liberalisation, there is 
continuing and substantial resistance to it. One possible explanation is that the gains 
from trade liberalisation are recognised to be a long-term benefit. This could be for 
‘simple’ static reasons: every tariff reduction leads to a new and more efficient 
allocation of resources. But in the short term, affected firms in an industry must make 
adjustments to trade liberalisation. The process of industry adjustment inevitably 
incurs costs for both labour and capital. The short-term dynamic adjustment process 
may be accompanied by costs such as the closure or decline of firms leading to some 
labour and capital being unemployed. The results of an increase in the unemployment 
rate include social problems and private losses. These negative side effects may 
outweigh the gains from trade liberalisation in the short term, giving rise to severe 
difficulties in achieving trade liberalisation and even economic development.1 
Another possible explanation is that the gains from trade liberalisation are recognised 
as net gains which are generated on the basis of the well-known theory of ‘gains from 
trade’ coupled with Pareto-efficient income redistribution. The central thrust of this 
theory is that although trade liberalisation yields gains to social welfare in the 
aggregate, it generates significant costs to certain workers and producers. According 
to the Pareto principle, those harmed by changes in trade policies can be 
compensated. In practice, the compensation of losers is conducted by means of 
income redistribution via government programs which provide supplementary 
assistance to displaced workers in designated industries. Such measures include 
supplementary unemployment benefit programs like long-term early retirement
1 Baldwin et al. (1979) estimate the impact of a 50 per cent multilateral tariff reduction on US trade, 
employment, capital utilisation and economic welfare. In the aggregate, the calculated gains from trade 
liberalisation dwarf the measured adjustment costs by a ratio of almost 20 to 1.
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benefits. In the United States, there is the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, and 
in other industrial countries, supplementary aid packages are provided to selected 
groups of displaced workers.
Effective compensation, however, is problematic when the information costs of 
identifying winners and losers are large. Implementation issues associated with 
programs of this type generally stem from a lack of information whereby to identify 
the adjustment costs of heterogenous workers (Brander and Spencer 1994; Feenstra 
and Lewis 1994). Benefits should vary across workers according to the adjustment 
costs they face, but the fact is that policy makers are unable to calculate the costs. The 
eligibility criterion often adopted by governments for adjustment assistance programs 
is the displaced worker’s former sector of employment. The rationale for this by 
policy makers is that a sectoral benefits approach coincides roughly with the sectoral 
pattern of adjustment costs (Gray 1996).
Some labour economists (Kruse 1987 and Kletzer 1995) claim that trade-displaced 
workers may have more difficulty in making labour market adjustments, but the 
source of the difficulty is their own disadvantage, not the characteristics of the 
industry from which they have been displaced. Others (Kletzer 1992; Summer 1986; 
Houseman 1988; Grando 1983; and Jacobson 1993) recognise the existence of 
marked sectoral effects on adjustment costs such as efficiency wages and unions. 
Industry trade specialisation in terms of inter- versus intra-industry trade is an 
important sector-specific effect in determining the gains from trade liberalisation. 
Thus the level of intra-industry trade specialisation may to some extent have an effect 
on adjustment costs.
3
The central hypothesis
It has been an article of faith in commenting on European integration that successful 
economic integration within European economies can be attributed to some extent to 
the larger share of intra-industry trade between economies (Greenaway and Hine 
1991) since it is believed that the adjustment costs associated with intra-industry trade 
specialisation are lower than those associated with inter-industry trade specialisation. 
Despite a lack of theoretical analysis, this argument has been investigated empirically 
by many economists (Balassa 1966; Adler 1970; Rayment 1976; Lundberg 1986). The 
results from these studies are quite weak, as the relative adjustment costs under inter- 
versus intra-industry trade are examined very intuitively. Hence, there is merit in 
analysing the adjustment costs under different trade patterns both theoretically and 
empirically in a more rigorous way.
World economies are becoming more and more integrated. While European economic 
integration is widening and deepening, trade liberalisation is also on the agenda of 
APEC economies. Whether APEC economies will experience similar ease in their 
adjustment to trade liberalisation depends very much not only on the nature and 
characteristics of the economies within this region, but also on relative adjustment 
costs under different trade patterns. Hence, the study of relative adjustment costs 
under different trade patterns has important policy implications for trade liberalisation 
of Asia Pacific economies.
4
From these perspectives, this study seeks to formulate and test the central hypothesis 
that adjustment costs under intra-industry trade specialisation are lower than those 
under inter-industry trade specialisation.
An analytical framework
A common theme in studies of structural adjustment is that structural change refers to 
the longer term and more fundamental changes that occur in the production patterns, 
employment, output and size of industries and firms. Structural change occurs as a 
result of longer term pressures, such as the emergence of new sources of import 
competition. Structural adjustment refers to the ways in which firms attempt to 
accommodate these changes. According to adjustment costs theory, firms suffer short- 
run output loss as they adjust their stocks of quasi-fixed inputs over time. In 
considering the costs arising from the adjustment process of fixed factors, firms will 
form an optimal adjustment of all factors of production in a given time period. Given 
the nature of this adjustment process, use of the dynamic adjustment costs model is 
proposed and applied in this study. The theory of optimal adjustment of all factors of 
production provides a basis for the study of adjustment costs resulting from resource 
reallocation.. The problem of the theoretical adjustment costs model is, therefore, 
defined as the maximisation of the current value of profits over an infinite time 
domain by a price-taking firm, subject to a net change in quasi-fixed factors.
There are many approaches that can be followed to generate functional forms for 
factor demand functions in solving the problem outlined above. Epstein (1981)
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establishes a duality Between the value function and the production function and 
applies the envelope theorem to the value function to generate optimal solutions to 
quasi-fixed input, variable input and output supply.
The adjustment cost approach is thought to be more appropriate because it allows for 
the imperfect adjustment of resources in response to changes in external forces. These 
slow-to-adjust factors are called quasi-fixed inputs. Their level and rate of change are 
determined by exogenous factors. Quasi-fixed inputs are also choice variables which 
affect production in both the short and long run (Huang et al. 1995).
The empirical model derived this theoretical model can not only account for the 
relationship among multiple outputs, inputs, and exogenous shifters, but it also allows 
for the imperfect adjustment of resources in response to changes in external forces. 
Therefore, relative adjustment costs can be measured in this framework empirically as 
the relative effectiveness in reallocating quasi-fixed factors when there is a change in 
external conditions, such as trade liberalisation. The adjustment coefficients of quasi- 
fixed factors can be provided as a measure of adjustment speed (or the extent of inter- 
or intra-industry factor adjustment) while the eigen values of the adjustment matrix 
provide a check on the stability of the adjustment process of quasi-fixed factors.
In most previous studies, the adjustment costs under different trade patterns are 
addresssed not only intuitively but also statically. By using a dynamic adjustment 
costs model, the analysis of adjustment costs from factor relocation is undoubtedly a 
better starting point.
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Methodology
One of the most important features of this study is the way in which it measures the 
association between two factors. Weiss (1968) has defined association between two 
factors as follows: ‘Two qualities are associated when the distribution of values of the 
one differs for different values of the other’. At the same time, Weiss has identified 
four alternative ways of examining association. One way of examining association is 
to hypothesise what the data would look like if there were no association and then 
calculate the presence of association to the extent that the observed data depart from 
this. The second involves examining sub-group differences. The third approach 
entails forming all possible comparisons of one member of the population with 
another. In these comparisons, we decide whether the two qualities under study occur 
together or not. The fourth way of measuring association involves examining the 
extent to which increments in one factor occur together with increments in the other.
A relationship is often specified in terms of an increase or decrease of a certain 
number of units in the one variable producing an increase or decrease of a related 
number of units of the other. Under these circumstances, it is more correct to refer to 
that relationship as a correlation rather than an association. The important measures of 
correlation are summarised by Kalirajan (1998) as: Pearson’s product moment 
correlation coefficient; Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient; and Kendall’s rank 
order correlation coefficient. When examining one group of data, if the aim is to 
examine whether there is any difference in behaviour in the two matched pairs under 
two different circumstances, Wilcoxen’s test is the most appropriate. The method to 
be applied depends on the nature of the association of the two factors.
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The above-mentioned methods are often referred as non-stochastic measures. A more
rigorous and stochastic measure of a relationship between two factors is well- 
specified econometric modelling, in which one variable is treated as an explained 
variable and the other is an explanatory variable. Under this kind of econometric 
modelling, the relationship between two variables can be tested not only in direction 
but also in magnitude and significance levels. For this reason, econometric modelling 
is used in this study to examine factor adjustment coefficients and the level of intra­
industry trade (Chapter 4); and labour adjustment costs indicators and the level of 
intra-industry trade (Chapter 5).
Although the stochastic method is used where possible to address the relationship 
between the two variables throughout the study, non-stochastic tests are useful in 
some cases, for example when there is not enough information to construct a well- 
specified econometric model. In Chapter 6, the relationship between foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and the level of intra-industry trade (IIT) is examined using 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients test.
Structure of the study
A review of existing studies identifies the theoretical nature and the direction of 
empirical analysis of adjustment costs under different trade patterns following trade 
liberalisation (Chapter 2).
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Trade liberalisation results in price changes in the affected markets, but if agents fail 
to respond quickly to these changes, or if any price change is resisted, an adjustment 
problem is said to exist. In theory, an adjustment problem is a short- to medium-run 
phenomenon, depending on the nature of the market. When using a specific-factor 
model, an adjustment problem arises when there is some degree of factor specificity, 
and the resulting wage (price) inflexibility leads to sticky or incomplete adjustment 
and/or adjustment friction arises as a result of market segmentation, for example, 
when the labour market is segmented occupationally and/or geographically. The 
adjustment costs arising from the adjustment process are therefore defined as greater 
import penetration leading to a contraction in domestic production. Resources are 
displaced from domestic production and may become temporarily unemployed. The 
redeployment of resources will be costly for those involved in terms of temporary loss 
of earnings, and the expense of relocation, job search and retraining.
By definition, inter-industry trade is international trade among different industry 
categories, and intra-industry trade is international trade within the same industry 
category. By further investigating theoretical explanations for inter- and intra-industry 
trade together with the nature of the adjustment process from the specific-factor 
model, it is argued that following trade liberalisation, adjustment costs under intra­
industry trade are lower than those under inter-industry trade. Other factors which 
affect adjustment costs under different trade patterns are also discussed, including the 
ways in which FDI is linked to intra-industry trade thereby smoothing the adjustment 
process and the differences in factor gains under different trade patterns.
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Previous studies on the measurement of adjustment costs are subject to some 
limitations. A more appropriate analytical framework—the dynamic adjustment costs 
model—for an empirical study of adjustment costs under different trade patterns is 
recognised in Chapter 2 and formally introduced in Chapter 3. Epstein (1981) applies 
the familiar principles of duality and the envelope theorem to the value function, and 
generates optimal solutions to quasi-fixed input and variable input and output supply. 
As Epstein’s dynamic adjustment costs model is based on the assumption that firms 
are price-takers, the justification for the use of this model under economies of scale 
and imperfect competition is discussed.
In Chapter 4, the dynamic adjustment costs model is used to examine relative factor 
adjustment under different trade patterns. The hypothesis that intra-industry factor 
adjustment will be associated with an industry characterised by high levels of intra­
industry trade is tested in this chapter. The test for this hypothesis is designed in three 
steps. Firstly, the optimal solutions for factor demand and output supply are derived 
with the production function in the dynamic adjustment costs model assigned a 
quadratic form. Secondly, using data in quasi-fixed input demand equations, 
adjustment coefficients are estimated. Thirdly, the relationship between the 
adjustment coefficients of labour and capital and the level of intra-industry trade is 
examined.
Chapter 5 tests actual adjustment costs under inter- versus intra-industry trade 
patterns, as measured by several adjustment cost indicators including average 
unemployment duration and the rate of re-employment in the same industry, using 
displaced workers’ data from the United States. Linear probability and logit model
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estimations are applied to test the hypothesis that adjustment costs are lower for 
industries with intra-industry trade specialisation.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is closely related to intra-industry trade (IIT) through 
intra-firm trade. This is examined and tested in Chapter 6, using panel data of FDI and 
IIT for the United States in and between APEC and European economies. The 
correlation between FDI and IIT is estimated. A positive correlation tends to support 
the view that foreign direct investment, mainly channelled through multinationals, 
helps to reduce adjustment costs following trade liberalisation.
In order to draw policy implications for future trade liberalisation from the results of 
this study, the determinants of intra-industry trade need to be examined. Most of the 
existing empirical analyses of the determinants of intra-industry trade are 
concentrated on developed economies. In Chapter 7, the determinants of intra­
industry trade are examined among APEC with developed, newly industrialising and 
developing economies.
The final chapter summarises the findings and policy implications of the study and 
discusses the study’s shortcomings. Directions for future study are also identified.
1 1
2 Adjustment Costs under Inter- versus Intra-Industry
Trade: A Theoretical Analysis
Introduction
This chapter analyses relative adjustment costs in the context of resource relocation 
associated with inter- versus intra-industry trade.
In neoclassical welfare economics, adjustment is represented by an instantaneous 
jump from one point to another on the production possibility frontier and no cost of 
adjustment is explicitly recognised. However, movement from one point to another on 
the production possibility frontier conceals a great deal of economic activity. In 
particular, in a world in which when there are market imperfections, there are private 
and social costs associated with the process of adjustment. This gives rise to questions 
about the nature of the relative adjustment costs in the course of resource reallocation 
associated with different trade and production structures.
Some studies have touched upon this issue. Where intra-industry trade is prevalent, 
firms bear the cost of retraining labour when rationalisation takes place. In contrast, 
where inter-industry trade is prevalent, adjustment entails considerable public 
assistance to help labour retrain and relocate on an inter-industry and inter-region 
basis (MacCharles 1987). Moreover, Greenaway and Hine (1991) argue that since 
industries are frequently geographically concentrated, intra-industry specialisation
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requires less inter-regional mobility of capital and labour than would otherwise be the 
case. The aim of this chapter is to clarify the idea of adjustment costs and to provide a 
systematic theoretical analysis and to shed some light on how to proceed with 
empirical analysis by surveying existing studies. I aim to establish a theoretical 
framework for exploring the adjustment implications of trade liberalisation under 
different trade patterns and to advance the central hypothesis that adjustment costs 
under intra-industry trade specialisation are lower than adjustment costs under inter­
industry trade specialisation.
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 specifies the nature of adjustment by 
adopting a specific model from international trade theory. A survey of the literature to 
compare the main determinants of inter- versus intra-industry trade is conducted in 
section 3. In section 4, based on the framework set out in section 2 and the discussion 
in section 3, the implications for adjustment are drawn out for inter- and intra-industry 
trade patterns. Other factors that influence the adjustment process are addressed in 
section 5. Section 6 reviews existing empirical studies relating to adjustment costs 
and intra-industry trade. Finally, section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
The nature of adjustment problems
Adjustment problems arise when agents in a market fail to respond quickly to a price 
change, and as a result, the market in question fails to clear. Often adjustment 
problems are associated with market imperfections which frustrate the adjustment
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process. At the same time, adjustment problems are a short- to medium-run issue; in 
the long run, agents can always respond fully to price changes.
Greenaway and Milner (1986) made an important contribution to the discussion of 
adjustment costs using a specific factor model. Following their work and that of Jones 
(1971) and Neary (1978; 1982 and especially 1985), the nature of adjustment 
problems is discussed in both the short and medium run. In this study, production is 
assumed to be a function of two primary factors— labour and capital. The analysis 
here is confined to these factors.
Suppose there are two sectors, X  and Y, and two factors, labour and capital. Suppose 
also that only one of the factors, labour, is assumed to be mobile in the short run, 
whereas the other, capital, is sector-specific in the short run, but adjusts slowly over 
time.
In Figure 2.1, the upper part describes the well-known specific-factors model. It can 
be used to demonstrate short-run equilibrium in a way that is both simple to 
understand and reasonably plausible. The lower part of Figure 2.1 is an Edgeworth- 
Bowley box, whose dimensions correspond to a country’s factor endowments. Labour 
is measured along the horizontal axis of the box. Putting the two parts together, we 
can trace both the short-run and long-run consequences of any exogenous shocks.
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Figure 2.1 The nature of adjustment problems
Lx=MPLx Ly=MPLy(Py/Px)
A 2 ______
W
Oy
Oy
Ky
Source: Adapted from Greenaway and Milner (1986).
It is assumed that each sector uses a single factor, labour, in common with other 
sectors. But capital including plant and equipment, non-traded resources and 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills, is specific to each sector. Industry X  produces 
exportables, industry Y produces import substitutes and X  is assumed arbitrarily to be 
the relatively labour-intensive sector. The initial equilibrium is indicated by points A0 
and B0 in the upper and lower parts of the figure, respectively. The economy produces 
two goods, X  and Y, under perfectly competitive conditions in both commodity and 
factor markets, using fixed supplies of the two factors, labour and capital, and subject 
to constant returns to scale. In the long run, both factors are completely mobile
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between sectors, and in the short run, capital goods are fixed. However, there are 
diminishing returns to labour in each sector, because of the fixity of capital goods. 
Hence, entrepreneurs in each sector maximise profits by increasing employment until 
the value of the marginal product of labour equals the wage rate. The initial wage rate 
and labour force allocation is determined by the intersection of the two marginal 
products of the labour schedules at A0 in the upper part of Figure 2.1. The location of 
these schedules depends on the initial commodity prices, and on the initial allocation 
of capital to each sector, with the latter represented by distances OxKx and Oy Ky in
the lower part of the figure. Point A0 in the upper part corresponds to point B0 in the 
lower part, and the latter lies on the contract curve, indicating that the initial 
equilibrium is one in which both labour and capital are allocated in such a way that 
they receive the same return in each sector.
Consider now the effects of a fall in the relative price of Y. Without loss of generality, 
we choose good X  as the numeraire, which implies that price changes do not affect the 
location of the Lx curve and the vertical axis measures the wage rate in terms of good 
X. The reduction in the price of good Y therefore leads to an equiproportionate 
downward shift in that sector’s labour demand schedule from Ly to Ly \  The new
short-run equilibrium is at point A, and Bx in the upper and lower parts of Figure 2.1: 
restoration of labour market equilibrium requires a fall in the wage rate in terms of X, 
leading sector X  to expand its output and employment and sector Y to contract.
The question now is how the economy actually moves from the initial equilibrium 
represented by point A0 to the new short-run equilibrium represented by point A,. For
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a variety of reasons, adjustment may take time to occur. One possibility is that wages 
may be flexible within sectors but, in the short run, wages may be independent of 
each other. This could occur if there were constraints on occupational mobility 
between the sectors, or if the sectors were geographically concentrated and there were 
constraints on moving from one region to another. In this sort of segmented labour 
market, sector X  is insulated from the shock in the very short run, whereas the wage in 
sector Y falls by the full amount of the price change from A0c to ac. Over time, the 
resulting disparity in wages between sectors provides an incentive for labour in Y to 
retrain or relocate in order to gain employment in X. Hence, the production points in 
the two sectors move along the Lx and L schedules until the new equilibrium at A, is 
attained and the wage differential is eliminated.
Another possibility is that the same type of labour is employed in X  and Y and the two 
industries draw from the same pool of labour, but real wages are sticky downwards. In 
this case the fall in the relative price of Y results in a temporary equilibrium at b. The 
impact of a fall in the price of Y is therefore that sector Y lays off workers that sector 
X  has no incentive to hire. Over time, the excess supply of labour causes the real wage 
to fall and both sectors adjust their labour demand schedules towards b. Naturally, the 
process of adjustment in an actual economy is likely to combine elements of both 
these extreme mechanisms, with both sectors exhibiting a combination of 
unemployment and sluggish wage change throughout the adjustment period.
In a competitive economy, adjustment takes place because any exogenous shock 
changes the incentives to factor owners and entrepreneurs. However, it is not only 
suppliers of labour services who face such incentives: owners of capital face them
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too. In the short run, the move from A0 to A, in the upper part of Figure 2.1 
corresponds to a move in the lower part from B0 to B] because of the specificity of 
capital. Clearly this cannot be a new long-run equilibrium, since it lies off the contract 
curve. In economic terms, the fall in the real wage facing producers in sector X 
increases the return to capital in that sector, whereas the rise in the wage rate relative 
to the price of good Y lowers the return to capital there. Hence there is now an 
incentive for capital to move out of sector Y into sector X.
As capital reallocates, both curves in the upper part shift rightward. In the lower part, 
the economy moves along a path from Bx towards a new long-run equilibrium at point 
B2. The adjustment of labour towards long-run equilibrium can be divided into the 
two adjustment scenarios described above. The adjustment of capital depends very 
much on the ability of the expanding sector to absorb the existing capital which is 
released from the sectors which have contracted.
This is a relatively simple framework for clarifying the nature of adjustment 
problems, and it incorporates a variety of restrictive assumptions. In the present 
context it is useful because it permits us to identify not only how factors of production 
adjust to a long-run equilibrium in response to a change in relative prices, but also 
suggests possible reasons why adjustment to a change in relative prices may be 
protracted; either because there is wage inflexibility in a downward direction and/or 
because the labour market is segmented or the ability of the expanding sector to 
absorb existing labour and capital released from contracted sectors is limited.
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Adjustment problems can arise from many areas of an economy facing trade 
liberalisation. At the national level, there are problems of structural unemployment 
and public assistance. When international trade is liberalised, some industries may 
expand and some may contract in the wake of international competition. The 
adjustment costs arising from the adjustment process in this context therefore can be 
regarded as a result of greater import penetration leading to a contraction in domestic 
production. Resources are displaced from domestic production and may become 
temporarily unemployed. The redeployment of resources will be costly for those 
involved in terms of temporary loss of earnings, relocation, job search and retraining 
expenses.
Determinants of inter- versus intra-industry trade
In order to compare the adjustment costs arising from the adjustment process which is 
described in the previous section, it is necessarily to identify determinants for 
different trade patterns. The distinguishing feature of inter- and intra-industry trade is 
that intra-industry trade is defined as international trade occurring within the same 
industry categories whereas inter-industry trade is international trade occurring in 
different industry categories.
The standard theory of inter-industry trade relates the pattern of trade (which country 
will export which goods) to comparative advantage (international differences in 
relative opportunity costs), and then tries to explain comparative advantage in terms 
of differences in technologies, factor supplies and so on.
19
The theory of comparative advantage is simple: if two countries engage in trade, each 
will have incentives to increase production, and reduce consumption, of goods in 
which they have the lower relative marginal cost prior to trade. Thus we may 
conjecture that in free trade equilibrium, each country will export such goods.
In principle, under autarky, the differences in relative marginal costs between 
countries can arise from differences in any of the underlying exogenous entities in the 
equilibrium of each: consumer tastes, production technologies or factor supplies. For 
the first—difference in consumer tastes—means that other things being equal, a 
country will import goods for which domestic consumers have stronger preferences 
than foreign consumers. 1 The second aspect—differences in production technology— 
is at the heart of Ricardo’s model in which a single input illustrates in a simple way 
how comparative advantage matters for trade. A modification of the Ricardo-Viner 
model is very instructive in that it embodies both differences in technology and 
differences in factor endowments as determinants of inter-industry trade.
Differences in factor endowments have proved to be the most widely analysed 
explanation of comparative advantage, as it can yield the greatest variety of testable 
propositions. The idea is that in each country, the factor which is relatively abundant 
will be used relatively more intensively in production and also will be cheaper. 
Therefore we should expect a country to have a comparative advantage in goods that 
are relatively intensive in the use of those factors that are in relatively abundant
1 This observations is rather trivial. With imperfect competition and product diversity, however, 
consumer tastes may have a more important effect on trade.
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supply. This is the cehtral proposition of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Such 
propositions are simple and plausible in the light of elementary economic intuition, 
but their justification rests on several assumptions such as the well-defined notions of 
factor intensity and factor abundance and the assumption of perfect competition.
Intra-industry trade (IIT), which accounts for a substantial proportion of total trade, is 
an important economic phenomenon observed by economists (Verdoom 1960;
Balassa 1966; Grubel 1967), and a huge literature has been developed to document 
and to seek a satisfactory explanation for it. Theoretical explanations of intra-industry 
trade involve consideration of factors such as relative factor endowments, product 
differentiation, economies of scale, monopolistic competition or oligopolistic 
behaviour, and there are many possible models proposed in the literature. They can be 
grouped under three headings.
Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin model
The first group of models explains intra-industry trade along vertically differentiated 
products (where varieties differ in their quality) based on the Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework. The production function is specified as a combination of basic factors 
such as capital and labour in a way that is consistent with constant returns to scale and 
perfect competition, and the pattern of vertical intra-industry trade is driven by 
relative factor endowments.
One well-known model of this type was developed by Falvey (1981). Based on 
differences in factor endowments, this model suggests that intra-industry trade occurs
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along vertically differentiated products giving reciprocal demand for both high and 
low qualities of a product between two countries. Unlike the standard Heckscher- 
Ohlin model, in this model capital is assumed to be industry-specific and one of the 
industries produces a differentiated product which is referred to as of different quality 
or vertically differentiated. These ‘qualities’ are distinguished by the capital-labour 
ratio: higher quality products require more capital-intensive techniques of production. 
Falvey shows that a capital-rich country will export higher quality differentiated 
products and a labour-rich country will export lower quality differentiated products 
and labour-intensive products.
An alternative explanation for intra-industry trade within the Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework extends the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model to take account of the human 
capital embodied in skilled labour. Assuming that higher quality versions of a good 
involve a larger proportion of skilled labour (and thus human capital) in their 
production then, according to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin prediction, countries that 
are well endowed with human capital will export goods intensive in that factor.
There are also some simple explanations of intra-industry trade which can be regarded 
as conforming to the inter-industry trade model. For example intra-industry trade 
could occur between countries with a common border. Because of low transportation 
costs in the parts of the country adjacent to the border, it is sometimes cheaper to 
trade products across the border than to transport the product within the country. 
Hence the geographical characteristics of countries are to some extent a determinant 
of the costs of production and transport and therefore of intra-industry trade.
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Monopolistic competition model
Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1980) have 
explained intra-industry trade based on horizontally differentiated products (where 
varieties differ in their characteristics) under monopolistic competition, scale 
economies in production and diverse consumer tastes. The main idea of these models 
is that if the number of varieties enters directly into the utility function (desire for 
variety) and economies of scale limit the number of variety of goods produced, then 
IIT may indeed take place and, by increasing the number of varieties, have positive 
welfare effects.
Neo-Chamberlinian models
Neo-Chamberlinian models are based on a model suggested by Krugman. It is 
assumed that consumers derive utility by simultaneously consuming a number of 
varieties of a given product with consumers’ consumption of more varieties yielding 
higher utility. It is also assumed that each country has only one industry which 
produces a range of differentiated products, so that international trade can occur 
between countries with identical costs. All goods have the same cost curve, and 
labour is the only factor of production to produce any variety.
The effect of opening two identical economies to free trade is that the number of 
varieties produced in each country is fewer under free trade than under autarky. But
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the total number available to consumers is higher than under autarky. It is clear that 
intra-industry trade occurs with different varieties being produced in each country.
This model provides an explanation for intra-industry trade which is not based on 
differences in factor endowment. Two economies produce differentiated products and 
trade to take advantage of the larger market.
Dixit and Norman, (1980) develop a two-country model to explain intra-industry 
trade. Two types of good enter into the utility functions: a numeraire good that 
represents the goods produced in perfectly competitive industries and under 
conditions of constant returns to scale; and goods produced in a monopolistically 
competitive industry, which are assumed to be differentiated and perfectly 
symmetrical, and subject to economies of scale. The potential range of varieties 
produced is assumed to be very large and hence the entry conditions for the industry 
determine the number of differentiated products to be produced.
The conventional theory of comparative advantage determines the net exchange for 
the numeraire goods. Two factors are important in determining intra-industry trade: 
the share of world income in each country and the share in world production of 
differentiated products in each country.
Trade in differentiated products is at its highest level when each of these two factors 
is nearly half, that is, the closer the two countries are in size, and if each has no clear 
comparative advantage among industries, then intra-industry trade is the predominant 
pattern of trade.
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Venables (1984) extended the Krugman model to take account of the production of a 
homogeneous good under constant costs, in addition to the production of a 
differentiated commodity. There are various possible equilibria including that 
identified by Krugman, so this is a more general class of model.
Lawrence and Spiller extend the basic model to include two factors of production 
which are used to make a capital-intensive horizontally differentiated product and a 
labour-intensive homogeneous product. They assume that firms entering the 
differentiated good sector face an initial capital outlay and that the two countries face 
initially different factor endowments. Their predictions are along the lines of the 
standard Heckscher-Ohlin and the Falvey models: the number of goods produced and 
the scale of production of the differentiated good increases in the capital-abundant 
country. In the labour-abundant country the number of varieties produced falls while 
production of the homogeneous goods increases.
Neo-Hotelling models
This type of trade model was firstly proposed by Lancaster. The basic idea is as 
follows. Products are horizontally differentiated by the set of characteristics. All 
consumers prefer certain characteristics, but as the products available are limited, 
consumers are forced to consume the good which better suits their preferences.
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Consumers are assumed to be identical in all respects except for different preferences 
in characteristics, and they benefit from diverse varieties because they can obtain 
goods closer to their ideal characteristics.
On the production side of this model, all goods are assumed to have the same cost 
function. Suppose that each producer chooses price and product characteristics, taking 
other firms’ values of these variables as given. Given that all goods in the product 
spectrum are produced with the same technology, and the distribution of consumers’ 
ideal characteristics is uniform along the spectrum, the resulting Nash equilibrium 
involves product varieties equally spaced along the line, each selling at the same price 
so that output and consumption of all varieties are also identical.
With the opening of the two identical economies to free trade, if the number of 
available products is unchanged, but the number of consumers is doubled, therefore 
demand for the typical varieties is doubled. Now existing firms will earn positive 
profits, so encouraging the entry of new firms to this industry until equilibrium is 
reached, where firms earn zero profit. At this equilibrium, firms are producing a 
higher output at a lower price than under autarky, the number of varieties available is 
greater than under autarky and fewer varieties are produced in each economy. As a 
consequence, intra-industry trade takes place.
One extension Lancaster made to his model was to allow for initial differences in 
factor endowment between the two countries, hence providing a Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework under the assumption of a relatively capital-intensive manufacturing sector 
and a relatively labour-intensive agricultural sector. Intra-industry trade occurs as well
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as inter-industry trade because each variety of manufactured good is only produced in 
one country.
Oligopolistic models
This group of oligopolistic models considers the strategic interdependence between 
firms in the industry. A major difference between models is the form of conjecture 
assumed to influence a firm’s decisions.
Brander and Krugman (1983), using Cournot type conjectures, developed a model 
which explains intra-industry trade in a homogeneous commodity which is often 
referred to as the two-way trade or ‘cross-hauling’ effect. This can occur because each 
producer seeks to maximise his own profit by selling to both markets, assuming no 
change in the sales of the other producer. This model assumes two countries which 
are identical in all aspects. There is one producer of the goods in each country and 
each faces the same production costs. The domestic demand function for the good is 
the same in both countries. This symmetry assumed in the model means that in 
equilibrium, each firm will produce the same output and will sell half its output on the 
domestic market and export the other half.
The extension of this model by incorporating transportation costs is referred to as the 
reciprocal dumping model. It is assumed that only a proportion g (0<g<l) of each unit 
of exports may be sold in the export market and a proportion of exports is ‘absorbed’ 
by across border fee charges. This increases the marginal cost of production for the 
export market above that of the home market.
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By introducing transportation costs to the profit function for each of the producers, 
intra-industry trade will still occur under the Cournot strategic assumption as long as 
transportation costs are not too high.
Given the symmetry assumed in the model, the same price will be obtained in both 
markets and each producer will receive a higher price for sales in the home market 
than from sales in the export market net of transport costs. This led Brander and 
Krugman to describe such intra-industry trade as reciprocal dumping.
Natural oligopoly and trade in vertically differentiated models have been developed 
by Shaked and Sutton (1982; 1983; 1984). This class of models explains intra­
industry trade along the lines of vertical differentiated products. They assume that 
there are fixed costs for firms entering the industry, and average variable costs are 
assumed to be constant or to increase slowly with improvements in the quality of 
goods.
All consumers are assumed to have the same tastes, hence there will be common 
ranking of commodities according to their perceived quality. But income across 
consumers is assumed to be different with high-quality commodities consumed by 
high-income consumers. In equilibrium, the number of firms in an industry depends 
on the range of income distribution, consumers’ tastes and the average variable costs 
of different qualities. If there is a narrow distribution of income and no variation in 
average variable costs on the basis of quality, a ‘natural oligopoly’ tends to emerge.
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The simple version of the models assumes that there are only two firms operating in 
the market. The firm with lower fixed costs will produce a low-quality variety at 
which the marginal revenue from changing the quality of its product is equal to the 
marginal cost of changing its variety; for the same reason, the firm with higher fixed 
costs will produce a high-quality variety.
Free trade between these two identical countries results in there being only one 
producer of each of the two qualities of good in each country, with each producer 
supplying both markets. As a result intra-industry trade occurs.
These theoretical models have several implications for intra-industry trade. Firstly, 
similarities in production structure are necessary for the presence of horizontal intra­
industry trade. Secondly, diversity of consumer preferences and similarity of taste 
play an important role in determining horizontal intra-industry trade; geographical 
characteristics to some extent determine both the horizontal and vertical intra-industry 
trade. Thirdly, similarities in factor endowment are one of the characteristics 
explaining horizontally differentiated intra-industry trade whereas comparative 
advantage based on differences in factor endowment are one of the characteristics 
explaining vertically differentiated intra-industry trade.
Adjustment implications under different trade patterns
Adjustment costs arising from domestic resource relocation are taken to mean all 
private and social costs resulting from the intersectoral relocation of capital and
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labour from one pattern of specialisation to another. Adjustment costs are made up of 
the costs of retraining and re-educating employees, social problems resulting from 
increased unemployment and the utility loss of being unemployed, among other costs. 
Physical capital is frequently industry-specific for technology reasons, and even if this 
is not the case, no perfect market for second hand physical capital exists. Thus, 
adjustment costs include the costs of obsolete physical capital which has to be 
depreciated.
The specific-factors model discussed in section 2 of this chapter served to highlight 
the implications of labour (factor) market segmentation for market clearing. The 
extent to which the market is segmented depends on the degree of occupational and 
geographical mobility between sectors.
As discussed in section 3 of this chapter, in the theoretical explanation of the nature 
of the development of inter-industry trade and intra-industry trade, both the 
occupational and geographical segmentation of factor markets are less significant for 
intra-industry trade than for inter-industry trade.
According to Balassa (1966) the theoretical concept of intra-industry trade is defined 
as the simultaneous export and import of products which are close substitutes in 
production and end use. In turn, the costs of reallocating capital and labour are 
expected to be small if exports and imports are close substitutes in production 
(Lundberg and Hansson 1986). The package of skills acquired during employment in 
the import substitute sector can be redeployed with minimal retraining in the export 
sector. In the extreme case, where adjustment takes place within the firm, workers
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could simply be transferred from one production line to another. By contrast, if factor 
mixes are very different between sectors, transferability would not be possible without 
complete retraining.
In theoretical models, intra-industry trade is classified as trade in horizontally and 
vertically differentiated products. Therefore, the adjustment cost implications are 
predicted to be different. Even when a simultaneous expansion of imports and exports 
occurs in the same ‘industry’, both product mixes and factor mixes may alter. 
Specialisation in products which are vertically differentiated provides a concrete 
example. In this case the capital-labour ratio alters in the process of specialisation. 
More importantly, however, the skill requirements may alter with the process of 
specialisation.
In sum, in the case of intra-industry trade in completely homogeneous products, 
technologies and skill requirements for exports and imports are equal and no 
structural adjustment is necessary. If exports and imports are horizontally 
differentiated, adjustment costs are still small because basically there is no need for 
essentially different technologies and skills to be applied. In the case of intra-industry 
trade in vertically differentiated products (differentiated in quality), there are two 
possible adjustment costs implications. When a change of product quality is not likely 
to require a fundamentally different production technology, intra-industry trade in 
vertically differentiated products will imply fewer adjustment costs than inter-industry 
trade. When vertically differentiated products are produced using different 
technologies, intra-industry trade will imply the same adjustment costs as inter­
industry trade.
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More generally, taking intra-industry trade as a whole, there is a possibility that 
adjustment from import-competing activities to export production can be managed in 
the same industry. In general, intra-industry adjustment is smoother because structural
unemployment can be avoided and existing skilled labour and physical capital can be
2
re-employed more effectively.
Another issue we should comment upon in this section is geographical mobility of 
labour. It can be argued that adjustment is likely to be smoother in an intra-industry 
trade setting because the expanding and contracting activities are more likely to be 
based in a given region than is the case with inter-industry trade. When industries are 
contracting, individuals may not only be required to retrain but also to relocate 
geographically. The greater the geographical resistance to mobility, the more 
protracted the adjustment. As with the issue of occupational mobility, the argument 
has a certain plausibility. After all, industries usually are geographically concentrated 
for particular reasons. Transportation costs may be one such reason. More 
importantly, the closer countries are geographically, the more similar the culture tends 
to be and therefore the more similar consumers’ tastes are. As noted in section 3 of 
this chapter, similarity in consumers’ tastes plays a significant role in generating intra­
industry trade. So if simultaneous expansion and contraction does occur within an 
industry and within an area/region, intra-industry specialisation requires less inter­
regional mobility of capital and labour.
2 Although there have been some attempts to separate vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade from 
total intra-industry trade, this is a task fraught with tremendous difficulties. Taking intra-industry trade 
as one measure (a mix of vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade), the above hypothesis may be 
weakened to some extent as the adjustment implications are different for vertical and horizontal intra­
industry trade.
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As discussed in section 2 of this chapter, there is another scenario for adjustment to 
short-run equilibrium which is the stickiness of wage rates. Attention has been paid to 
the explanation of why there may be a downward inflexibility of money wages, even 
when this might be inconsistent with expectations being formed ‘rationally’. One 
source of inflexibility which has received emphatic support is the existence of labour 
market institutions. In particular, the role of labour unions, implicit and explicit long­
term labour contracts, and transaction costs of hiring and firing labour, have all been 
stressed. One possible justification for greater ease of adjustment in sectors engaged 
in intra-industry trade is therefore that those labour market institutions which frustrate 
wage adjustments are less pervasive and less influential in industries where intra­
industry trade is relatively high and less important where intra-industry trade 
dominates. This, however, is a somewhat more difficult case to support.
One possible scenario has been suggested by Greenaway and Milner (1986). If the 
differential between the pre-trade expansion wage and the post-trade expansion wage 
is relatively small then the transitional period from the pre-trade to the post-trade 
equilibrium can be expected to be relatively short. This follows because with a 
smaller differential there may be a greater willingness and/or a greater ability to move 
from one sector to another. And, in turn, this is consistent with fewer distributional 
changes pursuant upon the opening of trade and, by implication, greater ease of 
adjustment. This model relies very much upon a ‘greater willingness’ to adjust notion; 
the smaller the required change in factor prices, the greater the likelihood that 
consumption gains will compensate for income losses, and therefore the more 
acceptable the change to agents in the import substitution sector.
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Many studies have been conducted on the factor price differential of opening up to 
trade under a range of assumptions. What Krugman (1981) had in mind is that the 
similarity in initial factor endowments between the two trading economies is 
responsible for narrow factor price differentials. A study of factor price differentials 
under inter- versus intra-industry trade was conducted by Chen (1995). By reviewing 
a set of papers and using the factor price equalisation theorem Chen shows that when 
economies have ‘similar environments’, factor prices tend to be closer. However, 
similar environments, as discussed in section 3 of this chapter, necessarily generate 
horizontal intra-industry trade in contrast to inter-industry trade, which occurs among 
countries with comparative advantages.
In summary, IIT adjustment is less costly than adjustment under inter-industry trade, 
because factor mixes tend to be more similar within industries than between 
industries, by definition. Secondly, to the extent that industries are geographically 
concentrated, factors in production are less likely to involve relocation if there is 
intra-industry trade creation than when trade creation is inter-industry. Thirdly, with 
respect to price adjustment, under intra-industry trade, the factor price gap before and 
after trade liberalisation is smaller than under inter-industry trade. Accordingly, the 
adjustment response to price change will be more rapid. Thus, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that the adjustment costs associated with domestic resource relocation 
should be lower when trade is intra-industry than inter-industry.
3 This is regarded in theoretical models as the similarity in consumers’ tastes and similarities in 
production technology and factor endowments etc.
34
Other factors
In addition to the theoretical determinants of inter- vs intra-industry trade which 
provide the basic grounds for drawing their adjustment implications under different 
trade patterns, other factors may contribute to the contrast between adjustment costs 
under different trade patterns.
FDIandllT
First of all, it has been noted on both theoretical and empirical grounds that IIT is 
closely related to foreign direct investment (FDI) through intra-firm trade.
FDI is the exercise of control over decision making in an enterprise located in one 
country by investors located in another. Although such investments may be made by 
individuals or partnerships, most FDI is undertaken by enterprises, and the larger part 
by multinational enterprises (MNEs) 4
Multinational enterprises are essentially those that own or control production facilities 
in more than one country (Sodersten and Reed 1994). Obviously, MNEs can only 
come into existence in the presence of FDI. Nowadays the importance of MNEs lies 
in their role as the major providers of FDI.
FDI is more than merely a capital flow; its function includes the exercise of control 
over business operations. A significant body of literature seeks to explain why MNEs
4 MNEs are also referred to as multinational firms (MNFs), multinational companies (MNCs) and 
transnational enterprises.
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choose FDI in the fifst place rather than expanding production and increasing exports 
in their home countries. The central element of FDI is that it consists of a package of 
capital, knowledge and skill. This suggests that FDI is industry-specific and is related 
closely to the characteristics of the industries in which it takes place.
Industry-specific investments take two important forms: horizontal and vertical 
integration. Horizontal integration is conducted in the form of opening new 
subsidiaries by large corporations. It is often carried out when one or several existing 
firms are acquired by a large international rival. Faced with an imperfect external 
market, such as intermediate inputs and technology, there are time lags, uncertainty, 
and high investment expenditure in the development of new processes and products. 
Firms therefore may choose to internalise these externalities by using backward or 
forward integration in the production process which is the basis of the vertical 
integration.
As noted above, MNEs can make available to their subsidiaries significant advantages 
through their control of management expertise and knowledge about new products 
and production technologies. This knowledge and management expertise flows on an 
intra-firm basis and therefore provides foreign subsidiaries with advantages over their 
counterparts, especially the smaller ones, in host countries. MNEs also have more 
flexibility in rationalising production through access to the products of affiliates and 
the marketing channels of parents. As a result, the subsidiaries are better able to 
reduce costs and gain access to export markets and this creates international intra-firm 
and intra-industry trade and resource relocation.
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FDI and IIT are linked because multinationals engage in international specialisation 
by establishing plants as specialist suppliers of components to affiliates. The 
specialisation of production activities across nations allows MNEs to overcome the 
problems of small-scale production and diversity of activities that would exist if the 
plants were producing for the domestic market alone. At the same time, subsidiaries 
owned by multinationals in host countries are more efficient and competitive than 
their domestic counterparts. Therefore, much of the host country’s international trade 
takes the form of intra-firm trade as MNEs trade products and components among 
themselves on a two-way basis. MNEs, through their ability to specialise 
internationally, create benefits by facilitating freer trade than would otherwise be 
available to the country in which the investment occurs. MNEs give their subsidiaries 
access to world markets which provides them with opportunities to specialise and 
increase production scales and exports (because of their relative competitiveness over 
the host country’s suppliers). They also give subsidiaries access to efficiently 
produced components and minor product lines that would otherwise have to be 
produced at a higher cost either by local suppliers or through internal production by 
the subsidiaries themselves. The flexibility to carry out rationalisation strategies 
creates two-way flows of products and components between affiliates. This results in 
a strong relationship between the number of MNEs in a country and the level of IIT. 
For host countries, the result of having high levels of FDI is increased cross-trade on 
an international basis as both exports and imports increase with rationalisation.
Some evidence from the literature is that IIT and direct foreign investment are related 
through intra-firm trade flows. As an illustration of this phenomenon, some estimates 
have put the level of intra-firm trade at 70 to 80 per cent of Canada’s total trade.
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These studies also indicate that about 80 per cent of the exports of Canadian 
subsidiaries go to affiliates, with over 80 per cent of them being materials and 
components meant for further processing by the receiving affiliates. A study by 
Bonturi and Fukasaku (1993) concludes that trade of the intra-industry type in 
manufactured goods among developed countries often takes the form of intra-firm 
trade. A well documented example of intra-industry, intra-firm trade is the U S- 
Canada-Mexico automobile trade, where cross-border trade of automotive parts and 
assembled cars within North America is conducted between parent firms and their 
affiliates.
Another example of such trade is trade in manufacturing among Asia Pacific 
economies, which has seen a rapid increase in intra-industry trade as a proportion of 
total trade over the last decade. This can be primarily attributed to the globalisation of 
corporate activities by US and Japanese firms and more recently by firms from Asian 
newly industralising economies (NIEs). This involves assembly production based on 
imported parts and components in different countries in East and Southeast Asia, and 
the establishment of these corporate networks has been associated with FDI by the 
United States, Japan and more recently, the Asian NIEs (Fukasaku 1992).
There are two aspects to be taken into account when considering the adjustment 
implications on the basis of the above discussion. The first point is that it is argued 
that much intra-industry trade is in parts and components rather than trade in final 
goods, which are horizontally or vertically differentiated. And this IIT through intra­
firm trade is partly due to the fact that subsidiaries owned by multinationals in the 
host country are more efficient and competitive than the host country’s counterparts.
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Therefore they are likely to be more competitive in the face of increased import 
competition (such as from trade liberalisation). However, as the traded components 
from subsidiaries and host country suppliers are produced in the same ‘industry’ and 
rely upon similar skills, transferring labour from contracting to expanding activities 
may be easier than otherwise. This phenomenon was noted by Adler (1970), in his 
study of specialisation patterns in the European steel industry. Furthermore, without 
FDI in the first place the host country’s counterparts would undertake more inter­
industry adjustment in the face of increased import competition.
A further point here is adapted from MacCharles (1987). He argues that under IIT, 
firms will undertake the costs of retraining labour as rationalisation takes place.5 But 
under inter-industry trade, considerable public assistance is required to retrain and 
relocate labour. As a result, resource relocation under IIT is quicker and smoother, 
thereby considerably reducing the costs of dislocation and unemployment and 
lessening the need for government assistance to smooth the transition process.
Factors gains from trade
Another important factor, as Krugman (1981) has shown, is that it is possible for all 
factors to gain from trade in an IIT setting, thus alleviating adjustment pressures.
5 Two facts form the basis for this view. Firstly, MNEs’ rationalisation will internalise retraining costs, 
as profit maximising firms can simply add retraining costs to total costs thereby reducing their taxable 
income. The second fact is that the reason MNEs expand their activities across nations in the first place 
is because they have an advantage in a package of knowledge including research and development 
(R&D). From that perspective, MNEs have a greater ability to internalise retraining costs than other 
firms.
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Krugman shows that under certain conditions, both factors can gain from trade. The 
distribution problems arising from trade will be less serious if this is the case.
To verify whether factors gain from trade, utility needs to be specified in a way which 
depends on the variables of the model. Individuals are supposed to receive a wage w 
and have the utility
U = l n ( £ c lj) '" ’ + ln(^C® J) '"  , 0 -< 6 -< 1
/= ! 7=1
(2 . 1)
where Cx. is consumption of the i\h product of industry 1; C2 . is consumption of the 
yth product of industry 2; and N x and N 2 are the numbers of potential products in 
each industry.6
It follows that individuals will then spend w / 2 on the products of each industry and 
divide their expenditure equally among the products within an industry. There are two 
kinds of welfare effects of trade. First, there is a distribution effect as factor prices are 
equalised. As can easily be verified, labour’s real wage remains the same in terms of 
the products of its own industry while rising or falling in terms of the other industry’s 
products, depending on whether the factor is abundant or scarce. The second effect 
comes from the increase in the size of the market, which makes a greater variety of 
products available. This increases everyone’s utility.
6 This utility function has several useful properties. First, it ensures that half o f income will always be 
spent on industry l ’s products. Second, if  the number of products in each industry is large, it implies 
that every producer faces a demand curve with elasticity l / ( l - 0 ) .  Finally, it explains the problem of 
gains and losses from trade in a particularly simple way.
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The result is that the abundant factor must be made better off as both effects work in 
its favour. For the utility of the scarce factor, it appears that when 0 -< 0.5, both factors 
gain from trade when products are sufficiently differentiated; if 6 >- 0.5, both factors 
gain from trade when countries have sufficiently similar factor endowments.
We have already seen that there tends to be a one-to-one relationship between 
similarity of factor endowments and intra-industry trade. Thus one can conclude that 
there is lower income distribution effect in an intra-industry trade setting than for 
inter-industry trade. Subsequently, this less troublesome income distribution effect 
will work to reduce the pressure of the adjustment process thereby smoothing the 
process of resource reallocation.
Test of adjustment costs
In existing studies, the adjustment implications are generally examined in the context 
of looking at the relationship between trade liberalisation and intra-industry trade. 
Basically they can be classified into five groups.
Case study approach
The adjustment implications under different trade patterns in this approach are 
examined by means of the changes in trade patterns following trade liberalisation.
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Adler (1970), in an study of adjustment within a specific sector following trade 
liberalisation, examines changes in steel production and trade across the original six 
members of the European Community following the creation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. This agreement created a free market for steel 
products within the European Community. As Adler notes, a prognosis of the effects 
of the agreement founded on the traditional Vinerian approach to customs union 
theory would suggest sectoral specialisation in accordance with comparative 
advantage in the member states. Fears of such inter-industry specialisation, with the 
German steel industry' dominating the entire market, created anxieties regarding 
possible adjustment problems, in particular on the part of the French and Italians.
What Adler demonstrates, however, is that at least by 1966, rather than inter-industry 
specialisation occurring, a substantial increase in intra-industry specialisation trade 
had taken place. Instead of one country dominating, as had been widely anticipated, 
specialisation in different steel products in different countries resulted in ten product 
lines examined, of which country specialisation was apparent in six.
Greenaway and Hine (1991) and Fukorora (1990) present a similar analysis of 
adjustment in the Japanese textile and clothing industry which followed trade 
expansion with a number of East Asian trade partners. The analysis demonstrates that, 
although significant changes have occurred in the industry, adjustment was relatively 
smooth. Fukorora offers evidence to support the thesis that this is largely attributable 
to the fact that the trade expansion was intra- rather than inter-industry trade in nature.
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Econometric analysis of the political economy of protection
Like the approach above, this approach examines the adjustment costs under inter- 
versus intra-industry trade by testing the relationship between intra-industry trade and 
tariff protection. A negative relationship between these two would imply lower 
adjustment costs associated with intra-industry trade and vice versa.
As Greenaway and Hine (1991) point out, adjustment pressures can give rise to 
political pressure for protection. This provides a further source of indirect evidence 
on adjustment costs: if adjustment costs are lower in sectors which are intensive in 
IIT, we would expect to see less pressure for protection and/or less resistance to 
liberalisation in those sectors. A number of analysts have investigated the relationship 
between protection (typically measured by tariffs) and IIT. Pagoulatos and Sorensen 
(1975), Lundberg and Gavelin (1986) and Ray (1987) all provide evidence which 
suggests that IIT and tariff protection are negatively correlated. Against this, a recent 
study of the United Kingdom by Greenaway and Milner (1990) provides mixed 
evidence. The results, however, are generally supportive of the view that recorded 
protection tends to be lower in IIT-intensive sectors.
7 Empirical evidence on this tendency has been provided by Cheh (1974). He examined inter-industry 
variation in reductions in norminal tariff and non-tariff rates negotiated by the United States at the 
Kennedy Round, and found that 50 per cent may be accounted for by variables that proxy labour 
adjustment costs. He concluded that trade policy, as manifest in the Kennedy Round reductions, aims to 
reduce short-run labor adjustment costs.
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The marginal intra-industry trade (MUT) approach
One group of papers uses marginal growth of IIT in total trade as the implicit measure 
of adjustment costs in the face of trade liberalisation. The basis of this approach is 
that following trade liberalisation, if there is a greater increase in the amount of intra­
industry trade, then lower adjustment costs are implied. The major difference between 
this approach and two approaches discussed above is the method used to measure 
intra-industry trade.
Milner (1988) discusses some of the weighting problems associated with the use of 
the standard Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index of IIT: the use of each industry’s gross trade 
in the denominator of the index means that the ranking of the industries according to 
the G -L index may be poorly correlated with one based on the absolute amounts of 
IIT in each industry. Trade resistance variables, such as trade barriers or transport 
costs, are more likely to affect the absolute amounts, rather than the shares of IIT (see 
Greenaway and Milner 1986; Kol 1988). The distinction between the share and 
amount of IIT becomes particularly relevant in the case of any empirical investigation 
into the adjustment implications of IIT. Given the initiatives to foster greater regional 
economic integration (for example in the EU and North America), the focus of 
research is increasingly on the effect of greater integration on intra-industry trade and 
specialisation at the margin. In turn, an increase in intra-industry trade or 
specialisation may involve different adjustment processes (employment and 
production changes) from those associated with increases in inter-industry trade and 
specialisation. For the purpose of empirical research into these results it would seem 
more appropriate to measure changes in the amount, rather than in the share, of IIT.
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From this perspective, in addition to using the Grubel-Lloyd index of IIT, Hamilton 
and Kniest (1991) employ a new index measuring the share of IIT in new trade flows. 
This new measure, the index of marginal intra-industry trade (MIIT), has been 
devised to overcome a conceptual problem encountered in comparing Grubel-Lloyd 
IIT indexes over different time periods. Then the relative adjustment costs are 
examined by assessing at the relationship between trade liberalisation and this new 
M IIT8
Following this work, Greenaway, Hine, Milner and Elliott (1994) demonstrate some 
potential limitations of the H-K MIIT index and illustrate the extent of the potential 
biases involved using United Kingdom trade data for the chemicals sector over the 
period 1979-85. Their work also suggests some alternative measures of marginal 
intra-industry trade, or specialisation, that may be used to investigate adjustment 
issues in trade expansion.
Brulhart (1994) argues that adjustment, being a dynamic phenomenon, is not directly 
related to the (‘static’) amount or proportion of matched two-way trade in one 
particular year. Neither is the absolute change in the ‘static’ levels of IIT between 
different periods in direct relation to the costs of adjustment due to increased trade. 
The nature of adjustment, in so far as it is affected by international trading patterns, 
directly depends on the structure of change in trade flows. In light of this idea, he
8 In their examination o f the impact of trade liberalisation following CER on the nature of trans-Tasman 
trade, they confirm that there is no support for the proposition that trade liberalisation encourages intra­
industry trade, by examining the MIIT indexes. A further study of structural adjustment and IIT 
provides some evidence, albeit not very strong, that trade liberalisation has induced more structural 
adjustment in industries characterised by inter-industry rather than intra-industry trade.
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points out that neither the H-K index nor the GHME measure provides any 
information on the structure of change in trading patterns. Therefore he proposes a 
‘Grubel-Lloyd style’ measure of MIIT. The main appeal of this index lies in the fact 
that it reveals the structure of the change in import and export flows, and at the same 
time it is defined in all cases and shares all the familiar statistical properties of the G - 
L index.
Menon (1996) takes this further. He finds that even Brulhart’s measure can 
overestimate the extent of MIIT and underestimate the extent of the adjustment cost. 
He asserts that his trade-weighted average of the percentage point contribution of 
dynamic intra-industry trade to the percentage growth in total trade in a sector 
overcomes this limitation.
)
CGE approach
Computable General Equilibrium techniques have been one of the most important 
empirical methods used to investigate the impact of policy shocks on trade flows. 
They have been also used by some economists to address the adjustment costs issue 
by means of comparing trade effects under perfect and imperfect competition 
assumptions.
Greenaway and Hine (1991) adapt a table from Richardson’s 1988 paper to 
summarise the work undertaken on imperfect competition and international trade. 
However, there are some difficulties in interpreting the information in the table. 
Harris (1984) and Cox and Harris (1985) carry out some studies on the theoretical
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structure and empirical implementation of general equilibrium evaluation of the 
impact of unilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation in Canada. These studies are 
primarily concerned with the implications for gains from trade. They also offer some 
comments on the adjustment issue.
In these studies, inter- and intra-industry adjustment is explicitly modelled, with intra­
sectoral adjustment dominating. For example Cox and Harris (1985) find that in both 
the unilateral and multilateral liberalisation scenarios, imports and exports expand in 
all sectors. Moreover, in both cases intra-sectoral resource reallocation dominates 
inter-sectoral reallocation. For example, in the multilateral liberalisation case only 6 
per cent of the labour force is reallocated intersectorally. This suggests to the authors 
that ‘the adjustment costs of adopting a free trade policy may not be large’ (p. 140). 
The simulations appear therefore to provide strong support for the view that 
adjustment to trade expansion may be smoother in an economy where a significant 
degree of intra-industry specialisation is evident.
However, in these studies it is also clear that trade expansion need not result in 
increased IIT between industrialised countries. It depends very much on market 
structure. Thus, in those cases where minimum efficient size is large relative to the 
total market, significant inter-industry adjustments can occur with large numbers of 
firms exiting sectors.
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Factor intensity approach
The above methods aim to draw out adjustment implications within a framework of 
analysing the relationship between trade liberalisation and intra-industry trade, so that 
the adjustment costs under different trade patterns are examined indirectly. A more 
direct method to examine the adjustment costs that has so far been devised is to 
calculate the factor similarities between and within industry groups.
One of the best known papers on intra-industry trade is Finger (1975). Finger purports 
to show that the variability in capital-labour ratios within SITC 3-digit ‘industries’ is 
greater than the variability of those ratios between 3-digit groups. Rayment (1976) 
offers similar evidence for the UK SIC. Lundberg and Hansson (1986) reinforce this 
result by pointing to product heterogeneity at the third digit of the Swedish Industrial 
Classification.
The question of similarity of factor requirements between and within industries as 
conventionally defined is of course an empirical issue. Evidence on this question was 
discussed in connection with the categorical aggregation problem. There is some 
evidence to suggest that variability in capital-labour ratios may be greater within than 
between industry groups, as proxied by the third digit of certain classifications (the 
SITC in the case of Rayment’s 1976 study); although some evidence to the contrary 
can also be cited (Lundberg and Hanssen 1986). The problem with this evidence is 
that capital-labour ratios can be computed in a variety of ways and any given measure 
can also be interpreted in various ways.
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An accurate and comprehensive measure of adjustment costs should in theory 
simultaneously incorporate the following two important features. First, any measure 
of adjustment costs should have dynamic characteristics, since adjustment is a 
dynamic process. Second, it should be a direct measure rather than one that merely 
draws implications from other relationships. The danger in this kind of analysis is not 
only that the results might be biased but they can also be totally misleading. The 
above-mentioned methods of measuring adjustment costs in existing studies are less 
satisfactory. For example, the MIIT measure captures the dynamic aspect to some 
extent, but it measures adjustment costs indirectly. The CGE model offers a labour 
reallocation index but it does not capture its dynamic nature. The other three measures 
have no dynamic features and do not measure the adjustment costs directly.
The comprehensive dynamic factor demand model derived by Epstein (1981) offers 
advantages both in respect of dealing with dynamic features and direct examination of 
resource reallocation. Based on the adjustment cost theory that firms suffer short-run 
output loss as they adjust their stocks of quasi-fixed inputs over time, the model 
provides imperfect adjustment of resources in response to changes in external 
conditions. However, this model is derived under the conventional assumption of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. It is therefore necessary to derive or 
make a justification for the use of a factor demand model incorporating imperfect 
competition and economies of scale for the study of adjustment costs.
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Conclusions
This chapter reviewed several strands in the literature with the aim of establishing a 
theoretical framework for the comparison of adjustment costs under different trade 
patterns, namely inter- vs intra-industry trade. There are four main results.
First, a specific-factor trade model can be used to examine the nature of adjustment. 
Trade liberalisation results in price changes in the affected markets, but if agents fail 
to respond quickly to these changes, or if any price change is resisted, an adjustment 
problem is said to exist. In theory an adjustment problem is a short- to medium-run 
phenomenon, depending on the nature of the market. Generally adjustment problems 
arise when there is some degree of factor specificity, and the resulting wage (price) 
inflexibility leads to sticky or incomplete adjustment. In turn, this inflexibility is 
generally attributable to differences in the input requirements of the expanding and 
contracting sectors. If factor ratios differ, for example between exportable and 
importable sectors, the relative price adjustments following any liberalisation shock 
are significant and, consequently, resistance to liberalisation is greater. Even where 
factor ratios are similar in terms of capital-labour requirements, adjustment friction 
can arise as a result of market segmentation. For example, the labour market is 
segmented occupationally and geographically. Often this leads to a mismatch between 
the ‘requirements’ of expanding sectors and the provisions of contracting sectors.
Secondly, the determinants of inter- and intra-industry trade have been distinguished. 
As an empirical phenomenon, inter-industry trade is defined as international trade 
among different industry categories, while intra-industry trade is defined as
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international trade within the same industry category. The reason inter-industry trade 
occurs is well explained by the conventional framework: under an assumption of 
perfect competition a country will specialise in and export goods whose production is 
intensive in factors with which the country is well endowed. In the case of intra­
industry trade, however, vertical intra-industry trade is explained under the 
conventional framework, but horizontal intra-industry trade is explained by similarity 
in consumers’ tastes on the demand side and similarity in factor endowments on the 
production side. Imperfect competition and economies of scale are also major 
determinants.
Thirdly, a comparison of adjustment costs between inter-industry trade and intra­
industry trade has been made according to the nature of adjustment, as analysed in 
section 2. First, since under the intra-industry pattern of trade, the market is less 
segmented both occupationally and geographically, the reallocation of resources is 
relatively easy. With price adjustment under the intra-industry trade pattern, the factor 
price gap before and after trade liberalisation is smaller than under the inter-industry 
trade pattern, so the adjustment response to price change will be quicker. Second, 
when intra-industry trade is closely related to FDI, rationalisation by multinational 
firms will internalise labour retraining costs, thereby smoothing the adjustment 
process. Furthermore, as argued, it is possible for both factors to gain from trade 
liberalisation under intra-industry trade. Consequently, it is easier for both parties to 
manage the adjustment.
Current empirical studies relating to adjustment costs were reviewed. They can be 
classified into five groups: the case study approach; the econometric approach; the
51
CGE approach; the factor intensity approach; and the MIIT approach. All these 
approaches are subject to one or both of the following limitations in measuring 
adjustment costs; lack of dynamic features and indirect measurement. The dynamic 
factor demand model, which is constructed under conventional assumptions is 
recognised as a more appropriate analytical framework to the empirical study of 
adjustment costs under different trade patterns, but only if its use under the condition 
of imperfect competition and economies of scale can be justified. The elaboration of 
the model is set out in the following chapter.
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3 Dynamic Adjustment Costs Model: An Analytical
Framework
Introduction
This chapter introduces the dynamic adjustment costs model, also known as the 
dynamic factor demand system.
As shown in Chapter 2, there are five main approaches in the literature to adjustment 
costs analysis under different trade patterns. They are the case study approach, the 
intensity approach, the CGE modelling approach, the political economy approach and 
the MIIT approach. Among them the case study, political economy and MUT 
approaches take basically the same line: adjustment costs are implicitly addressed 
through the relationship between trade liberalisation and intra-industry trade. The 
CGE modelling approach merely says that under imperfect competition, trade 
liberalisation gives rise to greater intra-industry resource allocation than would occur 
under perfect competition. The intensity approach examines the variations of factor 
intensities between and within industry groups. Each of these has two shortcomings. 
First, adjustment costs are not explicitly examined—only a few implications can be 
drawn from relationships between other variables. Secondly, factor adjustment is a 
dynamic process by nature, so an appropriate analysis must in some way incoporate 
this characteristic. With the exception of the MIIT approach, all the other approaches 
are essentially ‘static’.
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The adjustment cost approach is thought to be more appropriate because it allows for 
the imperfect adjustment of resources in response to changes to external forces. These 
slow-to-adjust factors are called quasi-fixed inputs. Their levels and rate of change are 
determined by exogenous factors. Quasi-fixed inputs are also choice variables which 
affect production in both the short and long run. Adjustment cost theory suggests that 
firms suffer short-run output loss as they adjust their stocks of quasi-fixed inputs over 
time.
Relative adjustment costs can be measured in this framework as the relative 
effectiveness in reallocating quasi-fixed factors when there is a change in external 
conditions, such as trade liberalisation. The adjustment coefficients of quasi-fixed 
factors can be provided as a measure of adustment speed (or the extent of inter- or 
intra-industry factor adjustment) while the eigen values of the adjustment matrix 
provide a check on the stability of the adjustment process of quasi-fixed factors.
After discussing the theory of adjustment costs in section 2 and the development of 
the adjustment costs model in section 3, in section 4 I present Epstein’s (1981) work 
on the establishment of a theory of duality between production and value functions for 
the adjustment costs model of the firm and the derivation of optimal solutions. Some 
justifications for applying this model under conditions of economies of scale and 
imperfect competition are discussed in section 5.
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Adjustment costs theory
Following Gravelle and Rees (1987), the theory of adjustment costs is simple in 
nature.
To demonstrate the nature of the problem, a two-input model is adopted here.
Suppose X, is a variable input: it can be varied at will by the firm. X 2 on the other 
hand takes time to vary (it is a quasi-fixed input). It is assumed to take one period to 
make available an increment of X2, for example the flow of services from a machine 
or some type of skilled labour. Hence, the firm can decide in the ‘present’ time period 
(period 0), to use any level of X, in production and is in a position to implement that 
decision. But a decision taken at the ‘present’ time period to increase the amount of 
X 2 by AX2 will result in that increment becoming available for use in production 
only in the next time period (period 1). X 2 is a constrained input into production in 
the present period. The amount of X2 used in production in the present period cannot 
be increased beyond the amount available at the start of this period. On the other 
hand, the firm may or may not be able to reduce the amount of X2 it uses in period 
0 . 1
The distinction between fixed and variable inputs has a crucial implication for the 
firm’s decision-making. The firm at the start of period 0 must make two types of 
decision. First, given the desired output level for period 0, it must choose an actual
1 For example, if the input is divisible, the firm will be able to use less than the maximum amount 
unless there is some contractual limitation. Since contracts usually stipulate the amount of an input to 
be paid for rather than the amount to be used, divisibility usually implies the possibility of using an 
input below capacity. For example, a firm may hire labour on a monthly contract, and be unable to 
increase or reduce the number of workers to whom it must pay a guaranteed weekly wage within that 
period, but it may if it chooses use less than the maximum possible number of man-hours.
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level of X, for period*0, given that maximum X 2 is fixed in production in period 0. 
Second, given the planned or desired output level for period 1, the firm must 
formulate a plan specifying the desired levels of X, and X2 to be used in period 1. If 
the desired amount of X 2 in period 1 in the plan differs from the level of X2 held by 
the firm at the start of period 0, the firm will change the amount of X 2, so that it is 
available at the start of period 1. Thus the choices implemented by the firm in period 
0 are on the variable input levels actually used in period 0, and the change on the 
fixed input available for the next period.
Firms are supposed to find their desired levels of X, and X2 to maximise production 
profit of producing the planned period 1 output. It is assumed that it was impossible 
to change X 2 within period 0 but that X, was freely variable. Adjustment costs, in 
general terms, are those costs which arise solely from a change in the level of use of 
an input. For example if a firm wishes to hire more labour, it may have to advertise 
for new workers. This advertising cost is an adjustment cost: it is incurred solely 
because the firm wishes to hire more labour. In general, firms must shop around, 
search, and collect information. Moreover, changes in input quantities have to be 
planned and organised. This absorbs resources and hence imposes adjustment costs.
If actual input levels differ from desired profit maximising levels, the firm will gain 
from changes in input levels. But these changes in themselves involve adjustment 
costs. Therefore, the firm needs to find an optimal rate of adjustment. Theoretically, 
this optimal rate of adjustment can be obtained by balancing the benefits (reduced 
production costs) against the adjustment costs of the changes. The firm will not in 
general adjust fully within the period because there are positive marginal costs of
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adjustment. Hence, in this situation, the adjustment cost in terms of opportunity cost 
from the firms’ point of view is one of output forgone.
The nature of the adjustment theory discussed above is that, in considering the costs 
arising from an adjustment process involving fixed factors to produce an output level 
which maximises long-run equilibrium profit, firms seek an optimal rate of 
adjustment for factors of production within a time period instead of adjusting fully. In 
other words, since there are costs associated with adjusting fixed factors in 
production, profit maximising firms will choose to adjust a fraction of fixed factors 
within a time period.
Development of adjustment costs model
The development of adjustment costs models is well reviewed by Epstein (1981), and 
is briefly summarised below.
Static profit maximisation
The large body of empirical studies of factor demand systems is based on the 
assumption of instantaneous adjustment by firms to prevailing prices. A factor 
demand system under this assumption can be derived from the theory of static profit 
maximisation. An exhaustive set of integrability conditions can be applied to guide 
the specification of functional forms and generate a meaningful hypothesis for testing.
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Empirical studies of this type can be found in Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau (1973), 
Berndt and Christensen (1973), Fuss and McFadden (1978).
Dynamic factor demand models
The first dynamic factor demand analysis is highly empirical in nature. Jorgenson 
(1965) appends an ad hoc lag structure to a theory of static profit maximisation to 
generate an investment demand function. Thereafter, Lucas (1967), Treadyway (1969; 
1971) and Mortensen (1973) provide a consistent dynamic theoretical framework for 
the determination of all inputs and outputs. Following from these studies, Schramm 
(1970), Nadiri and Rosen (1969) and Brechling (1975) develop econometric factor 
demand models by maintaining a flexible accelerator adjustment with constant 
adjustment coefficients.
There are some problems with econometric factor demand models. Adjustment costs 
theory implies that the flexible accelerator is generally optimal only locally in the 
neighbourhood of the steady state and the adjustment coefficients generally depend on 
exogenous variables (see Treadyway 1974). The studies mentioned above also fail to 
relate the hypothesised adjustment matrices to the specified technologies 
satisfactorily.
Berndt, Fuss and Waverman (1977) have estimated a model that is fully consistent 
with the adjustment cost theory. But there are three limitations to this approach. First, 
the approach is practical only when there is a single quasi-fixed factor in production, 
or at most two. Second, the flexible accelerator is the only adjustment mechanism that
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can be followed to generate testable hypotheses from this approach. Thirdly, they 
assume that firms expect current prices to persist indefinitely.
Epstein (1981) describes a practical procedure for generating a large class of 
functional forms for dynamic factor demand functions that can be used to test and 
apply the adjustment cost theory of the firm. The procedure developed in this 
approach is applicable to any number of quasi-fixed stocks and is capable of 
generating a richer class of dynamic adjustment mechanisms. However, the 
assumption of static expectations, common in the adjustment cost literature, is 
maintained.
The adjustment costs model
The theory of optimal adjustment of all factors of production provides a basis for the 
study of adjustment costs resulting from resource reallocation.
The basic assumption of the adjustment cost model is that at any point in time t -  0 
(or base period), a price-taking firm solves the following infinite horizon problem:
J (K 0, p, w, r) = max U0li0 ]e~"[F(L,  K , I ) - w T L -  p ’ K]dt (3.1)
0
subject to
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K  = I - S K ,  K(Q) = K0 >Q, (K(t ) ,p ,w ,) e 0 for all t
where F ( L , K , I ) is a production function giving the maximum amount of the scalar 
output y that can be produced from the perfectly variable factor L e Q m and the 
quasi-fixed factor K  e Q ", called capital stock or skilled labour, given that gross 
investment /  is taking place.
w e and p e £2" are the rental prices corresponding to L and K,  respectively, 
normalised with respect to the output price. The prices denote actual market prices at 
t -  0, which are expected to persist indefinitely. As the base period changes and new 
market prices are observed, the firm revises its expectations and its previous plans; 
thus only the t = 0 part of the plan corresponding to (3.1) is carried out in general.
r >- 0 is the real rate of discount, ö is a diagonal nXn  matrix made up of the 
depreciation rates 6i of the ith stock, i = 1, •••, n. K0 is the initial vector of capital 
stocks. The constraint I  > 0 is used to assume that investment is completely 
irreversible.
J  is the profit function for the specific intertemporal technology defined in (3.1). In 
other words, J  is the value of the problem (3.1), assuming that a solution exists.
0  e  Q 2',+m is a bounded and open set which will be taken below to be the domain of 
the value function J .
Many approaches can be followed to generate functional forms for factor demand 
functions in solving (3.1). Epstein establishes a duality between J  and F . This
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duality is local. A local duality suffices for empirical purposes since interest is 
generally centred on a neighbourhood of prices and quantities defined by the data.
There are some additional assumptions:
• The same real rate of discount is used by the firm in all base periods to discount 
future profits. Thus y is a constant and may be suppressed as an argument of J.
• The duality to be established is between functions F(L,  K,  / )  and J(K,  p, w ).
• The domain of definition of F  is restricted to a bounded open set 0c=n2"+m and 
this gives an implicit constraint in (3.1).
• Interior solutions, ( / ,  L) > 0, are assumed.
Some final notations:
<SKK)= {(L,I)\(L,K,I)<e <D), Q(K)~ {(p,w) \ (K,p,w)e  0}. Under this notation, 
for each K e. CT it is assumed that <t>(K) is empty if and only if Q(K) is empty.
K * (K0, p , w ) , L* (K0, p,w,)  and y * ( K 0, p , w ) are denoted as the optimal solutions 
in (3.1) at t = 0. They are also called policy functions (Arrow and Kurz 1970).
X * (K0, p, w) denotes the optimal current value shadow price at t = 0.
The following regularity conditions, valid throughout O, are imposed on the 
technology:
Condition T l: Fm aps O into Q 1; F , FL and F, are once continuously differentiable. 
Condition T2: FL, FK> 0, Ft < 0.
2 This is not restrictive if the empirical work is based on aggregate data.
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Condition T3: F is strongly concave in ( L , / ) .
Condition T4: For each (K0, p , w ) e  0 , a unique solution exists for (3.1), in the sense 
of the convergent integral; the policy functions K *, L* and y* are 
continuously differentiable on 0 .
Condition T5: A* (K , p , w ) is non-singular for each (K , p , w ) e  0 .
Condition T6: For each(L', K0, / ')  e O, there exists (K0, p ' , w') e  0  such that
(L \ / ')  is optimal in (3.1) at f = 0 given initial stock £ 0 and prices p \  
and w'.
Condition T7: For each (K0, p, w) e 0 ,  the problem (3.1) has a unique steady-state
capital stock K ( p , w ) e 0  that is globally stable, which means optimal 
paths converge to K ( p , w ) regardless of their starting point K0.
The specification of the above regularity conditions is for the purpose of empirical 
application.
T1—T3 are self-explanatory and fairly standard. T1 simply says that F  is a real­
valued function that assumes the value for those vectors (L, K , I ) that are 
technologically infeasible.
T2 asserts that the marginal product of variable factors and quasi-fixed factors are 
positive. F, < 0 reflects the adjustment costs associated with gross investment.
F  is strongly concave if the appropriate Hessian is negative definite throughout O. If 
O (/0  is not a convex set, F will be concave in (L,7) for each K  should be taken to
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mean that the appropriate Hessian is negative semi-definite throughout <b(K) for each 
K .
T4 asserts the existence of well-defined and differentiable solutions associated with 
(3.1).
The non-singularity of A* aims to reduce the considerable complexity in the
derivation. In fact non-singularity cannot be refuted empirically since it is a sufficient 
condition for the functional relationship X -  X * ( K , p , w )  to be locally invertible in p ,  
for given K  and w.
T6 ensures that there is one-to-one relationship between factor prices and 
corresponding factors. In fact points (L ' , K 0 , I ' ) ,  which violate T6, would never be 
observed empirically.
3T7 assumes the uniqueness and global stability of the steady state.
Suppose that F  satisfies Condition T and let J  be defined by (3.1). Then it is well 
known (Arrow and Kurz 1970: 33-35) that J  satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi equation3 4 
which takes the form
3 These have been investigated by Lau (1976).
4 This is described as - V t = max H  =  , where V  is the value function of the maximisation problem
V
and the function H  is known as the Hamiltonian.
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rJ(K,  p,w) = max(L I)e(t>(K){ F ( L , K , I ) - w T L - p x K+ J K(K,p,w)( I  — ÖK)}, 
(K , p , w ) e 0.
(3.2)
Moreover, the maximising values of L and I  when K - K Q are precisely the demands 
that are optimal in (3.1) at t = 0.
The significance of (3.2) in establishing the duality between J and F  is that static 
optimisation problems may be applied. The following problem, the ‘inverse’ of (3.2) 
will be important below:
F * ( L , K , I )  = min(p w)ee(K) {rJ(K,p,w) + wT L + p x K -  J K(k ,p,w)( I  -  SK), 
( K tp , w ) e  O.
Problem (3.3) can be interpreted as defining a production function F * given a 
function J  that satisfies appropriate regularity conditions. The properties (V) that 
characterise value functions J ( K , p , w ) are set out below.
Condition VI: J  is a real-valued, bounded-from-below function defined on 0 ;  J  and 
J K are twice continuously differentiable.
Condition V2: (I) (S + r ) J TK(K, p,w)+ p -  J KK{I (K, p,w) -  ÖK) > 0,
(II) J tk( K , p,w) > 0.
Condition V3: For each (K, p,w) e 0 , y > 0; for each K  such that &(K) is non­
empty, ( L{ K ,-,-), K, I ( K ,-,*)) maps S(K)  onto 0 ( ^ ) .
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Condition V4: The dynamic system K = 7 ( K , p , w ) - ö K ,  K(0) = K0, (K0,p,w)  e 0 ,  
defines a profile K{t ) such that (K( t ) , p , w) e  0  for all f and 
£ ( 0  — > K( p , w ) e  0 ,  a globally stable steady state.
Condition V5: J K is non-singular.
Condition V6: For (K , p  ,w') e 0 ,  the minimum in (3.3) is attained at (p',w') if 
(.I,L) = ( I ( K , p ' , w '), L { K , p \ w ')).
Condition V7: The matrix is non-singular for ( £ ,  /?, w) e 0 .
According to VI, J is real valued function; V2 (I) and (II) are dual to FK > 0 and 
F, < 0 , respectively. V3 is dual to F > 0 and T6. V6 is dual to T6. V4, V5 and V7 
roughly correspond to T7, T5 and T3, respectively.
The important condition V6 could have been expressed in the following equivalent 
manner: V6'— given (K,p'w') e  0  there exists ( /',L ')  e ®(K)  such that (p' ,w') is 
optimal in (3.3) given (L' , K ', / ' ) .  Alternatively, V6 may be viewed as requiring that 
the first order conditions be sufficient for a global (over S(K) )  minimum in (3.3), 
which is clearly a curvature restriction of sorts.
Following from that, Theorem 1 is therefore delivered. It establishes a duality 
between production and value functions.
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Theorem 1: (a) Let F  satisfy conditions (T) and define J  by (3.1). Then J  satisfies
conditions (V). If further J is used to define F  * by (3.3), then 
F * = F .
(b) Let J  satisfy conditions (V) and define F  by (3.3). Then F 
satisfies conditions (T). If further F  is used to define J  * by (3.1), then 
J * = J .
Proof of Theorem 1.
(a) Let F  satisfy (T) and show that J  defined by (3.1) satisfy (V).
There are a number of conditions in VI. Firstly, J  is well defined on 0  by T4 as T4 
ensures the existence of well-defined solutions for (3.1). Secondly, the boundedness 
of F  in O and (K0, p , w ) in © implies that J  is bounded below over 0 .  Thirdly, it is 
well known that J K( K, p , w ) = X*(K,  p,w),  the unique and twice continuously 
differentiable shadow price. Therefore, J K has the required differentiability. Since 77 
gives the differentiability of F  and T4 gives the differentiability of K, L and y, if we 
apply the envelope theorem to equation (3.3), the required differentiability of J  is 
established.
V2 (I) follows from T2 and the envelope theorem is applied to (3.2). For V2 (II), if 
J K < 0 at some (K, p , w ), then the maximum in (3.2) would not be attained over 
I  > 0, contradicting T4. V3 is implied by F > 0 and T6. T4 and T7 yield V4. V5 is 
simply a restatement of T5.
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Let (K,p ' ,w ') g 0  and according to T6, I *(K,p' ,w')  = K*(K,p' ,xv') + SK and 
L* (K, p ,w') are optimal in solving (3.2), given (p,w) = (p' ,w').  By the inverse 
nature of problems (3.2) and (3.3), it follows that (/?',w ') is optimal in (3.3) given 
(I ,L)  = (I * (K, p',w'), L* (K, p , w')). But the first order conditions for an 
optimum in (3.3) yield precisely that /*  = 7 and L*= L evaluated at (K,p'  ,w'). 
Henceforth there is no need to distinguish between (7*,L*) and (7 ,7 ) .  Similarly, 
y = rJ + wT L + p T K -  J K(T - SK) = y *, where the equality follows from (3.3).
V7 can be proved as follows: 7  and 7 (or equivalently L * and I  *) satisfy
F [ ( L , K , I )  = w, Fit( L , K J )  = - X * ( K , P,w) (3.4)
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to differentiate (3.4) with respect to L and 1, 
respectively, yields the following relationships:
A is non-singular from the strong concavity of F in L and I , and C is non-singular 
from the non-singularity of A*/;, therefore the matrix B is non-singular.
Now use J to define F * by (3.3). It must be shown that F = F * over their common 
domain. By V3, it is enough to prove that F = F * for all arguments of the form
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(L*(K,p , xv ) ,K, I  *(K,p,w)) ,  (K,p,w)  e 0 .  As in the proof above that J  satisfies 
V6, so that
F*( L*( K, p , w) , K , I * ( K, p , w) )  = rJ(K,p,w)  + wr L*( K, p , w)  + p zK - J K( I * ( K , p , w ) -
SK) = y * ( K , p , w)  = F( L*(K,  p, w), K , I * ( K , p ,  w)).
(b) Let J  satisfy (V), define F by (3.3) and show that F  satisfies (T).
F is firstly well defined by V6 and V3. The required differentiability of F  and T2 
can be verified by the Implicit Function Theorem. From the above, the functions p * 
and w * satisfying
(p,w) = (p*  (L,K, I ) ,  w*  (L, K, /)) iff ( L, / )  = (L(K,  p, w), I ( K , p ,  w)) (3.6)
are (locally) well defined and continuously differentiable. By V6 the minimum in
(3.3) is attained at (p*  (L ,K, I ) ,w*  ( L , K , I ) ) . The once continuous differentiability 
of F  now follows directly from (3.3). Apply (3.5), V2 and the envelope theorem to
(3.3) to obtain
F tk ( L , K, I )  = (r + S ) J rK(K, p*, w*) + p * - J  KK ( /  -  8K) > 0,
F z {L,K, I )  -  - J tk( K , p*,w*) < 0, (3.6)
F [ ( L , K , I )  = w*> 0.
(3.6) and the differentiability of J K and (/?*, w*) yields the continuous 
differentiability of F, and FL.
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where K -  1 -ÖK for any feasible path K(t) and J is bounded below on 0 .
The above formula shows that J(K0, p',w') is bounded above the value of any 
feasible program. This result is attained (uniquely) by the particular program defined 
by setting (L, /)  = ( L( p ', w' ) , / ( £ , /? ',  w')). Therefore, the original inequalities 
become equalities. And further it can be shown that
JoV ( I ,  K, I ) -  w'r L -  p"  Kje-"dt = J(K0, p ' ,w’) -  e' '7 J(K(T), p~, tv')
where K(t) denotes the profile defined by K  = 7 (K ,p ' , w ')~  ÖK, K(0) = K0. By the 
stability of the steady state (V4),
K(T) -> K ( p \ W )  as T —> oo.
Therefore e~rT J{K{T),p'W)  -> 0
and j ~ [ F ( L , K j ) - w "L -  p"  K]e-"dt =
J defines the value of programs corresponding to F . And A* = J K, K *= T -Ö K , 
L*= L and y* = y . The required differentiability of A* and the policy functions 
follow from (3.3) and the differentiability of J (VI).
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where K = I - S K  for any feasible path K(t ) and J  is bounded below on 0 .
The above formula shows that J ( K0, p , w') is bounded above the value of any 
feasible program. This result is attained (uniquely) by the particular program defined 
by setting (L,7) = (L(K,  p' ,w'), I  {K, p' ,w ')). Therefore, the original inequalities 
become equalities. And further it can be shown that
\ To [ F ( L , K j ) - w ” L - p a K]e-rldt = J (K0, p ' , w ' ) - e - ,TJ ( K( T ) , p \ w ' )
where K( t ) denotes the profile defined by K  = 1 (K, p ' , w ') -  6K, K(0) = K0. By the 
stability of the steady state (V4),
K(T)  -> K { p \ W )  as 7 -> oo .
Therefore e~rT J{K{T) ,p 'W)  -> 0
and 4"[F(L , K , I ) -  w" L - p” K]e~ndt =Jw').
J defines the value of programs corresponding to F . And A* = J K, k *  = 7 - 6 K ,  
L*= L and y* = y . The required differentiability of A* and the policy functions 
follow from (3.3) and the differentiability of J  (VI).
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T5 restates V5. ForT6, let { L , K 0,F)  e  O and let {p ,w' )  g O(K0) be optimal in 
(3.3). That this price vector makes (L ', / ')  optimal in (3.1) at t = 0 was shown in the 
proof of T4. T7 restates V4.
Now use F to define J * via (1). It was shown above in the above proof of T4 that
/*  = J.
Theorem 2: Let F satisfy (T) and let J be the dual value function. The policy
functions are given by k*  = T - S K ,  L*= L and y* = y .
Theorem 2 is the analogue of Hotelling’s Lemma. It is proved in the context of 
proving Theorem 1, mainly through the proof of the duality between V6 and T6. 
Therefore, if we apply the first order conditions for an optimum in (3.3), the following 
formulas which will be shown to describe optimal behaviour in (3.1) will be 
generated:
1 (K, p,w) = J ; i  (K, p, w)(rj; + K) + 5K,
L(K,p,w) = - rJ l (K, p ,w)  + J wK(T-8K) ,
(3.8)
y(K,p,w)  = rJ + w'  L - p ’ K -  J K( I - 8 K )
= r [ J - J „ w - J pp } - [ J K- w xJ„K- p xJ pK}( i -8K) .
The above development shows that if the production technology F is well specified by 
conditions (T), the value function J  will be characterised by conditions (V). Further, 
the value function J can be used to define F and vice versa. Thereafter, the factor
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demand and output'supply which describes the behaviour optimal to (3.1) can be 
generated.
Adjustment costs model under imperfect competition and scale economies5
A theory of duality between the production and value function has been established 
above for the adjustment cost model of the firm. In the context of proving this, an 
analogue of Hotelling’s Lemma was proved. In doing so, some formulas which 
describe optimal behaviour in (3.1) were derived. But it should be noted that the 
assumption maintained here is that firms are price takers. Under standard economic 
theory, firms are price takers only when economies are in a state of perfect 
competition. Now the question is whether the use of this model can be justified when 
there are scale economies and imperfect competition.6
Before answering the above question, let us look at the types of economy of scale and 
the types of competition that are relevant.7
There are generally two types of economy of scale: those internal to the firm and 
those external to the firm but internal to the industry.
5 It is not inconsistent with Epstein’s model in incorporating economies of scale. The key assumption 
in Epstein’s model is that of price-taking.
6 It is surprising that in existing studies this problem has never been explained or investigated. Some 
empirical studies apply this framework to a highly aggregated industry analysis. For example, Epstein 
and Denny (1979) applied a similar model to the aggregate US manufacturing sector.
7 These theories are well established. Discussion in this section is drawn from Gravelle and Rees 
(1987), Helpman (1984) and Maddala and Miller (1989).
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Economies of scale or diseconomies of scale which are internal to the firm can be 
represented by a firm’s production function of the form x = F(v),where v is a vector 
of factor inputs and x  is output.
Assume A is a scalar, then if AF(v) > F(Av), we say there are increasing returns to 
scale or economies of scale; if AF(v) = F( Av), there are constant returns to scale; 
when AF(v) < F(Av), there are diminishing returns to scale or diseconomies of scale.
Economies or diseconomies of scale which are external to the firm but internal to the 
industry are usually represented by a production function in the form x = F(v; X ), 
where x is the output level of the single firm, v is its vector of inputs and X  is 
industrial output. The production function is assumed to be quasi-concave and 
positively linear homogeous in v . This means that from the point of view of a single 
firm which considers the industry’s output level as invariant to its decisions, the 
production process exhibits constant returns to scale. Explanations of external 
economies of scale which are external to the firm but internal to the industry rest on 
the argument that a larger industry is better placed to take advantage of within- 
industry specialisation, as well as conglomeration, indivisibilities and public 
intermediate inputs.
Broadly speaking, there are three types of assumption about firms’ behaviour. The 
first behavioural assumption is that firms behave in a purely competitive fashion. That 
is, firms take prices of inputs and output as given, and choose the input-output 
combination that maximises profits. As a result, firms end up with marginal cost 
pricing. This pricing procedure is viable if the resulting profits are non-negative,
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which means that perceived marginal costs exceed perceived average costs— there are 
no economies of scale.
The second behavioural assumption that has been employed is that of price 
competition, associated with the name of Bertrand. Under this assumption a firm 
takes the prices charged by its competitors as given and chooses a price for its product 
so as to maximise profits.
The third assumption in this broad categorisation of firms behaviour is that of 
quantity competition, associated with the name of Cournot. Under this assumption, a 
firm takes the quantities of the sale by its competitors as given. In other words, it 
assumes that changes in its own sales will not affect the sales of its competitors. It 
then calculates the response of the price to changes in its sales and it chooses a profit- 
maximising level of sales.
If the process of production is characterised by global economies of scale, the 
competitive assumption is inappropriate. But when the economies (or diseconomies) 
of scale are external to the firm but internal to the industry, the single firm operates 
under perceived constant returns to scale. Firms are still price takers.
If the economies of scale are internal to the firm, then the competitive assumption no 
longer holds. Oligopolistic competition in the form of the Cournot or Bertrand model 
will result. Oligopoly is characterised by a small number of sellers who are well aware 
of their interdependence. The product can be homogeous or differentiated. In this 
context Bertrand price competition is examined in more detail.
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Assume that there is free access to technology, free entry (and exit) into the industry, 
and price competition. If an entering firm conjectures that by charging the market 
price it can get any market share it desires, that by charging a higher price it will get 
zero market share, and by charging a lower price it will capture the entire market, then 
in the resulting equilibrium there will be a single firm in the industry and it will 
charge the possible lowest price. The Bertrand model is based on the assumption that 
each firm believes that its competitor will maintain its current price. Firms therefore 
successively undercut each other’s price until a competitive outcome is reached. A 
practical way to think about the Bertrand model is as a model of competitive bidding. 
Each firm submits a sealed bid stating the price at which it will serve all customers; 
the bids are opened and the lowest bidder gets the customers. Once the bidder is 
aware of the bids, the next step for this firm is simply to sell or produce the amount at 
which its profit is maximised at this bidding price. In this regard, the firm can be 
loosely regarded as a ‘price taker’.
If there are decreasing returns to scale, free entry and free access to the technology 
lead to an infinite number of firms which operate at an infinitesimal level. The 
industry’s implicit production function exhibits constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition will prevail.
An extreme form of the case arises when the market for a commodity is supplied by a 
single monopolist. A firm with monopoly power, which faces a downward sloping 
demand curve, maximises profits by equating marginal costs to marginal revenue. The 
structure of the marginal revenue function depends on the nature of demand.
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Nonetheless, at the equilibrium, the monopolist is a ‘price maker’ rather than a price 
taker.
Monopolistic competition is characterised by a large number of firms producing 
differentiated products. The firms behave independently, and non-price competition is 
prevalent under the condition that there are no barriers to entry or exit.
In summary, in the presence of economies of scale and imperfect competition, the use 
of the adjustment costs model can still be justified with respect to the price-taking 
assumption of firms. If the economies of scale are external to the firm but internal to 
the industry, firms are still price takers. When the economies of scale are internal to 
firms, but they are assumed to follow price competition, the price taking assumption 
can be loosely maintained.
Conclusion
The existing studies of adjustment costs under different trade patterns are constrained 
by one or both of the following shortcomings: indirect measurement and lack of 
dynamic characteristics. Thus, a dynamic adjustment costs model is necessary to the 
present analysis.
Based on earlier development of the adjusment costs model, Epstein (1981) has 
shown that by applying the familiar principles of duality and the envelope theorem to
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the value function, ofne can generate optimal solutions to quasi-fixed input and 
variable input and output supply.
As the whole story of Epstein’s dynamic adjustment costs model is based on the 
price-taking assumption of firms, it is necessary to discuss the justification for the use 
of this model under economies of scale and imperfect competition. The result 
emerges is that when economies of scale are external to firms and internal to the 
industry, the price-taking assumption of firms is maintained. When economies of 
scale are internal to firms, only when firms follow price competition, can the ‘price- 
taking’ assumption be loosely attained. As discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical 
explanation of inter-industry trade is based on the conventional framework of perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale. But horizontal intra-industry trade involves 
product differentiation, economies of scale and monoplistic competition and 
oligopolistic behaviour, while vertical intra-industry trade is still explained under 
conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. This justification is 
very significant for the empirical analysis that follows.
This model provides the theoretical foundation of the empirical analysis that follows. 
As will be shown in the next chapter, this model not only can account for the 
relationship among multiple outputs, inputs, and exogenous shifters, but also allows 
for the imperfect adjustment of resources in response to changes in external forces. In 
Chapter 4, this model is applied to an empirical analysis of the costs of resource 
adjustment under different trade patterns.
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4 Factor Adjustment and Intra-industry Trade: An
Application of the Adjustment Costs Model
Introduction
There are theoretical reasons for believing that the adjustment costs associated with 
factor adjustments under intra-industry trade are lower than those under inter-industry 
trade. This idea is initially supported by a specific-factor model analysis. Where there 
are specific factors of production, the relative adjustment of labour depends on how 
the market is occupationally and geographically segmented (or concentrated). The 
nature of the determinants of intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade suggests that 
under intra-industry trade specialisation, firms within an industry are likely to be more 
geographically concentrated and the labour in that industry is likely to be less 
occupationally segmented. An implication is that intra-industry trade specialisation 
will be associated with lower factor adjustment costs as trade patterns change since 
much of the adjustment takes place within each industry.
Yet there is no comprehensive empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that 
factor adjustment under intra-industry trade specialisation predominantly occurs 
within industries rather than between industries. The aim of this chapter therefore, is 
to test this hypothesis using a dynamic factor demand system.
78
Functional forms of adjustment cost models
The theoretical basis for an adjustment costs model was introduced in Chapter 3. In 
order to test the core hypothesis in the thesis using this adjustment costs model, the 
form of the value function must be specified. Before doing this, the model of 
adjustment costs is summarised briefly.
Theoretical model
When facing adjustment problems with a set of quasi-fixed inputs (K), firms are 
assumed to select an optimal level of variable inputs (L), and an investment rate (/), 
for their quasi-fixed inputs. They make these choices to maximise the value (V) of 
their production over an infinite time domain (t), given output prices (p), variable 
input prices (w) and rental prices (q) of quasi-fixed inputs.
This maximisation problem can be written as
V(p,w,q ,K)  = Max(Y LI) e r,[ p ' Y - W L - q ' K ] d t  (4.1)
s.t.:
K = I - 5 K ,
K(0) = K0 > 0, and 
Y = f  (K, L, I )
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where r is the discount rate, K is the net investment in quasi-fixed inputs, K{0) = K0 
is the stock of investment at the base year, and 6 is a diagonal matrix with positive 
depreciation rates on the diagonal investment stocks. Earnings are measured as the 
difference between sales revenue and the costs of purchasing variable inputs and 
renting quasi-fixed inputs. The function /( • )  is a multi-product production function, 
twice continuously differentiable, which satisfies /(• )  > 0, f K(•) > 0, and f ,  (•) < 0 if 
/  > 0, f j  (•) > 0 if 7 < 0, and is strictly concave in K  and I  (Epstein 1981). The 
relationship f , <  0 reflects the adjustment costs associated with gross investment I , 
and is measured in terms of foregone output.
Given the regularity conditions on /(• )  and static price expectations, the value 
function in Equation (4.1) satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi equation:
rV(p,w,q,  K, l) = Max,[n * (p,w,q,  K, I )  — q' K + V' K (p,w,q,  K)(I  -  SK)\ (4.2)
where n * is variable profit and represents the optimum solution for profit 
maximisation in the short run, and Vk represents a vector of shadow prices associated 
with quasi-fixed stocks. Equation (4.2) indicates that producers can increase their 
earnings by accumulating net profit from production and by new investment in the 
quasi-fixed inputs with a marginal value of VK. By the duality relationship which 
exists between V and n  *, the value function V is expected to satisfy the following 
properties: V and VK are twice continuously differentiable; V is homogeneous of 
degree zero in prices, non-decreasing in p , and K,  non-increasing in w  and q , 
convex in prices (p,  w,  and q ), and concave in inputs (L and K ).
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By applying duality principles summarised in Chapter 3 and the envelope theorem to 
(4.2), the following equations can be generated:
K* = V-'(rVq +K)
L* = -rV w+Vkwk  (4.3)
Y* = rVp - V kpK
where the lower case subscripts are used to designate derivatives.
These equations indicate that the optimal solutions for the quasi-fixed inputs, variable 
inputs and output supply are functions of p, w, q and K.
The above system provides a useful representation of the determination of quasi-fixed 
input demand. In this study, the theory of optimal adjustment of all factors of 
production provides a basis for the study of adjustment costs resulting from resource 
relocation.
Empirical model
For the purpose of the empirical estimation of the dynamic factor demand response 
system of equation (4.3) above, an explicit functional form of the value function V(.) 
must be specified. Epstein (1981) proposed a number of functional forms for the 
value function which are useful in empirical studies. One of them, the normalised 
quadratic value function, has been used frequently in empirical work (Vasavada and
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Chambers 1986; Vasavada and Ball 1988; Huang, Rosegrant and Rozelle 1995). 
Following Huang et al., the specification that is used in this study is as follows:
The form of the value function can be expressed as
1
V(p,w,q,K) = a0+[ax,a2,a3,a^][p,w,q,K]'+-[p w q K ]
A F' G' H' MF B L N' r
G L C R~1'1 <i 1
H N R~x D U J
(4.4)
where, V, p , w, q, and K, are as defined in the theoretical model, and aG, - - ,a 5 and 
A,F,G, H,B, L ,N ,C ,R ,D  are parameter matrices with the appropriate dimensions.
Following the steps outlined in the theoretical model derivation, the empirical 
formulation of the dynamic factor demand equations (corresponding to the optimal 
solutions in equation (4.3)) has the following form:
Kt = rRa3 + (rU + R)Kt_, + rRGpt_x + rRLwt + rRCqt + ent
Lt = - ra 2 -  rF' pt_x -  rBwt -  rLq t -  N' Kt * +e3t (4.5)
where K* = rKt_x -  K and U is an identity matrix. All matrices and vectors have the 
appropriate dimensions.
In this study, each industry employs two primary factors—capital and labour— and 
both are treated as quasi-fixed inputs as a fraction of labour is skilled. Therefore only
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the first equation of the above factor demand system is required for empirical 
analysis.
Measuring intra-industry trade
There are two major issues in empirical studies involving intra-industry trade: 
defining an industry and measuring the extent of intra-industry trade within such 
industries.
Two main criteria have been used to define an industry. Two different products are 
the output of a single industry either if it is relatively easy to substitute one for the 
other in the production process or if consumers put them to essentially the same use. 
The choice between these two criteria depends on the use to which the data generated 
by the criteria is put.
Economists studying intra-industry trade often use data from published statistics on 
trade in various recognised ‘categories’. The most commonly used classification is 
the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). There are 10 sections at the 1- 
digit level, 63 2-digit groups, and so on.
The level of IIT depends crucially on the level of aggregation. If IIT is measured at a 
very detailed classification, there might be very little intra-industry trade. On the 
other hand, if IIT is measured at very high level of aggregation, much trade will be 
intra-industry trade. Such problems have led some economists such as Finger (1975)
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to suggest that intra-industry trade is merely a ‘statistical artefact’. Although 
relatively little effort has been devoted to measurement problems, they are of 
absolutely vital significance to the entire subject. The standard documentary work 
often reports IIT at the 3-digit level of aggregation. Efforts have been made to find a 
more constructive way to take some account of the bias due to the aggregation level 
or even to establish a more appropriate trade classification.
The first measure of the extent of intra-industry trade was proposed by Balassa in 
1966. The most widely used measure is the Grubel-Lloyd index, which is a simple 
modification of the Balassa measure. The problem with the Grubel-Lloyd index is 
associated with biases created by trade imbalances at the multilateral level (Grubel 
and Lloyd 1975). Some economists have attempted to correct this, but a widely 
acceptable method of correction has yet to be found. As argued by Helpman (1987), 
attempts to modify the Grubel-Lloyd index to correct for trade imbalance bias are 
inappropriate since the nature of the bias is not known. In particular, we do not know 
whether the imbalance is caused by homogeneous or differentiated products and 
whether the trade structure is in equilibrium or not. This explains why in general, 
bilateral IIT is more interesting than overall IIT.1
Following Grubel and Lloyd (1975), the individual industry IIT index between 
countries i and j  for product k in year t is given by
1 There are, of course, many methodological questions which have been raised in the literature about 
calculation of intra-industry trade indexes. Fontagn and Freudenberg (1997) etc, for example, provide 
an excellent review of the aggregation issue in their work on European trade.
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(4 .6)nr,j.=l i - I Xijjt M ijk I
y.it +  ^i/,Jt
-]*100
X and M are exports and imports of product k in year t between two countries 
respectively.
The aggregate IIT index is calculated as
/ n j = [  i - k ___________
KVm+K*)
k
]*100 (4 .7)
This is a weighted average of the individual industry indices, where the weights are 
the share of the industry in total trade.
Factor adjustment in various industries
Before testing the central hypothesis relating factor adjustment and IIT across 
industries, as foreshadowed in the first section, it is necessary to derive factor 
adjustment for various industries by applying the adjustment costs model.
Justification fo r the use o f the adjustment costs model
An industry’s output can be produced under either constant returns to scale or 
economies of scale, and firms may form prices under perfect competition,
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monopolistic competition or oligopolistic behaviour. Firms may engage in trade in 
either inter- or intra-industry trade. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to 
discuss the justification for the use of the adjustment costs model first.
Whether the use of the adjustment costs model can be justified depends on whether 
the price-taking assumption, which is the key assumption of the adjustment costs 
model, can be attained. As discussed in Chapter 3, the assumption that firms are price 
takers holds not only under perfect competition but also under conditions with 
economies of scale and imperfect competition. When economies of scale are external 
to firms and internal to the industry, the price-taking assumption of firms is 
maintained. When economies of scale are internal to firms, only when firms follow 
price competition can the price-taking assumption be loosely maintained.
Inter-industry trade is explained in theory under a framework of constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition, and vertical intra-industry trade has essentially the 
same implication. Firms pricing under these circumstances are simply acting as price- 
takers.
For horizontal intra-industry trade, economies of scale, monopolistic competition and 
oligopolistic behaviour explain why trade takes place. In the presence of economies of 
scale and oligopolistic behaviour of firms, these explanations of horizontal IIT lie in 
their incorporation of two assumptions: (a) that there exist sectors with product 
differentiation and there exists in every country a demand for a wide spectrum of 
varieties; and (b) that each variety of a differentiated product is produced with internal 
economies of scale. Two assumptions have been used to model the demand for
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varieties. One approach, based on Dixit and Stigliz (1977), assumes that a 
representative consumer likes to consume a large number of varieties. An alternative 
approach, taken by Lancaster (1979), assumes that a consumer prefers a product 
whose characteristics are close to his or her ideal. In both cases it is assumed that 
firms engage in price competition. Thus the price-taking assumption is also attained 
under these circumstances.
Theoretically, horizontal intra-industry trade can also take place under the condition 
of monopolistic competition. According to Maddala and Miller (1989), the 
monopolistic competition model was received very enthusiastically in the 1930s, but 
later attracted much criticism. One criticism concerns problems associated with the 
product differentiation assumption. Downward-sloping demand curves are derived 
from the assumption of product heterogeneity. This is inconsistent with the 
assumption that either cost curves or demand conditions are the same for all firms. 
Long-run equilibrium in which firms earn normal profit is logically incompatible with 
this assumption. If a firm is providing a unique product and making super-normal 
profits as a consequence, other firms can erode these profits simply by providing the 
same product, rather than some differentiated product.
Another problem created by the introduction of product heterogeneity is that it is 
difficult to define an industry or ‘competing group’. For example, tea, coffee, soft 
drinks, beer, wine and liquor could form a chain of competing products. Under 
models of perfect competition or monopoly, these would be considered as different 
homogeneous products. Under monopolistic competition, it is not clear where to draw 
the line.
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Finally, differentiated products are not necessarily produced by different firms. For 
instance, the fact that there are different brands of soaps and detergents does not mean 
that the market is monopolistically competitive. Different brands may be produced by 
a single firm, which has more than half of the market in soaps and detergents. This 
represents an oligopoly of multi-product firms.
Nevertheless, on the one hand we have observed that monopolies rarely exist in 
reality; on the other hand, there is no firm support for monopolistic competition in 
theory. Thus it is reasonable to rule out the case that horizontal intra-industry trade 
takes place under monopolistic competition.
Thus, firms’ pricing behaviour is limited to either perfect competition or price 
competition for both inter- and intra-industry trade specialisations, making the price­
taking assumption of the adjustment costs model justified.
Further, intra-industry trade is a fraction of an industry’s total trade and a large 
proportion may be vertical intra-industry trade. This fact may add more weight 
statistically to the justification of the use of the adjustment costs model under the 
condition that firms engage in both inter- and intra-industry trade.
2 A recent study by Greenaway, Hine and Milner (1994) reveals that, on average, more than two-thirds 
of the United Kingdom’s total trade is in the form of vertical intra-industry trade.
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Test equations
To facilitate testing of the adjustment costs hypothesis, the quasi-fixed input 
equations are linearised. For a two-factor system, the linearised first equation of (4.5) 
can be written as follows:
K =  a 0 + a xKt_x + a 2Lt_x + a 3 p t_x + a 4xvt + a 5rt + e x
/v (4.0,
Lt = ßo + ß \ Kt-\ + ß l Lt-\ + ßlPt-l + ß*Wt + ß5r, + £ 2
in which, Kt and Lt represent the change of capital and labour employment levels in 
the current time period, respectively; Kt_x and Lt_x are the capital and labour 
employment levels in the previous time period; p t_x is the output price in the previous 
time period; w, and rt are the current wage rate and rental price for labour and capital, 
respectively.
M =
a x a : 
ßi ß:
is called an adjustment matrix. The direction and magnitude of the 
particular factor adjustment can be obtained from the sign and value of a x and ß 2.
The dynamic nature of the model here is reflected as the changes of current labour or 
capital employment levels depending on labour and capital employment levels in the 
previous period.
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Data
As shown in the above test equation of quasi-fixed input demand, the data needed in 
this study are time-series data for total employed persons, the value of capital stock, 
output prices, wage rates and returns to capital. These data are available only from the 
OECD’s International Sectoral Database at a subdivision level of manufacturing 
industry, classified according to International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 
as shown in Table 4.1. Only three economies—the United States, Canada and 
Germany—have the information necessary to construct the above measures.
Table 4.1 Industry classification code for ISIC manufacturing
ISIC code description
3 Manufacturing
31 Food, beverages and tobacco
32 Textiles
33 Wood and products
34 Paper, printing and publishing
35 Chemicals
36 Non-metallic minerals products
37 Basic metal products
38 Machinery and equipment
39 Other manufactured products
Source: United Nations of Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in International Economics 
DataBank, Australian National University.
Output price indices are obtained as a GDP deflator at 1985 prices for each industry. 
Gross domestic product is expressed in market prices, except for Canada, where it is 
given at factor cost.
The value of capital stock available in this database is gross capital stock in 1985 
prices and measured in US dollars. The return to capital is derived as the ratio of 
gross operating surplus to gross capital stock. The level of labour employment is
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measured as the number of employees. The wage rate is first calculated as the value of 
compensation of employees at current prices divided by the number of employees, 
then converted to a wage rate index in 1985 prices.
Figure 4.1 Changes in labour and capital over time
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Source: The International Sectoral Database, 1993 at Statistics Directorate, OECD.
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All the above data are available from 1970 to 1989 for Canada, from 1960 to 1987 for 
the United States, and from 1970 to 1990 for Germany.
Figure 4.1 shows changes in the level of labour and capital over time for total 
manufacturing for Canada, Germany and the United States. For all these economies, 
changes in the level of employment of labour fluctuate markedly, with increasing 
trends for Canada and the United States, and a decreasing trend for Germany. The 
changes in the level of capital all increase over time but fluctuate less than labour. 
There may be slight differences in changes in the employment of labour and capital at 
a disaggregated level, but they should show the same trends. Negative signs for labour 
adjustment coefficients are expected, with some positive and some negative signs for 
capital adjustment coefficients.
Empirical results
Given price changes over time, the labour and capital adjustment coefficients can be 
derived using the two-equation system in equation (4.8). An iterative, seemingly 
unrelated regression procedure is used for the estimations.
Two sets of hypotheses can be tested before the formal analysis. In the formulation 
suggested by Epstein (1981), if the coefficients, M l 1 and M22 are 1 or -1, and the 
rate of movement towards equilibrium of one quasi-fixed input does not rely on the 
adjustment rate of the other (i.e. M12=M21=0), complete and independent adjustment 
to the optimal point in capital and labour is made in a single period, and adjustment 
costs are minimal. If the hypothesis that M l 1 and M22 are equal to 1 or -1 is rejected,
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that would mean that, on average, only a fraction of equilibrium factor adjustment is 
made in a single period. If the independent adjustment hypothesis (M12=M21=0) is 
rejected, it means that the adjustment paths are not independent. In other words, after 
a change in output prices makes the original levels of labour and capital less than 
optimal, the movement of labour towards its new long-run equilibrium level is 
affected by the adjustment of capital stock (and vice versa).
Table 4.2 Quasi-fixity of inputs and dependent adjustment test
HO: No adjustment costs 
& independent adjustment
United States
F Value 
Canada Germany
Labour: (Mll=-1 &M12=0) $  * i  l l t f l l l l i l ' 1 1 /•- m
3 52.58 22.97 40.52
31 13.31 1.94 9.97
32 13.96 4.86 17.88
33 3.68 7.82 3.92
34 33.17 4.39 25.38
35 126.07 3.71 16.87
36 44.02 18.02 15.44
37 36.51 8.15 8.69
38 33.59 8.18 16.48
39 29.22 0.16 5.65
Capital (M22=-1 or 1 & M21=0)
3 561.91 7.28 125.54
31 61.18 78.06 45.75
32 448.07 29.75 36.58
33 545.64 27.41 70.34
34 369.80 13.62 16.61
35 334.62 7.38 40.41
36 392.80 36.65 45.57
37 422.27 44.23 90.43
38 287.58 55.403 111.34
39 291.72 77.24 18.86
DF 2/21 2/13 2/14
1 % critical value 5.78 6.70 6.51
5% critical value 3.47 3.81 3.74
Source: Author’s calculation.
Table 4.2 shows that the hypothesis of no adjustment costs and independent 
adjustment is rejected for most industries for the three economies at both 1 per cent
and 5 per cent significance levels. The high F-statistics in the tests of quasi-fixity of 
capital by itself and labour by itself and the joint test of the two quasi-fixed inputs 
point to the importance of accounting or dynamic adjustment costs in the analysis.
The adjustment coefficients (M) for labour and capital for each industry are calculated 
by applying the data constructed above to equation (4.8). As the model is written in 
the form of first differences, the Eigen values of the adjustment matrix provide a 
check on the stability of the adjustment process of capital and labour. Their absolute 
values, as calculated, are less than unity. Therefore the quasi-fixed demand system is 
stable. The results are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Adjustment coefficients from dynamic adjustment analysis
Labour adjustment coefficients
Industry code United States t-ratio Canada t-ratio Germany t-ratio
3 -0.22334 -1.87 -0.27955 -2.64 -0.14225 -1.35
31 -0.37185 -3.12 -0.92302 -5.65 -0.17388 -1.12
32 -0.48328 -3.11 -0.62938 -4.58 -0.39492 -3.02
33 -0.59581 -3.36 -0.70465 -4.82 -0.50539 -3.41
34 -0.01501 -0.12 -0.88760 -5.91 -0.14964 -0.74
35 -0.16365 -0.96 -0.48179 -2.92 0.02063 0.15
36 -0.47410 -3.26 -1.01610 -6.19 -0.43351 -4.72
37 -0.58103 -5.44 -0.80051 -4.32 -0.36043 -2.24
38 -0.18442 -1.43 -0.63471 -3.64 -0.24313 -0.89
39 -0.63918 -2.93 -0.92067 -6.30 -0.34815 -1.77
Capital adjustment coefficients
Industry code United States t-ratio Canada t-ratio Germany
.
t-ratio
3 0.04134 1.35 0.14425 0.76 -0.13384 -2.81
31 0.15610 2.31 0.17769 3.26 -0.28331 -4.43
32 0.09182 2.73 0.23681 2.66 -0.23446 -2.68
33 0.19997 8.68 -0.07629 -0.63 -0.17758 -3.01
34 0.03349 0.91 0.20821 1.58 0.09596 0.45
35 -0.01271 -0.15 -0.45260 -2.99 -0.16200 -2.06
36 ' 0.06969 1.95 0.25669 2.58 -0.20479 -3.39
37 0.05745 1.74 -0.17589 -1.77 -0.27930 -5.86
38 -0.08525 -1.95 0.12723 1.66 -0.16233 -1.63
39 0.26153 3.90 0.10945 1.84 -0.07798 -0.53
Note: All the coefficients are significant at least at the 5 per cent level with the exception of the 
following: industries 34 and 35 in the United States and 34, 35, 38 in Germany for labour adjustment 
coefficients; industries 34 and 35 in the United States, 3 and 33 in Canada and 34 and 39 in Germany 
for capital adjustment coefficients.
Source: Author’s calculation.
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To interpret these adjustment coefficients, it is necessary to clarify that the sign and 
value of these adjustment coefficients are the indicators of the direction and 
magnitude of adjustment, respectively. For example, the labour adjustment 
coefficients of industry 32 for the United States is -0.48328 which means that, on 
average over the sample time period, 48 per cent of labour adjustment decisions are 
carried out annually in the US textile industry. In other words, after changes in price, 
the full adjustment for labour to the long-run equilibrium value takes on average 
about two years. Fractional adjustments in the labour and capital markets keep 
producers from making instantaneous adjustments (within one year) to long-run 
equilibrium.
Factor adjustment and intra-industry trade
After testing the adjustment coefficients, the next step is to examine how the 
adjustment coefficients vary across industries with respect to the extent of the level of 
intra-industry trade for these industries. This leads to a test of the central hypothesis 
of this chapter, namely the higher the level of intra-industry trade in an industry, the 
greater the intra-industry factor adjustment.
Model specification
There are several ways of looking at the relationship between labour and capital 
adjustment coefficients and the level of IIT across industries. One way, and possibly
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the most appropriate way under the circumstances, is to set up an econometric model 
to estimate the determinants of adjustment coefficients with IIT as one of the 
explanatory variables: a cross-industry and cross-country model in which
Labour adjustment coefficients = f(IIT , • • •) 
Capital adjustment coefficients = f(IIT , •••) (4 .9)
There are many factors that can affect labour and capital adjustment. They include 
whether or not an industry is highly unionised; socio-economic variables like sex, 
race and age composition of an industry can also affect labour adjustment. However, 
this study is only concerned with industry-specific factors. Two major factors are 
considered here: specialisation (intra-industry trade or inter-industry trade 
specialisation) and structural change effects. The test equations are therefore written 
as:
L — (Xq + a  J I T + a 2GIG +
K = ß 0 + ß ,I IT + ß 2G lG + ß 2 (4
Where L represents labour adjustment coefficients and K represents capital 
adjustment coefficients. IIT and GIG denote the variables of intra-industry trade 
level and industry structural change.
It is expected that, expressing adjustment coefficients in absolute values, there are 
negative signs to the coefficients of IIT and positive signs to the coefficients of GIG.
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Data t
In the labour and capital adjustment coefficients estimated above, there are 10 
coefficients of one variable for each country. The intra-industry trade level for each 
industry is calculated by using the Grubel-Lloyd index at the 4-digit ISIC level, and 
average IIT indices are calculated for each industry over the period 1970 to 1990 
using data from the ANU’s International Economic DataBank. These are set out in 
Table 4.4. The structural change variable is constructed as the average change in the 
ratio of industry GDP over total GDP over 1970 to 1989. The estimated results are 
shown in Table 4.5. There are negative signs associated with almost all structural 
changes in these industries which means that, on average, from 1970 to 1989, these 
industries’ share of total GDP declined. This was probably associated with a sharp 
increase in the output of the services industry in all three countries.
Estimation
The test of the hypothesis is conducted using an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
estimation. Cross-country and cross-industry data have been applied to the above- 
specified a group of test equations (4.10). Originally, there were 30 observations for 
estimations of labour and capital adjustment determinants. Due to insignificant factor 
adjustment coefficients and structural changes, 24 and 23 observations were applied 
in the final estimation for labour and capital adjustment, respectively.
In the regression analysis, several diagnostic tests were carried out in order to 
ascertain the reliability of the results.
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Table 4.4 Intra-industry trade levels for the United States, Canada and 
Germany, 1970,1980,1990 and average (per cent)
Industry Code 70 80 90 average
United States
3 62.32 63.01 68.45 64.59
31 44.33 55.86 57.26 52.48
32 50.44 52.71 38.05 47.07
33 54.62 69.30 70.07 64.66
34 74.48 77.62 80.20 77.43
35 63.83 55.81 69.62 63.09
36 70.42 64.62 71.11 68.72
37 76.44 69.10 61.17 68.90
38 63.28 65.16 73.14 67.19
39 51.16 67.26 37.04 51.82
Canada
3 60.63 59.36 66.47 62.15
31 56.25 59.13 67.81 61.06
32 40.60 39.86 37.60 39.35
33 28.13 28.74 38.03 31.63
34 11.21 14.78 22.43 16.14
35 61.12 65.81 74.66 67.20
36 36.00 40.52 53.17 43.23
37 44.78 55.64 67.56 55.99
38 79.67 72.55 75.55 75.92
39 36.24 41.01 43.10 40.12
Germany
3 59.38 65.39 72.09 65.62
31 48.62 70.09 79.12 65.94
32 79.85 71.69 71.08 74.21
33 53.66 64.43 76.46 64.85
34 47.24 59.48 64.08 56.93
35 64.26 67.26 74.90 68.81
36 73.14 84.87 85.58 81.20
37 69.88 77.62 86.67 78.06
38 51.93 59.19 68.22 59.78
39 77.70 69.77 80.91 76.13
Source: Author’s calculation using UNIDO data at the International Economic DataBank, Australian 
National University.
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Table 4.5 Average structural change for Canada, Germany and the United 
States, 1970-90 (per cent per year)
Canada Germany United States
3 -0.2167 -0.4033 -0.3418
31 -0.0357 -0.0938 -0.0517
32 -0.0435 -0.0923 -0.0533
33 -0.0151 -0.0278 -0.0159
34 -0.0098 -0.0173 -0.0004
35 0.0111 -0.0383 -0.0053
36 -0.0157 -0.0473 -0.0154
37 -0.0275 -0.0709 -0.0677
38 -0.0694 -0.0134 -0.1255
39 -0.0110 -0.0020 -0.0064
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the International Sectoral Databank, OECD.
This is, at this level of analysis, a cross-section analysis. One of the potential 
problems associated with cross-section analysis is hetroscedasticity, where the 
variances of the error term are not constant. In the presence of hetroscedasticity, the 
coefficients of a regression are still unbiased, but the estimation is no longer efficient. 
In this estimation, hetroscedasdicities for both cases are apparent. This problem is 
overcome by using White’s hetroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimation 
for unknown forms of heteroscedasticity. The results reported in Table 4.6 have been 
corrected for this problem.
As noted, this estimation is based on a very small sample. The use of OLS estimation 
is justified if several assumptions can be made. One assumption is that the error term 
must be normally distributed. In a large sample case, the central limit theorem ensures 
that estimators are asymptotically normal. But in a small sample case, normality can 
be violated. In this analysis the Jarque-Bera Asymptotic LM normality test has been
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applied in both cases. The results show that there are no violations to normality in
either case.
Thirdly, a model specification test was applied to this estimation to ensure that there 
were no missing variables for the initial specified estimation models. The Ramsay 
misspecification test was applied and the results reveal that there were no 
misspecifications for this estimation.
The final regression results are presented in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Regression results
L K
IIT 0.008 -0.01
t-ratio 3.45* -4.65*
GIG -1.22 -0.08
l-ratio -7.38* -0.30
Constant -1.08 0.63
t-ratio -7.20* 5.14*
R 2 0.50 0.29
No. of observations 24 23
Note: * significant at least at 1 per cent level. 
Source: Author’s estimation.
Interpretation of results
In Table 4.6, the extent of intra-industry trade specialisation has a positive and 
significant effect in explaining the labour adjustment coefficients. As all labour 
adjustment coefficients have negative signs originally, the result that intra-industry 
trade is associated with labour adjustment coefficients positively and significantly,
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can be expressed as follows: the higher the level of intra-industry trade for an industry 
the less the inter-industry labour adjustment. Alternatively, when faced with a price 
change over the relevant time period, profit-maximising firms (industries) will change 
their decision on labour use. In order to achieve long-run equilibrium, an industry has 
to reduce its labour force by a certain amount every year. Suppose over the time 
period concerned, an average of 1,000 employees have to be laid off. A negative 
adjustment coefficient merely says that on average a fraction of them are released 
from the industry each year. If the level of IIT and labour adjustment coefficients are 
positively associated across industries, higher levels of intra-industry trade for an 
industry are associated with a smaller fraction of labour released for that industry in 
each year.
The coefficient of the structural change variable is negatively and significantly related 
to the labour adjustment coefficients as expected. The interpretation of that coefficient 
is the same for intra-industry trade levels. The negative sign is due to the fact that all 
industries are shrinking over the time period in question. If an industry declines more 
sharply than others, the fraction of labour moving out of that industry is higher.
For the capital adjustment coefficients, while the coefficient of structural change 
variable is insignificant, the coefficient of IIT is negative and significant. As the 
capital adjustment coefficients are positive (some of them originally have negative 
signs, but in conducting the regression, an absolute value has been imposed on them), 
the interpretation will be exactly the same as for the labour adjustment coefficients. If 
an industry is more geared towards intra-industry trade specialisation than other 
industries, that industry’s capital adjustment will be more intra-industry oriented. This
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seems a reasonable interpretation from an empirical point of view, but from the 
perspective of firms’ actual operation, it is not that obvious. However, suppose a 
profit-maximising industry’s decision is to accumulate a certain amount of capital 
stock over the time period concerned. If that industry has a high level of intra-industry 
trade specialisation, it will only need to raise a small fraction of the capital outside the 
industry and the bulk will be found within the industry. It may be the case that some 
firms within an industry simply re-employ some equipment or machinery shed by 
other firms within the industry. Obviously, there is also the possibility that some firms 
might buy capital goods produced by other firms within the industry.
In summary, if an industry is geared more towards intra-industry trade specialisation, 
when facing price changes, the factor adjustments are more intra-industry oriented 
and, it may be inferred, less costly.
Conclusion
The hypothesis that intra-industry factor adjustment is associated with industries with 
high levels of intra-industry trade was tested in this chapter. The test was carried out 
in three steps. First, the optimal solutions of factor demand and output supply were 
derived following the steps described in the previous chapter for the dynamic 
adjustment costs model when the function of production is assigned in a quadratic 
form. Secondly, using data obtained from the OECD’s international sectoral database 
in the quasi-fixed input demand equations, adjustment coefficients were estimated at 
the subdivision level of ISIC manufacturing industries. Availability of data allowed
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this derivation to be employed for Canada, Germany and the United States. Thirdly, in 
explaining the determinants of labour and capital adjustment coefficients, two 
effects— a trade specialisation effect and a structural change effect— were specified in 
the empirical model. The results reveal strongly that if an industry has a high degree 
of intra-industry trade specialisation, the factor adjustments are more intra-industry 
oriented.
The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that in the face of trade liberalisation, the 
adjustment costs of factor relocation under intra-industry trade specialisation are less 
than those under inter-industry trade specialisation. The empirical evidence provided 
in this chapter provides initial support for this hypothesis. From the perspective of 
adjustment costs, intra-industry factor adjustment means that there are likely to be 
fewer costs associated with retraining and relocation of labour and that laid-off capital 
can be re-used more effectively. For example, workers displaced from internal labour 
markets tend to experience greater difficulty in finding alternative employment 
because of the importance of institutional and human capital factors in internal labour 
markets. Workers who are thrust upon external labour markets after a relatively long­
term, stable employment relationship appear to have lower re-employment prospects, 
ceteris paribus, and may thus suffer greater economic losses (Gray 1996). The 
relative adjustment costs issue has only been addressed implicitly here. A more direct 
and comprehensive empirical analysis of the issue is presented in the next chapter.
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5 Labour Adjustment Costs and Intra-industry Trade
Introduction
When there are price changes over time, firms re-adjust their capital and labour to 
produce long-run profit maximising output. In Chapter 4, it was also shown that if an 
industry has a high level of intra-industry trade, labour adjustment tends to take place 
more within that industry than is the case in other industries. But the central question 
remains unanswered: are the labour adjustment costs associated with intra-industry 
trade lower than those associated with inter-industry trade? The aim of this chapter is 
to answer this question.
There have been some attempts to resolve this issue.1 But a problem common to 
previous studies is that relative adjustment costs under different trade patterns are 
examined indirectly. Moreover, labour economists hold different views about labour 
adjustment costs. For example, Kruse (1987) and Kletzer (1995) claim that trade- 
displaced workers may have more difficulty in making labour market adjustments, but 
the source of the difficulty is their own disadvantage, not the characteristics of the 
industry from which they have been displaced. Others (Kletzer 1992; Summer 1986; 
Houseman 1988; Grando 1983; and Jacobson 1993) recognise that industrial 
characteristics, such as the setting of efficiency wages of industries, affect on 
adjustment costs. For these reasons, the study of labour adjustment costs under inter-
1 See Chapter 2 for a review of these studies.
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versus intra-industry trade specialisation that follows not only examines adjustment 
costs under different trade patterns directly but also provides an assessment of 
sectoral effects on adjustment costs.
Approach of analysis
In theoretical terms (Chapter 2), there are several reasons why labour may take time to 
adjust to a price change. One is that wages may be flexible within sectors but, in the 
short run, changes take place independently across sectors. This can occur when there 
are constraints on occupational mobility between the sectors, or if the sectors are 
geographically concentrated and there are constraints on moving from one region to 
another. In this sort of segmented labour market, some sectors are insulated from a 
price shock in the short run, whereas wages in other sectors fall by the full amount of 
the price change. Workers therefore are laid off in affected sectors. Over time, the 
disparity in wages between sectors provides an incentive for labour to relocate until 
the wage differential is eliminated.
When international trade is liberalised, some industries expand and some contract in 
face of international competition. The costs arising from the adjustment process are a 
result of greater import penetration leading to a contraction in domestic production. 
Resources are displaced from domestic production and may become temporarily 
unemployed. The redeployment of resources is costly for those involved in terms of 
temporary loss of earnings, relocation, job search and retraining expenses.
105
tThe theoretical basis for the hypothesis of lower adjustment costs associated with 
intra-industry trade rests on the fact that under intra-industry trade specialisation, the 
labour market is less segmented both occupationally and geographically. To test this 
hypothesis empirically requires an approach that incorporates:
• a measure of intra-industry trade
• a measure of adjustment costs
• a model of the determinants of adjustment costs.
Intra-industry trade level can be measured using the Grubel-Lloyd index.2 Measures 
of adjustment costs are proxies for the costs incurred by displaced workers including:
• Expected duration of unemployment
Unemployment is always regarded as costly. There is both a private and a social 
cost. McTaggart, Findlay and Parkin (1992) argue that there are four main costs of 
unemployment. The most obvious costs are lost output and income that 
unemployed workers would have produced if they had been employed. A second 
cost is the permanent damage that can be done to an unemployed worker by 
hindering his or her career development and skill acquisition. A rise in the 
unemployment rate usually causes an increase in crime and social distress as 
people who cannot earn an income from legitimate work sometimes turn to crime 
or suffer social degradation. A final cost that is difficult to quantify is the loss of 
self-esteem that afflicts those who suffer prolonged periods of unemployment.
2 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the definition of, problems with and justification for the use of the 
index.
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Duration of unemployment can be taken as a proxy of the measure of adjustment 
costs.
• Probability of re-employment in the same industry
Jacobson et al. (1993) argue that workers possessing skills that were especially 
suited to their old positions are likely to be less productive in subsequent jobs.
The fit between workers’ skills and the requirements of their old jobs could be the 
result of on-the-job investment in firm-specific human capital or costly searches 
resulting in particularly good matches with their old firms. The use of the 
probability of re-employment in the same industry as a measure of adjustment 
costs is based on this reasoning and the fact that re-employment in the same 
industry alleviates the need for displaced workers to undertake retraining with its 
attendant costs, and so the duration of unemployment may be shorter.
• Probability of loss of income
In theory, there are several reasons why displaced workers might experience loss 
of earnings beyond the period of unemployment following their job loss. Workers 
whose lost jobs paid wage premiums are likely to earn less if their subsequent jobs 
pay standard wages (Lewis 1986). It is also argued by Lazear (1981) that 
displaced workers’ long-term earnings will be lower if, in their previous jobs, they 
accepted wages below their level of productivity in return for higher earnings later 
in their careers. Workers might have accepted such ‘titled’ tenure profiles in order 
to enhance their employers’ incentives to invest in their human capital.
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• Geographical movement
If re-employment is subject to physical relocation of displaced workers, there are 
additional costs in the adjustment process. Although it can be argued that 
relocation expenses are often paid by employers to the re-employed, there are 
additional, unquantifiable costs to adjusting to life in a new environment.
One or all of these variables could be modelled empirically, including the level of 
intra-industry trade in the industry from which the worker was displaced as an 
explanatory variable.
Overview of data
The data used in this study—Current Population Survey, February 1996: Displaced 
worker, Job Tenure, and Occupational Mobility— are obtained from the United States 
Bureau of the Census. The data are microdata in which the unit of observation is 
individuals within housing units. The universe consists of all persons in the civilian 
non-institutional population of the United States living in households. The probability 
sample selected to represent the universe consists of approximately 48,000 
households.
Data are provided on labour force activity for the week prior to the survey. 
Comprehensive data are available on the employment status, occupation, and industry 
of persons 14 years old and over. Displaced worker questions were asked of all 
persons aged 20 years or older who lost a job involuntarily within the last five years
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based on operating decisions of a firm, plant, or business in which the worker was 
employed. Job tenure and occupational mobility questions were asked of all employed 
persons 15 years and older. In consideration of geographical coverage, states, regions 
and divisions are identified in their entirety.
The file consists of 133,424 records. As the question is set out above, the group of 
individuals in which we are interested is displaced workers. After imposing some 
restrictions on the original data file (such as interview status, and that the type of 
person record is an adult civilian household member; and a person aged 20 and older), 
the new data file has 83,902 records, of whom 6,608 are displaced workers.
An examination of these displaced workers data reveals not only the pattern of 
displacement but also the adjustment costs incurred by displaced workers along the 
lines described in the previous section.
Industry and occupational patterns of displacement
The workers displaced in the early 1990s came from a wide range of industries and 
occupations. Herz (1991) looked at worker displacement during 1979-83 and 1985— 
89 and concluded that nearly 50 and 38 per cent, respectively, of displaced workers 
had lost factory jobs. But in the most recent period, they have been increasingly 
joined by workers displaced from the services sector and the wholesale and retail 
sectors. While the incidence of factory displacement declined (23 per cent of the total 
displaced), far more displacement continued to occur among factory workers than 
among workers in other major industry groups (see Table 5.1).
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The most recent job losses are concentrated among the same group of manufacturing 
industries as was identified in Herz’s work. Between 1993 and 1995, among the 3,830 
displaced workers in the sample, 107 and 89 workers lost jobs in non-electrical and 
electrical machinery industries, respectively. Another 91 workers lost jobs in 
transportation equipment (including auto manufacturing). The non-durable goods 
industries account for the greatest numbers of displaced workers, including apparel 
with 72, printing and publishing with 80, and food processing with 64 (See Table 
5.A1).
Reflecting the above industry patterns, 1,163 were displaced from technical, sales and 
administrative support occupations, 831 and 832 were operators, fabricators, and 
labourers, and managerial and professionals. Compared with Herz’s earlier work, the 
proportion of workers displaced from managerial and professional occupations 
increased from 20 per cent to 21 per cent, and operators, fabricators and labourers 
decreased from 26 per cent to 21 per cent (see Table 5.6).
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fTable 5.1 Displaced workers by industry, 1993-95 (persons)
Industry All displaced Displaced due to plant closure 
or abolition of position
(persons) (persons)
Agricultural wage and salary workers 57 57
Mining 44 44
Construction 429 429
Manufacturing 881 881
Durable goods 533 533
Non-durable goods 348 348
Transportation and public utilities 262 262
Wholesale and retail trade 954 954
Finance, insurance and real estate 153 153
Services 1050 1050
Professional services 958 958
Other service industries 92 92
Sub-total 3830 3830
Not in universe (-1) 2726 329
No response (-9) 52 52
Total 6608 4211
Source: Current Population Survey, February 1996: Displaced Workers, Job Tenure, and 
Occupational Mobility, United States Bureau of the Census, 1998.
Table 5.2 Geographical movements of displaced workers, 1993-95
Industry All displaced Moved to seek work Moved and re-employed
(persons) (persons) (per cent) (persons) (per cent)
Agricultural wage and salary workers 57 4 7.0 2 50.0
Mining 44 6 13.6 4 66.7
Construction 429 33 7.7 28 84.8
Manufacturing 881 68 7.7 59 86.8
Durable goods 533 39 7.3 35 89.7
Nondurable goods 348 29 8.3 24 82.8
Transportation and public utilities 262 21 8.0 19 90.5
Wholesale and retail trade 954 72 7.5 64 88.9
Finance, insurance and real estate 153 11 7.2 11 100.0
Services 1050 108 10.3 101 93.5
Professional services 958 94 9.8 87 92.6
Other service industries 92 14 15.2 14 100.0
Sub-total 3830 323 8.4 288 89.2
Not in universell) 329 0 0.0 0 0.0
No response(-9) 52 3 5.8 1 33.3
Total 4211 326 7.7 289 88.7
Note: Data refer to persons with tenure of 3 years or more who lost or left a job between January 1993 
and 1995 because of plant closure or relocation, downturn in work, or the abolition of positions or 
shifts.
Source: See Table 5.1.
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Table 5.6 Displaced workers by occupation, 1993-95 (persons)
Occupation All Re-employed in
displaced same occupation
(persons) (persons) (per cent)
Total 6608 1280 19
Managerial and professional specialty 832 299 36
Executive, administrative and managerial 441 134 30
Professional specialty 391 165 42
Technical, sales and administrative support 1163 288 25
Technicians and related support 106 40 38
Sales occupations 459 103 22
Administrative support, including clerical 598 145 24
Service occupations 381 108 28
Precision production, craft and repair 561 199 35
Mechanics and repairs 133 55 41
Construction trades 270 98 36
Other precision production, craft and repair 158 46 29
Operators, fabricators and labourers 831 186 22
Machine operators, assemblers and inspectors 388 81 21
Transportation and material moving occupations 210 68 32
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers and labourers 233 37 16
Farming, forestry and fishing 57 11 19
Armed forces 3 0 0
Sub-total 6383 1764 28
Not in Universe (1) 2726 182
No response (-9) 54 7
Note: Data refer to persons with tenure of 3 years or more who lost or left a job between January 1993 
and 1995 because of plant closure or relocation, downturn in work, or the abolition of positions or 
shifts.
Source: See Table 5.1.
Re-employment
When surveyed in January 1996, 74 per cent of displaced workers held new jobs, 
somewhat higher than the proportion that was found in 1990 and 1988 (72 per cent), 
and well above the 60 per cent noted in the first survey in January 1984.
Increases in re-employment among displaced workers since the second half of the 
1980s reflected overall improvement in national economic conditions. Herz (1991)
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targues that the timing of individual survey periods may affect the re-employment rate. 
Because of movements in the business cycle, a larger proportion of the displacements 
occurred lately in the surveyed period during the period when economy is slowing 
down than during the period when economy starts to boom. Thus, those displaced 
when economy is slowing down had less time, on average, before the survey date to 
find a job than did those displaced when economy starts to boom.
As in previous surveys, the January 1996 study showed that the likelihood of finding 
new jobs varied markedly by industry. For example, 72 per cent of displaced 
manufacturing employees were re-employed in January 1996, compared with 76 per 
cent of displaced services workers. Workers who lost jobs in durable goods 
manufacturing had a relatively higher re-employment rate—75.4 per cent, compared 
with non-durable goods manufacturing at 67.8 per cent. Similar patterns are apparent 
in the services industry: the professional services re-employment rate is 76.5 per cent 
but for other service industries, the re-employment rate is 69.6 per cent.
Changing industries
Many of the workers displaced between 1993 and 1995 who found new jobs no longer 
worked in the industries from which they had been displaced. The proportion re­
employed in work similar to the jobs they had lost varied by industry. Half of the 
workers displaced from services, for example, were re-employed in new service 
industry jobs in January 1996. In contrast, only 28 per cent of displaced durable goods 
manufacturing workers found new jobs in the same sector.
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Since the services industries were expanding throughout the 1993-95 period, a 
disproportionate share of workers who changed industries moved into services jobs. 
For example, of the 72 per cent of re-employed displaced manufacturing workers, 
one-third found new manufacturing jobs, and the remainder were spread among other 
industries
Re-employed displaced workers were more likely to change occupations than to 
change industries (see Table 5.6), in contrast to the result Herz obtained for the 1985— 
89 period.
Unemployment duration
Although for all industries, on average, there is a 74 per cent re-employment rate, in 
January 1996 the duration of unemployment for those re-employed varied. As shown 
in Table 5.3, the average unemployment duration (the sum of the number of weeks 
which had passed when the displaced took a new job in an industry divided by the 
persons of re-employed) varies across industries. Average unemployment duration for 
those displaced from the manufacturing industry is 15.9 weeks, which is higher than 
the average for all industries— 12.3 weeks. Average unemployment duration before 
re-employment for those displaced from durable manufacturing is 16.5 weeks, slightly 
higher than that for those displaced from non-durable manufacturing— 14.9 weeks.
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Loss of earnings
While workers displaced between 1993 and 1995 had an easier time finding new jobs 
than did those displaced earlier in the decade, earnings patterns in the new jobs were 
quite similar to those noted in the earlier study periods. Table 5.4 shows the status of 
earnings of displaced workers between 1993 and 1995. Across industries, average 
weekly incomes in current jobs were almost all less than earnings in lost jobs (only 
workers displaced from agriculture, and wholesale and retail trade increased their 
average weekly income). In the mining sector almost 9 out of 10 suffered earnings 
losses and for manufacturing industry, 7 out of 10 suffered earnings losses. Even in 
the agricultural sector, 62 per cent of workers suffered earnings losses.3
Health insurance losses
As shown in Table 5.5, about 50 per cent of workers displaced between 1993 and 
1995 were covered by some form of group health insurance in their lost jobs, down 
significantly from 74 per cent in January 1990 and 78 per cent in January 1984. About 
1 in 4 of those who had previously been covered were no longer covered by any group 
plan at the time of the January 1996 survey.
As would be expected, the previously covered workers who were unemployed in 
January 1996 or who had left the labour force were most likely to be without health 
insurance. According to the survey data, about 40 per cent had no coverage compared
3 It should be noted that such decreases are somewhat understated (and increases overstated), as the 
figures are not adjusted for inflation.
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with the results of previous surveys. However, coverage among displaced workers in 
all employment status groups was up substantially. The fact that coverage increased, 
even for non-employed workers, suggests that they relied more heavily than in the past 
on the plans of their spouses or other family members. The substantial increase in the 
number of dual-earner families during the 1980s and 1990s makes such a scenario 
plausible.
Geographical movement
Some displaced workers moved to another city or county looking for work 
opportunities. Although the percentage is low relative to other indicators— 8.4 per 
cent of all industries—there is variation across industries. The mining sector has the 
highest rate of geographical movement— 13.6 per cent, followed by the service 
sector— 10.3 per cent. For the manufacturing industry the rate is 7.7 per cent, slightly 
below the average for all industries. There is a large difference between professional 
services ( 9.8 per cent) and other services industries (15.2 per cent) and a small 
difference between durable (7.3 per cent) and non-durable (8.3 per cent) 
manufacturing. This may reflect the fact that professional services and durable 
manufacturing are often geographically concentrated and may more skill-specific. The 
prospect of finding a job in another place may be lower for this group of displaced 
workers.
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The rate of re-employment for displaced workers who relocate is 89.2 per cent on 
average for all industries, while for agricultural and mining workers it is 50 and 66.7 
per cent, respectively, well below all other industries.
To summarise, despite overall economic expansion, many workers continued to be 
displaced from long-held jobs during the early 1990s. However, the rate of post­
displacement employment is high and increasing. But displaced workers who were re­
employed in January 1996 were unlikely to be holding jobs with earnings comparable 
to those they had lost. A significant percentage of them changed industries and 
suffered a period of unemployment before finding a new job. And although increases 
in the number of dual-worker families and in the rate of re-employment led to an 
improvement in the incidence of health insurance coverage, many workers remained 
unprotected after losing their jobs. In order to find re-employment opportunities, some 
displaced workers relocated, but not all of them were successful.
Empirical estimation of adjustment costs and IIT
Model specification
The central hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is that across industries, the higher 
the level of IIT, the lower the adjustment costs. Following the analytical approach 
outlined in section 2, the following econometric model is proposed to test above 
hypothesis:
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tAdjustment costs variable =f(IIT, ...) (5.1)
As this study focuses on the industry-specific effects on labour adjustment costs, in 
addition to the level of IIT, two other variables are included in the model as 
explanatory variables: an industry structural change variable (GIG) is proposed to 
capture the industries’ growth effect and a dummy variable (DUM) is included to 
distinguish the effect on durable and non-durable manufactured goods. The final 
model can be specified as:
Adjustment costs variable = f(IIT, GIG, DUM) (5.2)
Data
Given the industrial classifications used in the dataset, the empirical analysis is 
limited to the manufacturing industry, as international trade among other sectors is 
more limited.
The industry classification in this survey is different from the ISIC system. In order to 
link adjustment costs with IIT, a concordance is developed between the labour survey 
and industry data, as shown in Table 5.7.
121
Table 5.7 A concordance of industry classification between this survey and ISIC
Industry
code
This survey 
Industry name
ISIC
Industry
code
Industry name
0 Manufacturing 300 Manufacturing
1 Lumber & wood prods, excl. furniture 331 Wood & cork prods excl. furniture
2 Furniture & fixtures 332 Furniture, fixture excl. prim, metal
3 Stone, clay, concrete, glass prods 361 Pottery, china, earthenware
362 Glass & prods
369 Other non-metal mineral prods
4 Primary metals 371 Iron and steel basic industries
372 Non-ferrous metal basic industries
5 Fabricated metals 381 Fabricated metal products
Not specified metal industries n.a.
6 Machinery, excl. electrical 382 Machinery excl. electrical
7 Electrical machinery, equip, supplies 383 Electrical machinery, appliance, &
supplies
8 Motor vehicles & equip. 384 Transport equipment
Aircraft & parts 384 Transport equipment
Other transportation equipment 384 Transport equipment
9 Professional & photo equip., watches 385 Professional, scientific &
measuring, controlling equip, n.e.c.
10 Toys, amusement & sporting goods 390 Other manufacturing industries
Misc. & n.e.c. man. industries 390 Other manufacturing industries
11 Food & kindred prods 311 Food manufacturing
312 Other food manufacturing
313 Beverage industries
12 Tobacco prods 314 Tobacco manufactures
13 Textile mill prods 321 Manufacture of textiles
14 Apparel & other finished textile prods 322 Wearing apparel excl. footwear
15 Paper & allied products 341 Paper & products
16 Printing, publishing & allied inds 342 Printing, publishing & allied
industries
17 Chemicals & allied prods 351 Industrial chemicals
352 Other chemical prods
18 Petroleum & coal prods 353 Petroleum refineries
354 Misc. prods of petroleum & coal
19 Rubber & misc plastic prods 355 Rubber products
356 Plastic products n.e.c.
20 Leather & leather prods 323 Leather and prods excl footwear,
apparel
324 Footwear excl. rubber, plastic
footwear
Notes: 1) n.a. means not available.
2) n.e.c. means not elsewhere classified. 
Source: Author’s construction.
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Intra-industry trade levels are calculated as an average Grubel—Lloyd index over the 
years 1993 to 1995 for each manufacturing industry at the 4-digit level and are listed 
in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8 Intra-industry trade levels in manufacturing industries
Code Industry 1993 1994 1995 Average
0 Manufacturing 70.24 70.09 71.32 70.55
1 Lumber & wood prods, excl. furniture 67.43 61.68 63.41 64.18
2 Furniture & fixtures 61.81 60.52 59.02 60.45
3 Stone, clay, concrete, glass prods 78.19 74.67 74.76 75.87
4 Primary metals 60.30 53.93 62.52 58.92
5 Fabricated metals 86.67 86.57 84.75 86.00
6 Machinery, excl. electrical 83.03 82.87 82.05 82.65
7 Electrical machinery, equip, supplies 81.06 80.06 79.33 80.15
8 Transport equipment 60.24 61.02 61.77 61.01
9 Professional & photo equip., watches 65.65 67.43 67.08 66.72
10 Other man industries 33.11 32.84 33.93 33.29
11 Food & kindred prods 68.03 67.32 64.83 66.73
12 Tobacco prods 28.80 8.90 9.19 15.63
13 Textile mill prods 65.71 67.23 69.16 67.36
14 Apparel & other finished textile prods 26.33 27.63 29.64 27.87
15 Paper & allied products 77.11 80.09 79.46 78.89
16 Printing, publishing & allied inds 93.21 93.39 92.18 92.93
17 Chemicals & allied prods 84.33 84.00 84.94 84.43
18 Petroleum & coal prods 79.44 77.11 87.13 81.22
19 Rubber & misc. plastic prods 65.78 66.96 69.70 67.48
20 Leather & leather prods 45.12 39.30 36.81 40.41
Source: Author’s calculation using ISIC trade data at International Economic DataBank, Australian 
National University.
The industry structural change variable is constructed as an average of the change of
share of industry GDP in total GDP, and is listed in Table 5.9.
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Table 5.9 Industry structure change in manufacturing industries
Code Industry 1993-92 1994-93 1995-94 Average
0 Manufacturing -0.666 0.254 0.739 0.109
1 Lumber & wood prods, excl. furniture 0.086 0.042 -0.008 0.040
2 Furniture & fixtures 0.019 0.002 -0.005 0.005
3 Stone, clay, concrete, glass prods -0.007 0.032 -0.012 0.004
4 Primary metals -0.059 0.129 0.023 0.031
5 Fabricated metals -0.007 0.052 0.048 0.031
6 Machinery, excl. electrical 0.066 0.306 0.559 0.310
7 Electrical machinery, equip, supplies 0.075 0.129 0.448 0.217
8 Transport equipment -0.058 0.206 -0.249 -0.034
9 Professional & photo equip., watches -0.079 -0.098 0.005 -0.057
10 Other man. industries 0.011 -0.013 0.006 0.001
11 Food & kindred prods -0.092 -0.280 0.003 -0.123
12 Tobacco prods -0.139 -0.002 0.008 -0.045
13 Textile mill prods -0.008 -0.002 -0.038 -0.016
14 Apparel & other finished textile prods -0.027 -0.027 -0.051 -0.035
15 Paper & allied products -0.107 0.032 -0.016 -0.030
16 Printing, publishing & allied inds -0.038 -0.112 -0.044 -0.065
17 Chemicals & allied prods -0.123 -0.016 0.053 -0.029
18 Petroleum & coal prods -0.217 -0.161 -0.013 -0.130
19 Rubber & misc. plastic prods 0.045 0.052 0.033 0.043
20 Leather & leather prods -0.004 -0.016 -0.011 -0.010
Source: Author’s calculation using data of UNIDO and World Bank, World Tables, in International 
Economic DataBank, Australian National University.
As discussed above, measures of adjustment costs are proxies of the costs incurred by 
displaced workers including:
• Expected duration of unemployment;
• Probability of re-employment in the same industry;
• Probability of loss of income; and
• Geographical movements.
Not all the above measures are readily available. However, we can construct measures
to capture these indicators.
124
Although this survey provides some information on unemployment duration, such as 
the year unemployment commenced, whether re-employment had occurred at the time 
of the survey, and number of weeks before re-employment, it is still not possible to 
determine the duration of unemployment for persons who remain unemployed. Two 
measures are used to overcome this problem.
The probability of continuing unemployment (cost 1). This measure can be 
constructed as 1 minus the probability of re-employment. The higher the probability of 
continuing unemployment, the higher the adjustment costs.
Unemployment duration for the re-employed (cost 2). This measure is constructed as 
average unemployment duration. The longer the average unemployment duration, the 
higher the adjustment costs.
Probability of re-employment in the same industry (cost 3) is a very straightforward 
measure which can be constructed as the percentage of persons of re-employed within 
the same industry over that of the total re-employed. The higher the percentage of re­
employment within the same industry, the lower the adjustment costs.
For loss of income, a very direct measure is earnings. As the survey also provides 
information about health insurance, we can use the following measures:
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fProbability of loss of earnings (cost 4). This measure is constructed as the percentage 
of the re-employed whose current earnings are less than their earnings in the jobs they 
lost.
Probability of loss of health insurance (cost 5). This measure is constructed as the 
percentage of persons who do not now have health insurance, but who were covered 
in the job they lost. The bigger the percentage, the larger the adjustment cost.
Probability of incurring relocation costs in re-employment (cost 6). The survey asks 
questions related to the geographical movements of displaced worker (Since that job 
ended, have you moved to a different city or county? Was the reason for the move—to 
look for work or to take a different job?). From this information, it is easy to calculate 
the percentage of displaced workers who moved in order to look for work or to take a 
different job. The higher the percentage of people who moved for work, the greater 
the associated adjustment costs.
These six measures covering four dimensions of adjustment cost are summarised in 
Table 5.10.
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An overall measure of adjustment costs should include all these dimensions. As these 
indicators are expressed in different terms (for example, probability of loss of health 
insurance is in percentage form, and average unemployment duration is in weeks), it is 
difficult to compare measures. Moreover, although it may be possible to express all 
these measures in uniform terms, it is still very difficult to find an accurate weighting 
for these measures, and hence an overall measure of adjustment costs. This is an area 
for future work on labour adjustment costs.
There were 20 original observations. Due to unreliable adjustment cost indicators for 
industries 12 and 18, 18 observations are available for regression.
Estimation
To test the model specified above, an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation has 
been applied to the six adjustment cost indicators.4 In order to obtain a reliable 
estimation, the following diagnostic tests were conducted and the final regression 
results are summarised in Table 5.11.
In the application of an Ordinary Least Square regression, it is generally assumed for 
hypothesis testing that the residuals follow a normal distribution. In large samples, the 
central limit theorem ensures that estimators are asymptotically normal, but small 
samples do not possess such a characteristic. Therefore, a normality test must be 
implemented first to ensure the validity of the OLS being applied to this small sample
4 As most of the adjustment costs indicators are zero or 1 variables, the least squares method is also 
called the linear probability model.
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case. The Jarque-Bera LM test is often used to test for departures from normality 
(Greene 1993). This test is used to conduct the normality test in this analysis. Failure 
does not indicate cause of action, but it can often be explained in practice by the 
presence of outliers. In this exercise, I use the LM test to test for outliers until 
normality is ensured. (That is why we start with the uniform 18 observations, but end 
up with different observations for all the cases.)
Several explanatory variables are proposed in the estimation: the IIT levels, the 
structural change variable and the dummy variable for durable goods. Which of these 
variables should be included in or omitted from the final regression is determined by a 
statistical test. Ramsay’s RESET test is used to test for misspecification of functional 
forms (an omitted variables test in practice). The conventional method of examining 
the t-ratios and R 2 is used to determine the omission of a particular variable.
For cross-sectional data, we have to be very careful about the problem of 
hetroscedasticity. Though the estimated coefficients are unbiased, the efficiency of the 
estimators will be very much affected. A number of tests have been used to detect this 
problem. With the presence of heteroscedasticity in some cases, White’s (1980) 
heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to correct the 
estimators for an unknown form of heteroscedasticity. The results presented in Table 
5.11 are corrected for this problem.
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The final regression results are as shown in Table 5.11. Although there are three 
possible explanatory variables, not all of them are included in the final regression in 
consideration of model specifications. The main objective in this chapter is to look at 
the relationship between adjustment costs indicators and the level of IIT across 
manufacturing industries in the United States. As expected, the six indicators of 
adjustment costs all have the correct sign with respect to the level of IIT, with some 
more significant than the others.
The first indicator of adjustment costs is the re-employment rate for displaced 
workers. The coefficient of IIT is positive and significant at the 2 per cent level. This 
result implies that, across US manufacturing industries, the higher the level of IIT for 
that industry, the higher the possibility of re-employment after displacement. In other 
words, the higher the level of IIT in an industry, the lower the possibility of no re­
employment and therefore the lower the adjustment costs for displaced workers in that 
industry.
Indicator 2 measures the average unemployment duration for the re-employed. The 
coefficient of IIT is negative and significant at only the 12 per cent level. A direct 
interpretation of this is that the higher the level of IIT, the shorter the average 
unemployment duration for the re-employed for that industry. There could be many 
possible reasons for this, including the possibility that IIT is less occupationally or
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geographically segmented, so that workers displaced from an industry with higher IIT 
levels may find re-employment opportunities more quickly and adjustment costs 
would be smaller.
Indicator 3 in Table 5.11 is the probability of re-employment within the same industry 
for those re-employed. The coefficient of IIT is positive and significant at the 9 per 
cent level. This means that if the IIT level of that industry is higher, then for those re­
employed displaced workers, the possibility of re-employment within the same 
industry is higher. The implication of this result is that if displaced workers are re­
employed within the same industry, they may need less retraining and may be re­
employed sooner, and adjustment costs are lower.
Indicator 4 in Table 5.11 is the probability of loss of earnings for displaced workers 
which is an income-related indicator. The coefficient of IIT in this case is negative and 
significant at the 7 per cent level. This implies that the higher the level of IIT in an 
industry the lower the probability of loss of earnings. In regard to adjustment costs, 
there are two findings: displaced workers have yet to be re-employed at the time of the 
survey, they suffer an absolute loss of earnings; and some of the re-employed receive 
lower wages than before, and they suffer a relative loss of earnings. The negative 
relationship between IIT and the probability of loss of earnings reveals that firstly, the 
higher the level of IIT in an industry, the higher the rate of re-employment and 
therefore the lower the probability of suffering an absolute loss of earnings. Secondly, 
the higher the level of IIT in an industry, the lower the probability of suffering a 
relative loss of earings following re-employment.
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Another aspect of loss of income is measured as indicator 5—the probability of loss of 
health insurance. The coefficient of IIT is negative and significant at the 1 per cent 
level. As the measure of the probability of loss of health insurance is constructed as 
the percentage of persons who had health insurance in their lost job but do not have 
health insurance in their current job, the negative relationship between the level of IIT 
and the probability of loss of health insurance directly indicates that if an industry has 
a relatively high level of ITT, displaced workers will have a lower likelihood of 
sacrificing their health insurance in seeking re-employment.
Indicator 6 describes the geographical movements of displaced workers. Although the 
actual percentage of persons who relocated to seek work is low compared with other 
indicators, the overall trend across industries reveals that there is a negative 
relationship between the level of IIT and the probability of geographical movement. It 
was argued earlier that in theory, IIT is more geographically concentrated than inter­
industry trade. If workers are displaced from an industry' with a relatively high level of 
IIT, they may expect there to be more opportunities for re-employment if they stay 
where they are rather than moving to another city or county. However, it is 
demonstrated in the case of indicator 3 that there is a positive relationship between the 
level of IIT and the probability of re-employment within the same industry. A 
geographical perspective may also provide support for the above result in the sense 
that, when workers are displaced from an industry with a high level of IIT and that 
industry is geographically more concentrated, the probability of re-employment within 
that same industry is high.
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As well as the main points outlined above, there are some other interesting 
relationships between the adjustment cost variables and some of the other explanatory 
variables in the regressions. One of the variables is structural change, which measures 
the average change of share of industry GDP in total GDP. The positive coefficient for 
the re-employment rate for those displaced (but only significant at 75 per cent 
confidence intervals) can be explained by the fact that when an industry’s share of 
GDP is larger, there is a better chance for the workers originally displaced from that 
industry to be re-employed. Another example is the explanation of the structural 
change effect on the average unemployment duration for re-employed workers, where 
a positive coefficient would mean that the larger the increase of an industry’s GDP 
share in total GDP, the longer the unemployment duration for those re-employed. This 
seems to contradict the generally accepted observation that if an industry is expanding, 
then the displaced should be quickly re-absorbed. In fact, in 1993-95, while the re­
employment rate was high, the unemployment duration for those re-employed was 
longer when the industry from which the workers were originally displaced was 
expanding. This may be explained intuitively as follows. The reasons for workers’ 
displacment from an industry in this study are plant or company closure or relocation; 
a plant or company may have continued to operate but workers lost or left jobs 
because of a downturn in work or the abolition of positions or shifts. But during that 
time, if an industry was expanding relative to other industries, it could have been the 
case that while some plants or companies closed or some positions were abolished, 
other plants or companies or positions may have been established. For re-employed 
displaced workers who took steps such as training to meet requirements for new jobs,
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unemployment duration is simply the time gap between the closure of one plant and 
the establishment of another.
Another explanatory variable is a dummy variable to distinguish between durable and 
non-durable goods. The inclusion of this variable is justified in the cases of costs 1, 5 
and 6. Workers displaced from durable manufacturing tend to have a high re­
employment rate with a high probability of loss of health insurance. Displaced 
workers in non-durable manufacturing have a high propensity to move to another 
place to seek re-employment opportunities. This is because the workers displaced 
from durable manufacturing may have skills which are more industry-specific, and the 
prospects for re-employment as a result of moving to another place tend to be small.
In summary, the hypothesis that the adjustment costs of intra-industry trade are lower 
than those of inter-industry trade is supported empirically by adjustment cost 
indicators in relation to IIT levels: they are positive and significant in relation to re­
employment rates and the probability of re-employment in the same industry and they 
are negative and significant in relation to average unemployment duration, probability 
of loss of earnings and health insurance, and probability of moving for re­
employment.
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fAlternative method: logit model
In the last section, adjustment cost indicators for each industry are first calculated, 
then the hypothesis that adjustment costs of displaced workers are lower when the 
industry from which they were originally displaced has a higher degree of intra­
industry trade specialisation than others is tested using an OLS estimation. The 
empirical results strongly support this hypothesis. But the small number of 
observations used in the test may lead to doubts about the strength of the hypothesis 
testing. Given the nature of each adjustment cost indicator,5 we can also apply the 
logit model to test the hypothesis.6
To conduct logit analysis I propose the following explanatory variables.
The first and most central variable is the level of intra-industry trade. As discussed in 
the section on the analytical framework, there are many aspects of intra-industry trade 
to be considered in explaining adjustment costs. Intra-industry trade is positively 
associated with the re-employment rate, and the rate for re-employment within the 
same industry, and negatively associated with the loss of health insurance and the loss 
of earnings, and costs arising from moving for work and unemployment duration.
5 Most of the adjustment cost indicators specified above are in the nature of dichotomous variables. For
6 In this case, the number of observations corresponds to individuals.
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Apart from this industry-specific factor,7 some individual characteristics that affect 
labour adjustment costs are included in the estimation. Age is one factor that reduces a 
worker’s mobility. Older workers generally find it harder to get a new job in another 
industry. This is because their capability for learning new skills is more limited, and 
they also have to put up with a loss in pay, seniority and job satisfaction. Older 
workers may, therefore, lack both the ability and the inclination to seek re­
employment in another industry (Cheh 1974). This argument has been supported 
empircally by Haber, Ferman and Hudson (1963) and Lipsky (1967).
Gender is another factor that may affect labour adjustment costs. It is argued that the 
impact of displacement fell most severely on females in 1974. This was probably 
because of the concentration of women in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. Marriage 
can also deter women from relocating or travelling to areas enjoying employment 
expansion (Bureau of Industry Economics, 1983). Crossley et al. (1994) also provide 
evidence of gender differences in displacement costs.
Lack of skills may also inhibit the re-employment of displaced workers. If import- 
competing industries are less skill-intensive than export industries, and the former 
contract while the latter expand, there may be short-term labour adjustment costs for 
unskilled labour employed in import-competing industries (Cheh 1974).
7 The inclusion of structural change as an explanatory variable is not justified in most cases of OLS 
estimation.
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Finally, union membership is clearly important in determining the extent of labour 
adjustment costs. Unions can provide members with protection especially when they 
have strong bargaining power.
We therefore specify the following variables for each industry to proxy:
Dependent variable:
1 When a person is re -  employed
Adjustment cost 1: *
0 Otherwise
1 When a person is re — employed in the same industry
Adjustment cost 2: *
10 Otherwise
1 When there is no earning loss
Adjustment cost 3:
0 Otherwise
1
Adjustment cost 4: <
0
When there is no health insurance loss 
Otherwise
r
1
Adjustment cost 5: <
When a person moves to seek work
0 Otherwise
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1 When unemployment duration is above average
Adjustment cost 6: <
0 Otherwise
Independent variables:
IIT: Intra-industry trade levels, which are calculated using the Grubel-Lloyd index, 
are shown in Table 5.8.
Age: A series of numbers which are the actual ages of people in the sample.
Sex dummies <
1 Male 
0 FemaleV
1 Union member
Union membership <
0 Otherwise
Education level: a series of initial code numbers from the survey which is used to 
estimate the skill level of displaced workers in the jobs they lost. The higher the 
number, the higher the skill levels.
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The regression results by applying the logit model are summarised in Table 5.12.8
By applying a logit model, we get the same relationship between adjustment cost 
indicators and IIT levels (or dummies) as in the OLS regression analysis: intra­
industry trade levels (or dummies) are positively associated with the re-employment 
rate and the rate for re-employment within the same industry, and negatively 
associated with loss of health insurance, loss of earnings, cost of moving for work and 
unemployment duration. Only the earnings loss indicator is insignificant.
For some other explanatory variables:
Age: The older the worker, the more difficult it is to gain re-employment; the older the 
worker, the more likely he or she is to suffer earning losses in re-employment; the 
older the worker, the less likely to have health insurance loss when taking a new job; 
the older the worker, the shorter the duration of unemployment for the re-employed 
who are advantaged by cumulative working experience; the older the worker, the less 
likely to move to another place to seek re-employment.
8 In the case when the dependent variable is re-employment, intra-industry trade dummies are used 
instead of levels of intra-industry trade after the failure of the use of IIT levels. Educational levels are 
omitted from the estimation, as there is a high statistical collinearity between IIT and educational levels 
(0.98) in this case.
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Sex: Males tend to have an advantage in securing re-employment; males tend to be 
more likely to be re-employed within the same industry; they tend to have fewer 
health insurance losses; but males’ unemployment duration is longer than females’.
Union: Union membership helps displaced workers find re-employment within the 
same industry, there are no health insurance losses and duration of unemployment is 
shorter, but there are earning losses from re-employment.
Education: Education levels are used here to represent the skill levels of displaced 
workers. The higher the level of skills, the more likely to be re-employed; the higher 
the level of skills, the less likely to be re-employed within the same industry (not 
significant); the higher the level of skills, the less likely to have health insurance 
losses; the higher the level of skills, the more likely to move to another place to seek 
re-employment.
Conclusion
Using data from the US ‘Current Population Survey, February 1996: Displaced 
Worker, Job Tenure, and Occupational Mobility’, this chapter tested the central 
hypothesis that adjustment costs for labour associated with an industry with a high 
degree of intra-industry trade specialisation are lower than those in an industry with an 
inter-industry trade specialisation.
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To test this hypothesis a linear probability model (OLS estimation) is applied. The 
results from this test support the hypothesis strongly: the six adjustment costs all have 
a negative and significant relationship with the level of intra-industry trade across 
industries. In consideration of the small number of observations used in the above test, 
an alternative model— a logit model— was also applied. The inclusion of some socio­
economic variables including sex, age and educational level, statistically affected the 
significance of the level of IIT in explaining labour adjustment costs. But five of the 
six adjustment cost indicators have expected and significant coefficients of IIT, which 
supports the hypothesis that there are lower labour adjustment costs associated with an 
industry with a high degree of intra-industry trade specialisation. At the same time, 
these results indicate that industry-specific factors in terms of trade specialisation do 
have an effect on labour adjustment costs.
Labour adjustment costs here are measured in terms of several adjustment cost 
indicators. An overall measure of labour adjustment costs is not constructed due to the 
availability of information. Constructing an overall measure and test of labour 
adjustment costs under different trade patterns would offer an overall assessment of 
the argument that adjustment costs under intra-industry trade are lower than those 
under inter-industry trade.
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Appendix
Table 5.Al Displaced workers by manufacturing industries, 1993-95
Industry All displaced 
(persons)
Displaced due to plant closed 
or position abolished
(persons)
Manufacturing 881 881
Durable goods 533 533
Lumber & wood prods, excl. furniture 35 35
Furniture & fixtures 27 27
Stone, clay, concrete, glass prods 29 29
Primary metals 31 31
Fabricated metals 57 57
Machinery, excl. electrical 107 107
Electrical machinery, equip, supplies 89 89
Transportation equipment 91 91
Motor vehicles & equip. 25 25
Aircraft & parts 29 29
Other transportation equipment 37 37
Professional & photo equip., watches 29 29
Other manufacturing industries 38 38
Toys, amusement & sporting goods 7 7
Misc. & n.e.c. mfg industries 31 31
Non-durable goods 348 348
Food & kindred prods 64 64
Tobacco prods 1 1
Textile mill prods 25 25
Apparel & other finished textile prods 72 72
Paper & allied products 28 28
Printing, publishing & allied inds 80 80
Chemicals & allied prods 36 36
Petroleum & coal prods 1 1
Rubber & misc. plastic prods 32 32
Leather & leather prods 9 9
Subtotal 3830 3830
Not in universe (-1) 2726 329
No response (-9) 52 52
Total 6608 4211
Source: See Table 5.1.
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Table 5.A2 Geographical movements of displaced manufacturing workers, 
1993-95
Industry Total Moved to Moved and
displaced seek work re-employed
(persons) (persons) (per cent) (persons) (per cent)
Manufacturing 881 68 7.72 59 86.8
Durable goods 533 39 7.32 35 89.7
Lumber & wood prods, excl. furniture 35 1 2.86 1 100.0
Furniture & fixtures 27 0 0.00 0
Stone, clay, concrete, glass prods 29 1 3.45 0 0.0
Primary metals 31 4 12.90 3 75.0
Fabricated metals 57 1 1.75 1 100.0
Machinery, excl. electrical 107 9 8.41 8 88.9
Electrical machinery, equip, supplies 89 6 6.74 6 100.0
Transportation equipment 91 10 10.99 10 100.0
Motor vehicles & equip. 25 4 16.00 4 100.0
Aircraft & parts 29 1 3.45 1 100.0
Other transportation equipment 37 5 13.51 5 100.0
Professional & photo equip., watches 29 3 10.34 3 100.0
Other manufacturing industries 38 4 10.53 3 75.0
Toys, amusement & sporting goods 7 0 0.00 0
Misc. & n.e.c. mfg industries 31 4 12.90 3 75.0
Non-durable goods 348 29 8.33 24 82.8
Food & kindred prods 64 6 9.38 4 66.7
Tabacco prods 1 0 0.00 0
Textile mill prods 25 2 8.00 1 50.0
Apparel & other finished textile prd. 72 3 4.17 2 66.7
Paper & allied products 28 4 14.29 3 75.0
Printing, publishing & allied inds 80 8 10.00 8 100.0
Chemicals & allied prods 36 3 8.33 3 100.0
Petroleum & coal prods 1 0 0.00 0
Rubber & misc. plastic prods 32 3 9.38 3 100.0
Leather & leather prods 9 0 0.00 0
Subtotal 3830 323 8.43 288 89.2
Not in universe (-1) 329 0 0.00 0
No response (-9) 52 3 5.77 1 33.3
Total 4211 326 7.74 289 88.7
Source: See Table 5.1.
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6  Foreign Direct Investment and Intra-industry Trade
Introduction
It is argued in the theoretical analysis (in Chapter 2) that in the face of trade 
liberalisation, adjustment costs under intra-industry trade are lower than those under 
inter-industry trade. A factor supporting this argument is the role of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Two aspects were taken into account when considering the 
adjustment implications of the role of foreign direct investment in IIT. The first aspect 
of the argument is that much intra-industry trade is in parts and components rather 
than in final goods, which are horizontally or vertically differentiated. However, as 
the traded components from foreign subsidiaries and host country suppliers are 
produced in the same ‘industry’ and rely upon similar skills, transferability of labour 
from contracting to expanding activities may be easier than the reverse. Furthermore, 
without FDI in the first place, the host country’s counterparts would face more inter­
industry adjustment in the face of increased import competition.
The second aspect is that firms undertake the costs of retraining labour as 
rationalisation takes place. As a result, resource relocation under IIT is quicker and 
smoother, significantly reducing the costs of dislocation and unemployment and 
reducing the need for government assistance to smooth the transition process.
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For these factors to provide support for the hypothesis that adjustment costs under 
intra-industry trade are lower than those under inter-industry trade, a crucial 
assumption is that intra-industry trade is closely related to foreign direct investment. 
But there has not been much theoretical analysis of the linkage between FDI and IIT 
and, in particular, there is little empirical research. As an alternative approach, taking 
intra-firm trade as a consequence of FDI, some researchers have studied IIT in the 
context of intra-firm trade to link FDI and IIT. Again, the empirical evidence linking 
intra-firm trade and IIT is thin.
Norman and Dunning (1984) come to no firm conclusion on the issue of whether 
intra-industry trade and FDI should be viewed as substitutes or complements. Agmon 
(1979) and MacCharles (1987) are in no doubt. They argue that FDI and intra-industry 
trade are complementary rather than substitutive. Markusen (1983) considers a variety 
of circumstances in which factor movements and commodity trade are likely to be 
complements rather than substitutes. A more rigorous theoretical analysis of the 
linkage between FDI and IIT is conducted by Greenaway and Milner (1986) using the 
OLI paradigm.1 Further models of intra-firm intra-industry trade are developed by 
Mainardi (1986) in situations where any intra-firm trade is likely to be intra-industry 
trade.
As mentioned earlier, empirical evidence on the link between intra-industry trade and 
intra-industry trade is remarkably thin. In measuring the determinants of FDI, in a 
study of 27 industries in 30 countries, however, Baldwin (1979) found that product 
differentiation affects FDI. Furthermore, although some studies suggest that FDI and
1 OLI represents ownership advantage, locational considerations and internalisation gains.
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IIT are closely linked, other empirical studies find no evidence to support such a 
connection. For example, as a determinant in explaining IIT, the activities of MNEs 
are found to be totally insignificant in Wickham and Thompson’s (1989) study.
Other evidence from the literature links IIT and foreign direct investment by 
examining the relationship between IIT and intra-firm trade. A case study by Bonturi 
and Fukasaku (1993) concludes that intra-industry trade in manufactured goods 
among developed countries often takes the form of intra-firm trade. Other case studies 
provide evidence on intra-firm trade in particular industries where intra-industry trade 
is prevalent (Casson et al. 1986). When Caves (1981) includes a proxy which directly 
measures intra-firm trade in a study of intra-industry trade in a multi-country and 
multi-industry study in the principal OECD countries, intra-firm trade turns out to be 
positively and significantly related to the pattern of intra-industry trade.
Thus, although there is some evidence consistent with a positive association between 
FDI and intra-industry trade, it is rather slight. For this reason, there is considerable 
merit in conducting further empirical study of the linkage between FDI and IIT.
Intra-industry trade and multinational enterprises—a theoretical explanation
Various theoretical developments contribute to understanding of the linkage between 
FDI and IIT. Agmon (1979) argues that the factors which are likely to result in the 
emergence of MNEs are precisely those factors that one can expect to result in intra­
industry trade; thus one can expect the two to go hand in hand. MacCharles (1987) 
sees FDI followed by intra-industry trade as an avenue to exploit firm-specific
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advantages as well as a means of acquiring information about foreign markets. In this 
setting, the linkages between FDI and IIT are intuitively observed. More rigorous 
explanations are conducted by Greenaway and Milner (1986) and Mainardi (1986). 
These are discussed below.
The OL1 paradigm
Dunning (1981) proposed an ‘eclectic’ approach known as ‘the OLI paradigm’ to 
explain the motives that may underlie foreign direct investment. According to this 
approach, foreign direct investment will occur when three conditions hold. First, the 
firm must enjoy certain ownership advantages in a foreign market and have a 
competitive advantage over local producers. The ownership advantage may take the 
form of technical know-how or patent protection. The second condition is the 
existence of specific locational advantages to produce in the foreign market. This 
locational advantage can take the form of access to raw materials, the availability or 
relatively cheap labour, or the ability to ‘jum p’ over import restrictions. The third 
condition is the opportunity to exploit ownership and locational advantage through 
internal markets, rather than through other ‘arms-length’ arrangements.
The linkage between FDI and IIT using the framework discussed above is based on 
the assumption that the goods one is dealing with are differentiated. According to 
Greenaway and Milner (1986), in the case of differentiated goods, ownership 
advantage may take the form of brand image. Locational advantages are perceived as 
flowing from differences in factor prices across countries, and perhaps the ability to 
respond more readily to changes in tastes through being located in the foreign market.
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Internalisation may not only reduce uncertainty and encourage trade, it might also 
facilitate the exploitation of vertical economies of scale.
Models of intra-firm intra-industry trade
Based on the work of Hirsch (1976) and Agmon and Hirsh (1979), Mainardi (1986) 
argues that any intra-firm trade is likely to be intra-industry trade. In this model it is 
assumed that a given firm is pursuing a strategy of cost minimisation and the firm is 
assumed to be considering arms-length export via FDI. Further, it is assumed that the 
commodites produced are differentiated. The conditions for FDI in country B on the 
part of a firm based in country A are stated by Mainardi as follows:
(6.1)
\ ai„p, (6.2)
(6.3)
\%p, < \%pq (6.4)
where
\  = marketing costs incurred by the subsidiary for its sales in country B;
\  = marketing costs incurred by the parent company for its export and sales in 
country B;
<5. = marketing costs incurred by the marginal indigenous supplier in country B;
\  = marketing costs incurred by an alternative foreign subsidiary located in country 
C;
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\  = marketing costs incurred by an alternative foreign subsidiary for its export and
sales in country B;
aiq = technical production coefficients;
Pq = unit prices of input q.
Equation (6.1) relates the marketing and production costs of the subsidiary in the host 
country to the marketing and production costs of the parent company undertaking 
arms-length transactions. The costs of the subsidiary and local competitors are 
compared in equation (6.2), equation (6.3) gives the possibility of investment in a 
third country and equation (6.4) compares the costs of the subsidiary and competing 
subsidiaries of other MNEs.
By separating production and marketing costs for both the parent company and the 
subsidiary, ‘horizontal’ intra-firm intra-industry trade will take place if the following 
conditions hold:
4 <4 and ait/ > ait/ Pq (1 < i < j ) (6.5)
7, >7, and au, pq < p„ ( j ^ i ^ n ) (6.6)
where
= marketing costs incurred by the subsidiary for its export and sales in country A; 
and
f i = marketing costs incurred by the parent company in country B.
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Condition (6.5) means that, for some product varieties, the parent company has a 
production cost advantage and for the same varieties, the subsidiary has an advantage 
in marketing costs. For a range of other varieties, the opposite situation may prevail 
(6.6). In these circumstances an MNE pursuing a strategy of cost minimisation would 
produce varieties 1 —» j  in country A to be sold in countries A and B. Varieties 
j  + 1 —» n are produced in country B and sold in countries A and B.
Following from this, Greenaway and Milner (1986) argue that intra-firm, intra­
industry trade will also occur because of location-specific production cost advantages 
and location-specific marketing cost advantages. Location-specific production cost 
advantage is related to economies of scale and scope. There may be an optimal plant 
size for a given number of varieties which necessitates specialisation by varieties. 
Differences in location-specific marketing costs are considered to be access to local 
consumers, and an ability to respond to changes in tastes and preferences, as well as 
lower freight costs.
In regard to vertically differentiated commodities, ‘quality’ is assumed to be a 
function of relative capital input. Differences in initial factor endowments would 
result in parent companies producing ‘high-quality’ varieties in capital-abundant 
countries whilst their subsidiaries specialise in ‘low-quality’ varieties in labour- 
abundant countries.
As noted above, MNEs can make available to their subsidiaries significant advantages 
through FDI, by means of their control of management expertise and knowledge about 
new products and production technologies. This knowledge and management
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expertise flows on an intra-firm basis and therefore provides foreign subsidiaries with 
comparative advantages over their counterparts in host countries. MNEs also have 
more flexibility in rationalising production through access to the products of affiliates 
and the marketing channels of parents. As a result, subsidiaries are better able to 
reduce costs and gain access to export markets and this gives rise to international 
intra-firm and intra-industry trade and resource relocation.
FDI and IIT are linked because multinationals engage in international specialisation 
by establishing plants as specialist suppliers of components to affiliates. The 
specialisation of production activities across nations allows MNEs to overcome the 
problems of small-scale production and diversity of activities that would exist if the 
plants were producing for the domestic market alone. At the same time, subsidiaries 
owned by multinationals in host countries are more efficient and competitive than 
their domestic counterparts. Therefore, much of the host country’s international trade 
takes the form of intra-firm trade as MNEs trade products and components among 
themselves on a two-way basis.
Data availability and limitations
Empirical study of the linkage between FDI and IIT is mainly hampered by the 
relative scarcity of detailed data on FDI. The only systematic information available on 
FDI and intra-firm trade is that produced by the US Department of Commerce.
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In the United States, a company is defined as an affiliate if the ‘parent’ company owns 
10 per cent or more of its voting stock. If the parent company owns more than 50 per 
cent of the voting stock, the affiliate company is considered to be a subsidiary of the 
parent company, and it is called a majority-owned foreign affiliate (MOFA). Some 
benchmark surveys (US Department of Commerce 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1994) 
provide data for foreign affiliates of US companies. These data are at a good level of 
disaggregation and the nationality of parent and affiliate companies is also available. 
Besides the benchmark surveys, annual surveys are also available, although they are 
limited in coverage in some instances. Thus the US Department of Commerce 
provides ‘universe’ estimates on an annual basis. A serious limitation is that some 
disaggregated data are not disclosed for reasons of confidentiality.
Recent developments of US foreign direct investment
Until the First World War, nearly all international investment was portfolio 
investment (Sodersten and Reed 1994). According to Henderson et al. (1997), US 
investment was different. From the beginning, Americans investing abroad have 
shown a greater propensity to transfer know-how than financial capital.
Between the wars, the United States began to emerge as a major source, primarily of 
direct investments, as American industrialists began to establish foreign operations in 
the image of their pre-Depression home-market successes. Following the Second 
World War, the United States became the primary supplier of international finance, 
first in the form of official loans and gifts, and secondly in the form of FDI, as
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American firms made major contributions to postwar industrial reconstruction. By 
1960, the United States was supplying about two-thirds of all international 
investment. By the 1980s, the European Union and Japan had joined in exporting 
their management technology through FDI. In the 1990s, with the fall of Soviet 
communism and the liberalisation of third-world economies, FDI became the main 
instrument for global industrialisation.
Trends and patterns
Figure 6.1 Total assets of US affiliates, region by destination, 1983-94
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Source: Author’s construction using data from ‘Total assets of affiliates, of majority-owned non-bank 
foreign affiliates of non-bank U.S. parents’, in U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, US Department of 
Commerce, various years.
As shown in Figure 6.1, recent US FDI in terms of total assets of affiliates has 
increased substantially. This is more pronounced for industries as a whole than for 
manufacturing. The increase in Europe is much more significant than in APEC. Table 
6.1 shows that the share of manufacturing in US foreign direct investment in all 
industries increased in the late 1980s from 35 per cent to around 38 per cent and
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declined in the early 1990s to around 29 per cent. This is because US foreign direct 
investment shifted towards (away from) manufacturing from (to) other industries, 
such as the wholesale and finance sectors. From a regional perspective, this decrease 
in the share of manufacturing in all sectors is more significant for Europe (from 40 
per cent in 1983 to 27 per cent in 1994) than for APEC (from 40 per cent in 1983 to 
34 per cent in 1994), developed APEC (from 39 per cent to 35 per cent) and 
developing East Asia (from 30 per cent to 29 per cent). MOFAs follow the same 
pattern and change of commodity structure as total affiliates.
Table 6.1 US foreign direct investment in manufacturing, (per cent), 1983-94
1983 1985 1988 1991 1992 1994
Total
All countries 35.03 36.49 37.93 35.99 33.87 28.86
Europe 40.46 41.54 40.77 36.80 33.65 26.84
APEC 39.97 42.37 40.58 39.52 38.18 34.21
Canada, Australia, Japan 39.10 41.94 39.42 38.16 37.72 34.77
East Asian developing 30.44 32.38 38.99 38.47 35.49 29.37
Others 20.55 19.76 23.53 22.82 23.39 22.63
Majority-owned
All countries 32.39 33.19 34.15 33.30 32.30 26.87
Europe 40.96 40.41 39.06 36.11 34.03 27.18
APEC 36.22 38.52 35.08 34.61 34.66 29.14
Canada, Australia, Japan 36.09 38.67 33.93 33.53 33.23 28.23
East Asian developing 26.30 28.28 31.58 31.41 32.32 26.04
Others 15.84 14.91 17.60 17.40 18.72 18.85
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Total assets of affiliates of total and majority-owned 
non-bank foreign affiliates of non-bank US parents’, in U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, US Department 
of Commerce, various years.
The changing pattern of US foreign direct investment is also reflected in changing
geographical patterns. Among MOFAs in all industries, Europe accounts about 40 per
cent of all US foreign direct investment in 1983, while APEC only accounts for
around 30 per cent and the rest of the economies take the remaining 30 per cent.
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Following a big change in 1988 and until 1994, Europe’s share increased to almost to 
55 per cent and the share of APEC increased to 35 per cent, with the rest of the 
economies shrinking to 10 per cent. But this geographical change is not observed in 
MOFA manufacturing industry, in which US direct investment in Europe is initially 
high— more than 50 per cent. It increases significantly over the 1980s and decreases 
slightly in the early 1990s, but still accounts for around 60 per cent of total investment 
in MOFA manufacturing. This change is accompanied by a large decrease in the rest 
of the economies’ share in total MOFA manufacturing while APEC economies 
experience no significant change.
Figure 6.2 US foreign direct investment by regions, 1983-94
MOFA in all industries MOFA in manufacturing
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Source: Author’s construction using data from Total assets of affiliates, country by industry of 
majority-owned non-bank foreign affiliates of non-bank US parents’, in U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 
US Department of Commerce, various years.
A further look at geographical changes in the APEC and European regions reveals 
different patterns. Both for MOFAs in all industries and MOFAs in manufacturing, 
US direct investment in developed APEC economies decreased significantly while it 
increased markedly in developing East Asian economies, especially in the early
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1990s. This may have been because of the good economic prospects in developing 
East Asian economies or the transfer of labour-intensive operations to East and 
Southeast Asia in the wake of the appreciation of the yen. Another factor may have 
been the investment boom in China (Petri 1995).
US direct investment in Europe is mainly in EC-12 economies, where MOFAs 
account for more than 80 per cent of all industries and MOFAs manufacturing take 
almost 95 per cent. This concentration increases for MOFAs in all industries over the 
1980s and the early 1990s and declines slightly in 1994. There is no significant 
change for MOFA manufacturing: it increased slightly in 1988 and decreased 
thereafter, falling slightly short of the 1983 level.
Figure 6.3 US foreign direct investment in APEC, 1983-94
MOFAs in all industries MOFAs in manufacturing
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Source: See Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.4 US foreign direct investment in Europe, 1983-94
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Source: See Figure 6.2.
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Petri (1995) argues that there are highly visible American export platforms in 
developing East Asia in the 1970s. Table 6.2 reveals that from 1983 to 1994, sales by 
affiliates from a regional perspective predominantly target the local market. For all 
countries, local sales by affiliates account for about 65 per cent of all sales in 1983, 
increasing to 67 per cent in 1994. Sales to other foreigners for all countries, which 
account for 24 per cent of total sales, decreased almost 2 per cent in 1994. The share 
of local sales in total sales for APEC (around 70 per cent) is about 10 per cent higher 
than that for Europe (around 60 per cent), while the share of sales to other foreigners 
in total sales for APEC (around 10 per cent) is about 20 per cent lower than that for 
Europe (around 30 per cent). For developing East Asia, local sales are low in 1983 
(38 per cent) and increase to 53 per cent in 1994; sales to other foreigners are 34 per 
cent in 1983 and decrease to 29 per cent in 1994.
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fTable 6.2 Sales by US affiliates, region of affiliate by destination, 1983-94
1983 1985 1987 1988 1991 1992 1994
Share of local sales in total sales
All countries 64.76 63.83 66.14 65.34 66.35 65.91 66.91
Europe 62.29 61.65 63.40 61.80 64.27 64.00 64.77
APEC 72.53 69.50 71.44 71.41 72.25 71.04 70.51
East Asian developing 38.48 34.47 38.53 41.76 n.a. 51.78 52.58
Others 57.42 58.18 64.67 65.15 58.00 59.52 65.57
Share o f sales to other foreigners in total sales
All countries 24.36 23.50 22.96 23.72 23.55 24.04 22.61
Europe 33.77 33.25 32.05 33.23 31.73 32.21 31.18
APEC 10.07 10.18 9.41 9.71 9.82 10.60 10.91
East Asian developing 34.05 36.45 32.42 34.38 27.91 n.a. 28.74
Others 23.68 20.70 15.81 16.73 19.28 18.91 16.30
Note: n.a. means not available.
Source: Author’s construction using data on ‘Sales by affiliates, country of affiliates by destination of 
majority-owned non-bank foreign afffiliates of non-bank US parents’, in U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad, US Department of Commerce, various years.
Another characteristic of US direct investment is the existence of substantial intra­
firm trade. As shown in Table 6.3, the share of intra-frim trade in total MNE trade 
increased between 1983 to 1994 at the global level, accounting for a substantial 
proportion of total MNE trade. Moreover, it can be seen from Table 6.4 that the share 
of intra-firm trade in national trade may also be substantial— 26 per cent on average 
for exports and 16 per cent on average for imports.
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Table 6.3 US intra-firm trade in US MNEs’ trade, 1983-94
A B B/A
US exports shipped by US parents
Total To affiliates Share
(US$ million) (US$ million) (per cent)
1983 146212 49397 33.8
1985 164138 61852 37.7
1987 166425 66414 39.9
1988 199704 79378 39.7
1991 239674 97124 40.5
1992 245475 104679 42.6
1994 317251 134311 42.3
US imports shipped to US parents
Total From affiliates Share
(US$ million) (US$ million) (per cent)
1983 115135 43632 37.9
1985 139416 54027 38.8
1987 150865 60379 40.0
1988 163117 69491 42.6
1991 193343 83483 43.2
1992 199858 92614 46.3
1994 240617 119438 49.6
Source: Author’s calculation using data on ‘US exports (imports) associated with US parents and their 
foreign affiliates of non-bank US parents’ in U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, US Department of 
Commerce, various years.
Table 6.4 US intra-firm trade in US total trade, 1983-94
Total Intra-firm Share Total Intra-firm Share
exports exports imports imports
(US$ million (US$ million) (per cent) (US$ million) (US$ million) (per cent)
1983 194620 49397 25.38 267971 43632 16.28
1985 205239 61852 30.14 358705 54027 15.06
1987 243682 66414 27.25 422407 60379 14.29
1988 304886 79378 26.04 459017 69491 15.14
1991 397705 97124 24.42 507020 83483 16.47
1992 420812 104679 24.88 551591 92614 16.79
1994 476190 134311 28.21 687096 119438 17.38
Sourcse: For intra-firm trade data, see Table 6.3; Total exports and imports are from UN commodity 
trade data in International Economic DataBank, Australian National University.
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The observed US intra-firm trade is mainly conducted with APEC economies— 62 per 
cent for exports and 72 per cent for imports in 1983— although the regional share of 
US total intra-firm trade is declining. Among APEC economies, Canada alone 
accounts for 65 per cent on average of APEC’s total US intra-firm trade. Together 
with Japan and Mexico, these economies account more than 80 per cent of APEC’s 
total US intra-firm trade.
Table 6.5 Regional distribution of US intra-firm trade, 1983-94
1983 1985 1987 1988 1991 1992 1994
Exports
All countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Europe 31.39 29.57 29.80 31.26 32.65 32.52 30.69
Others 6.88 5.81 5.29 4.89 13.94 14.80 15.58
APEC 61.73 64.62 64.91 63.85 53.42 52.67 53.74
APEC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada 66.95 68.84 65.34 62.47 64.20 64.16 58.71
Japan 5.55 6.46 8.32 9.82 15.25 14.17 13.93
Mexico 7.25 8.63 9.40 9.48 17.38 19.28 19.82
Imports
All countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Europe 12.16 13.62 17.31 16.84 15.42 15.40 15.13
Others 15.88 10.98 8.97 9.10 19.20 21.28 20.70
APEC 71.96 75.40 73.72 74.06 65.38 63.31 64.16
APEC 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada 67.53 65.33 60.22 62.27 66.92 67.63 68.16
Japan 2.25 3.05 4.69 4.41 3.63 3.72 4.07
Mexico 6.25 8.52 10.57 10.69 16.96 19.93 22.47
Source: Author’s calculation using data on ‘US Merchandise trade with affiliates, by country of affiliate 
of majority-owned non-bank foreign affiliates of non-bank US parents’, in U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad, US Department of Commerce, various years.
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One can see from Table 6.6 that US intra-firm trade is mainly concentrated in
manufacturing, although exports are declining and imports are increasing.
Manufacturing intra-firm trade is mainly from three sectors: transportation equipment;
machinery; and chemicals.
Table 6.6 Sectoral structure of US intra-firm trade, 1983-94
1983 1985 1987 1988 1991 1992 1994
Exports
All industries 100
Petroleum 2.89
Manufacturing 69.40
Food and kindred products 1.57
Chemicals and allied products 7.87
Primary and fabricated metals 1.25
Machinery, except electrical 11.04
Electric and electronic equipments 10.39
Tansportation equipment 29.41
Other manufacturing 7.87
Wholesale trade 25.69
Other industries 2.02
Imports
All industries 100
Petroleum 24.91
Manufacturing 66.39
Food and kindred products 0.89
Chemicals and allied products 4.04
Primary and fabricated metals 0.91
Machinery, except electrical 6.78
Electric and electronic equipments 13.60
Transportation equipment 35.66
Other manufacturing 4.51
Wholesale trade 6.45
Other industries 2.26
100 100 100 100 100 100
2.56 2.04 1.54 2.22 1.77 1.45
70.48 69.76 68.29 65.69 66.36 59.46
1.12 1.23 2.01 1.39 1.86 1.55
6.91 8.10 7.51 7.53 7.58 7.26
1.47 1.24 1.48 1.39 1.31 1.22
11.08 10.26 9.89 12.38 12.07 10.31
8.85 9.70 8.73 8.89 8.76 8.26
34.35 32.69 31.97 25.67 25.54 23.36
6.60 6.55 6.69 8.44 9.25 7.50
25.43 26.91 28.78 30.41 30.07 36.57
1.64 1.29 1.38 1.68 1.79 2.52
100 100 100 100 100 100
20.83 13.70 9.77 11.73 10.37 6.62
70.89 74.27 78.52 77.92 79.15 82.86
1.15 1.00 0.93 1.29 1.35 1.51
3.40 3.84 3.88 4.40 4.42 4.09
1.08 1.69 2.15 0.98 1.03 1.16
7.76 11.63 13.22 16.53 16.35 18.28
13.62 13.73 13.17 12.41 13.40 12.33
39.37 37.16 39.26 35.37 35.56 39.34
4.50 5.22 5.90 6.94 7.04 6.15
6.63 10.08 9.92 9.25 9.28 9.83
1.65 1.96 1.79 1.10 1.20 0.69
Source: Author’s calculation using data on ‘US merchandise trade with affiliates by industry of 
affiliates of majority-owned non-bank foreign affiliates of non-bank US parents’, in U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad, US Department of Commerce, various years.
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In summary, the volume and structure of US direct investment abroad have changed 
dramatically since 1983. Investment has increased more in Europe than in APEC and 
the share of investment in manufacturing has declined. Sales of affilates are 
concentrated in local markets. There is no strong evidence that there are US export 
platforms in developing East Asia. Most importantly, as US direct investment 
abroad increases, US intra-firm trade also increases. The proportion of US intra-firm 
trade in US MNE trade is substantial and increasing.
Relationship between FDI and IIT
As we can see above, US direct investment abroad and US intra-firm trade go hand in 
hand. Some theoretical studies argue that there is a link between FDI and IIT because 
intra-firm trade is trade in differentiated products. Therefore, one way of looking at 
the linkage between FDI and IIT is to seek empirical evidence to support the linkage 
between intra-firm trade and IIT. In practice, this approach is often restricted by data 
limitations (see Greenaway 1987). Other approaches, including the construction of a 
model of the determinants of FDI with product differentiation and the construction of 
a model of determinants of IIT with multinational activities as explanatory variables, 
also involve substantial data requirements. A direct and straightforward way is to look 
at the association between the two variables, that is, to examine association between 
an economy’s direct investment in various destinations and its IIT with the host 
economies.
2 At an individual country level, US investment in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1980s and 
Indonesia in the 1990s exhibits the pattern of export platforms.
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fThe FDI data are obtained from ‘Total assets of affiliates of US non-bank parents in 
Europe and APEC individual economies’, in U.S. Direct Investment Abroad (US 
Department of Commerce). IIT is calculated as Grubel-Lloyd indices using data from 
UN commodity trade and UNIDO export and import data at the 4-digit level.3 FDI for 
total non-bank foreign affilates of non-bank US parents and majority-owned non-bank 
foreign affiliates of non-bank US parents are included in the estimation. Industries are 
classified at two levels, all industries and manufacturing, as it is believed that IIT is 
mainly concentrated in manufacture. Also, as the previous section revealed, the 
regional patterns of US FDI vary. Despite conducting an analysis on pooled European 
and APEC economy data, a separate analy sis of Europe and APEC is expected to 
offer different results, as the patterns of US FDI in these regions are different. This 
analysis is conducted over four years: 1985, 1988, 1991 and 1994.
There are many ways to analyse the associations between two variables.4 Due to the 
nature of FDI and IIT data—FDI data are in values and IIT data are in percentage 
form— Spearman’s rank correlation is used in the estimation.
The formula for Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients is defined as:
'Z (R i -  RKSt -  S)  
I ' L ( R i - R ) 2' L ( S , - S ) 2
3 These data are obtained from the International Economic DataBank, Australian National University. 
See Chapter 4 for the definition, problems and justification of Grubel-Lloyd index as a measure of IIT.
4 See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion.
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where /?, is the rank of the ith x value, 51, is the rank of the ith y value, and R and S 
are the means of the R, and values, respectively. Averaged ranks are used in the 
case of ties (Mendenhall and Reinmuth 1978).5 6
Originally, 15 APEC economies and 17 European economies were included in the 
survey and estimations of US direct investment abroad using US Department of 
Commerce data. Due to confidentiality limitations, in some years, some economies’ 
data are not disclosed. The estimated Spearman’s correlation coefficients between 
FDI and IIT and the number of observations used are reported in Table 6.7.
From these estimates of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients, the hypothesis that 
there is a positive association between FDI and IIT is supported strongly. There is a 
positive relationship between US foreign direct investment in European and APEC 
economies together and US IIT with these economies. This positive association is 
evident at a 1 per cent significance level for all industries, for manufacturing, for total 
non-bank foreign affiliates, and for majority-owned non-bank foreign affiliates for all 
the years estimated.
5 When there are no ties in either the R or the S observations, the expression for 6 can be reduced to
6 Idf
the simpler expression as often appeared in some of the text books: 6 = 1 - ---------- where d: = St -  /?,
n ( n - 1)
and n is the number of observations.
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Table 6.7 Estimated Spearman’s correlation coefficients between FDI and IIT
All industries 
Total Majority-owned
Manufacturing
Total Majority-owned
All econom ies
1985 0.562** 0.597** 0.643** 0.586**
(31) (31) (31) (29)
1988 0.551** 0.604** 0.576** 0.636**
(31) (31) (31) (31)
1991 0.641** 0.649** 0.659** 0.789**
(31) (32) (30) (32)
1994 0.588** 0.548** 0.583** 0.617**
(31) (32) (29) (32)
Europe
1985 0.801** 0.818** 0.859** 0.799**
(17) (17) (17) (15)
1988 0.791** 0.816** 0.774** 0.774**
(17) (17) (17) (17)
1991 0.796** 0.796** 0.770** 0.789**
(17) (17) (16) (17)
1994 0.755** 0.755** 0.746** 0.748**
(17) (17) (15) (17)
APEC
1985 0.364 0.368 0.468* 0.333
(14) (14) (14) (14)
1988 0.307 0.411 0.407 0.485*
(14) (14) (14) (14)
1991 0.472* 0.461* 0.567* 0.630*
(14) (15) (14) (15)
1994 0.346 0.249 0.394 0.496*
(14) (15) (14) (15)
Notes: 1) Data in parenthesis are the number of observations.
2) * significant at 5% critical value.
3) ** significant at least at 1% critical value.
4) Critical values are obtained from ‘Critical values of Speearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient’, in Statistics for Management and Economics.
Source: Author’s calculations.
When the estimation is conducted for Europe and APEC economies seperately,
however, the results are different. The results obtained from European economies are
consistent with the pooled sample: positive and siginificant at a 1 per cent
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significance level. Although the results obtained from APEC economies exhibit a 
positive association between FDI and IIT, they are only significant at a 5 per cent 
significance level in 1991 for all industries, in 1985 and 1991 for total manufacturing, 
and in 1988, 1991 and 1994 for majority-owned manufacturing.
These different results for Europe and APEC are not surprising as US direct 
investment to these regions has been observed to be different. US direct investment 
abroad is mainly concentrated in developed economies; the investment volume in 
Europe is larger than in APEC; and in APEC, US direct investment is mainly 
concentrated in a few economies such as Canada, Japan and Mexico.
It is also argued that to some extent, trade in parts and components between northern 
firms and southern counterparts takes the form of non-equity subcontracing 
arrangements. That is, intra-industry takes place, but at arm’s length. Oman (1989) 
argues that non-equity forms of corporate networking based on outward-oriented 
industrialisation have been important in the recent economic development of Asia 
Pacific economies.
Conclusion
One of the factors that supports the central hypothesis that adjustment costs under 
intra-industry trade are lower than those under inter-industry trade is related to the 
activities of MNEs. This argument crucially depends on a linkage between FDI and
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IIT. This chapter, therefore, reassessed the linkage between FDI and IIT both 
theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, the linkage between FDI and IIT can be explained using an OLI 
paradigm by assuming the goods traded are differentiated vertically or horizontally. 
Mainardi (1986) also demonstrates in a theoretical model that all intra-firm trade can 
be regarded as intra-industry trade. Using data in ‘U.S. Direct Investment Abroad’ 
from the US Department of Commerce, the patterns of and changes in US direct 
investment abroad are examined and it is found that intra-firm trade is growing hand 
in hand with FDI. A further examination, using Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficients, reveals that US direct investment to European and APEC economies and 
intra-industry trade with these economies is positively and significantly correlated.
Although this study is conducted using US data alone, the underlying theory is 
generalisable. One can expect similar results in other economies given the availability 
of data.
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r7 Determinants of Intra-industry Trade: A Case Study
of Asia Pacific Economies
Introduction
So far the thesis has examined relative adjustment costs under different trade patterns 
from several angles. In the face of trade liberalisation, the conclusion is that 
adjustment costs under intra-industry trade are lower than those under inter-industry 
trade. This result supports the argument that successful economic integration of 
European economies may have been based partly on their high levels of intra-industry 
trade. What, then, of APEC economies and their attempts to proceed with trade 
liberalisation? The level of intra-industry trade among APEC economies remains low. 
It may therefore be that trade liberalisation among APEC economies will involve 
high adjustment costs. What are the trends in trade specialisation in the region? If 
there is a tendency towards increased intra-industry trade, this could ease the burden 
of adjustment to regional trade liberalisation.
Whether further close economic integration and trade liberalisation will be followed 
by lower adjustment costs will depend upon the determinants of intra-industry trade. 
A large number of studies have explored the origion of IIT. Theoretical studies of the 
determinants of IIT, as surveyed in Chapter 2, are extensive. But most empirical 
studies of IIT deal with European or OECD economies, and there is little empirical 
analysis of the determinants of IIT for APEC economies. Asia Pacific economies
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differ considerably from European economies and among themselvies in respect of 
per capita income, size of economy and level of industrialisation, exposure to external 
trade, commodity patterns of trade and so on (see Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council 1995 and Fukasaku 1992). The question is whether the theoretical 
explanations of IIT that emerge from empirical studies of developed economies, have 
relevance to countries sch as those in the Asia Pacific region.
Previous empirical studies suggest that the level of intra-industry trade among 
developed economies is high. It has been recognised in the last few years that intra­
industry trade among less developed countries (LDCs) is becoming more significant. 
This is especially so among the most dynamic group of LDCs— Asian newly 
industrialising economies (NIEs)— whose impressive economic performance is the 
key element in East Asian and Pacific growth. Following earlier work (Fukasaku 
1992; Lee 1989; Loertcher and Wolter 1980; Lowe 1991), this chapter examines the 
determinants of intra-industry trade using data from economies in this region for 
1975, 1985 and 1995. The analysis will not only help to identify the main 
determinants of intra-industry trade but also to clarify the peculiarities of economic 
adjustment in this region. The findings from this exercise should provide insight into 
the prospects of future economic integration among the economies of Asia and the 
Pacific.
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Literature survey
Theoretical explanations of I IT
A review of theoretical models of IIT was conducted in Chapter 2 with ithe aim of 
drawing out the adjustment implications of inter- versus intra-industry trade. These 
models are summarised below for the purpose of examining the determinants of intra­
industry trade in Asia Pacific economies.
The first group of models incorporates competition between a large number of firms. 
There are several models that explain intra-industry trade within the Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework. These models are based on factor endowment differences and specify 
production as different combinations of basic factors such as capital and labour in a 
way that is consistent with constant returns to scale and perfect competition, 
demonstrating that the pattern of intra-industry trade is driven by relative 
endowments. One well-known such model was developed by Falvey (1981). Based 
on differences in factor endowments, this model reveals that intra-industry trade 
occurs along vertically differentiated products giving the reciprocal demand for both 
high and low qualities of a product between two countries. On the other hand, models 
incorporating monopolistic competition, scale economies in production and diverse 
consumer tastes, intra-industry trade along horizontally differentiated products has 
been explained by Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1979) and 
Lancaster (1980). The main idea behind these models is that if the number of 
varieties enters directly into consumers’ utility function (desire for variety), but the
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economies of scale limit the number of varieties in production, then IIT indeed may 
take place and, by increasing the number of varieties, have positive welfare effects.
The second group comprises oligopolistic models focused on the strategic 
interdependence between firms in an industry. A distinguishing feature of these 
models is the form of conjecture assumed to influence a firm’s decision. Brander and 
Krugman (1983), using a Coumot-type conjecture, developed a model which explains 
intra-industry trade in an identical commodity which is often referred to as two-way 
trade or ‘cross-hauling’. That this two-way trade can occur is a consequence of price 
being above marginal cost in both markets, both producers seeking to maximise their 
profit by selling to both markets, taking the sales of the other producer as given so 
long as transportation costs are not high.
Empirical studies
Several economists have estimated the degree of intra-industry trade. The results of a 
comparative study undertaken by Greenaway and Milner (1989) suggest three 
important findings. First, as expected, the level of IIT is lower when a more detailed 
level of industry classification is applied. Second, the level of IIT is higher for 
manufacturing than for other industries. Third, among different economies, intra­
industry trade is dominant for all developed market economies (DMEs), especially in 
trade between the DMEs. It is less important but still significant for the newly 
industrialising economies, but it is only of relatively minor importance for less 
developed countries.
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Greenaway and Milner (1989) surveyed the literature on the testing of hypotheses 
about intra-industry trade. Their survey covers a wide range of empirical studies 
including those of Pagoulatos and Sorenson (1975), Finger and De Rosa (1979), 
Loertscher and Wolter (1980), Caves (1981), Toh (1982), Lundberg (1982), Culem 
and Lundberg (1983), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Bergstrand (1983), Tharakan 
(1984, 1986), Greenaway and Milner (1984) and Balassa (1986a, 1986b). Since then, 
other important studies have been published, such as those by Lee (1989), Lowe 
(1991), Fukasaku (1992) and Clark (1993). The hypotheses tested in these studies are 
either derived from various theories of IIT or suggested by more casual empiricism. 
According to Greenaway and Milner (1989), the hypotheses can be grouped under 
three headings: country-specific variations in intra-industry trade intensity for any 
given industry will depend on the characteristics of the trading partners; industry - 
specific variations in intra-industry trade intensity across industries will depend on 
commodity/industry-specific demand and supply characteristics; and policy-based 
variations in intra-industry trade intensity are influenced by policy/institutional 
factors.
The major country-specific hypotheses are that the average levels of IIT will be high: 
(1) in DMEs compared with LDCs because of differences in income and in economic 
structure; (2) in ‘large’ economies compared with ‘small’ ones since the scope for 
product diversity and economies of scale may be expected to be higher in the former; 
(3) when there is taste overlap between trading partners, since this may increase the 
scope for the exchange of differentiated commodies; and (4) when trading partners 
are geographically close, either because proximity means lower transport costs or 
because of similarities of culture and taste.
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rThere are five industry-specific hypotheses. IIT will be higher: (1) the greater the 
product differentiation; (2) in commodities where there is scope for scale economies;
(3) when the market structure tends towards monoplistically competitive conditions;
(4) when there is potential for product cycle trade and/or technological 
differentiation; (5) when there are more multinational corporations.
The two policy-based hypotheses are that IIT will be greater when tariffs and non­
tariff barriers are low; and when economies are subject to some form of economic 
integration.
Existing econometric studies which test some of these hypotheses generally confirm 
the expected signs of the estimated coefficients and are sometimes statistically 
significant, although this is not always the case. In some, the scale economy variables 
are less consistent; and tariff barriers are often an insignificant variable. A major 
difficulty with such studies is to obtain data which are appropriate proxies for the 
explanatory variables, as economic theory suggests. This is especially so for two 
important industry-specific explanatory variables: product differentiation and scale 
economies. Given these difficulties, the explanatory power of the regressions in these 
sudies is often low. Another feature of the econometric studies in the field is that 
there are very few studies of vertical product differentiation and the activities of 
multinational corporations as they affect IIT. Greenaway, Hine and Milner (1994) use 
an intuitively plausible criterion to disentangle vertical and horizontal IIT in the 
bilateral trade of the United Kingdom, and show that in that country over two-thirds 
of all IIT is vertical. From this finding, it is worthwhile to distinguish between
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horizontal and vertical IIT and to work on their explanations separately. On the other 
hand, using the case of the automobile industry, Becuwe and Mathieu (1992) show 
that intra-firm trade is the major determinant of intra-industry trade in that industry.
Model specifications
In the literature, there is no consistent theoretical framework to analyse intra-industry 
trade. Different models explain intra-industry trade under different assumptions. But 
the major difference arises from the different types of intra-industry trade, namely 
vertical and horizontal intra-industry trade. To undertake a proper empirical 
examination of the determinants of intra-industry trade in Asia Pacific economies, 
these characteristics of intra-industry trade must be taken into account in specifying 
an econometric model for IIT.
Vertical intra-industry trade
One well-known model, which explains vertical intra-industry trade, was developed 
by Falvey (1981). This model reveals that vertical intra-industry trade is driven by 
differences in factor endowments giving the reciprocal demand for both high and low 
qualities of a product between two countries.
This model is grounded in a two-country, two-factor setting, where initially each 
country has different endowments of capital and labour and capital is industry- 
specific. Further it is assumed that at least one sector produces a differentiated rather
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than a homogeneous commodity. The commodity is assumed to be vertically 
differentiated. Quality is determined by the capital-labour ratio. Demand for different 
product qualities is assumed to be a function of the product quality’s relative price 
and consumer income. It is assumed that where varieties of a commodity do vary by 
quality consumers will always prefer a higher quality to a lower quality variety. 
However, choice is income-constrained, and some consumers may be initially 
confined to consume a ‘low’ quality variety. As income increases, however, they will 
switch from th ‘low’ quality to a high quality variety.
On the basis of these assumptions, Falvey (1981) demonstrated that as long as there 
exists a demand for both high quality and low quality products, intra-industry 
exchange will take place. As a consequence of the assumption that a higher capital- 
labour ratio results in a higher quality product, a capital-abundant country will export 
relatively high quality products, whilst a labour-abundant country will export 
relatively low quality products.
Clearly, the relative capital intensity of production is a major causal force behind this 
model.
Following from this, a hypothesis can be generated that the larger the difference in 
factor endowments, the higher the degree of vertical intra-industry trade. 
Accordingly, the econometric model can be specified as:
1IT* =f ( RDKij) + uij (7.1)
where
7/Tv represents bilateral vertical intra-industry trade;
RDKtJ represents the difference in factor endowments of the countries concerned;
Ujj represents the error term.
Horizontal intra-industry trade
There is a large body of literature explaining intra-industry trade along horizontally 
differentiated products. In the survey of the determinants of intra-industry trade in 
Chapter 2, they are grouped under circumstances of monopolistic and oligopolistic 
competition. In summary, these models have several implications for horizontal intra­
industry trade.
• Similarities in production stucture, consumers’ tastes and initial factor
endowments are necessary for the presence of horizontal intra-industry trade. 
These are the conditions for the presence of horizontal intra-industry trade under 
Neo-Chamberlinian models.1 For example in Krugman’s (1979) study, it is 
assumed that there are two economies which are identical in every respect. Every 
variety of differentiated products enters the consumers’ utility function 
symmetrically and each variety will be produced in only one country. When trade 
opens, there will be welfare gains for consumers in both countries due to the fact 
that the number of post-trade varieties available in both countries is greater than
1 Examples of neo-Chamberlinian models can be found in Krugman (1979, 1980 and 1982); Dixit and 
Norman (1980); and Venables (1984).
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the number available to either under autarky. The gains of opening up economy to 
trade is the increase in the scale of production, leading to lower unit costs and 
prices.
• Economies of scale are important in determining horizontal intra-industry trade. 
Also as mentioned above in the discussion of neo-Chamberlinian models, the 
incentive to opening up to trade from the production side is the gains which result 
from increases in the scale of production leading to lower unit costs of 
production. This means that economies producing differentiated products and 
trading can take advantage of the larger market.
• Diversity in consumer preferences plays an important role in determining 
horizontal intra-industry trade. Neo-Hotelling models explain horizontal intra­
industry trade based on the assumption of diverse preferences. For example, in the 
basic Lancaster model, assuming initial factor endowments are the same, 
horizontal intra-industry trade takes place as a consequence of preference 
diversity from demand and decreasing costs from production. This is because 
consumers in both countries can enjoy the variety closer to their ideal one with 
trade than under autarky. Both countries will also benefit from lower product 
prices due to exploitation of scale economies.
• Geographical factors to some extent determine horizontal intra-industry trade. For 
example intra-industry trade could occur between countries with a common 
border. Because of low transportation costs in the parts of the country adjacent to 
the border, it is sometimes cheaper to trade products across the border than to
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transport the product within the country. Further, when countries are 
geographically close, consumers tend to have a similar cultural environment and 
therefore similar tastes which is a necessary conditon in some models for the 
generation of horizontal intra-industry trade. Finally under Brander and 
Krugman’s (1983) oligopolistic model, trade in identical commodities can occur 
when transportation costs are low.
• Trade restrictions or barriers will diminish any international trade.
Based on the results derived above, and together with previous empirical studies, the 
following hypotheses can be formulated for horizontal intra-industry trade.
(1) The smaller the difference in per capita income between two countries, the 
more similar are consumer tastes, hence the higher the degree of horizontal intra­
industry trade. This is because similarity in economic development is an important 
factor affecting the similarity of consumer tastes.
(2) The smaller the difference in factor endowments between two countries, the 
higher the degree of horizontal intra-industry trade. Similarities in factor endowment 
are one of the characteristics explaining horizontal intra-industry trade. At the same 
time it is a necessary condition for economies to have a similar production structure 
and to exhibit similar consumer tastes.
2 This explanation can also be applied in explanation of across-border inter-industry trade and vertical 
intra-industry trade.
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(3) The larger the economic size of countries, the more varieties of differentiated 
goods can be produced under the condition of economies of scale, hence the greater 
the degree of horizontal intra-industry trade.
(4) The lower the trade barriers and transportation costs, the greater the level of 
horizontal intra-industry trade.
(5) The higher the levels of development among countries, the higher the 
capability to develop and produce highly horizontally differenciated goods. These 
countries are characterised by highly differentiated demand which allows for the 
exploitation of economies of scale in the production of a wide variety of individual 
commodities.
Accordingly, the econometric model for this study will be as follows:
IK ; = f(RD Cij,RDKij,LNYu,BIASij,DUMs) + vu (7.2)
where IITH denotes th bilateral horizontal IIT of country i with country j. RDCi} is a
proxy variable indicating similarities in demand and tastes between countries. The 
hypothesis is that similarities in demand and consumer tastes between two countries 
create markets for differentiated products, thereby increasing intra-industry trade. 
RDK. is included in the regression equation as a proxy variable representing
similarities in the relative factor endowments between two countries. LNYtJ is a 
variable indicating the average market size of the countries involved. Variable BIAS.
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is the overall measure of trade resistance between economies. DUMs are the dummy 
variables to capture the effects of economic integration and similarity in extent of 
economic development.
Theory suggests that there are different determinants of vertical and horizontal intra­
industry trade. Accordingly, the empirical model can be specified as (7.1) and (7.2). 
To test these models, the key issue is to disentangle total bilateral intra-industry trade 
into vertical and horizontal trade respectively. As noted in the last section, so far only 
one or two studies have disentangled intra-industry trade empirically. For example, 
Greenaway, Hine and Milner (1994) used an intuitively plausible criterion to 
disentangle the bilateral intra-industry trade of the United Kingdom. To follow their 
criterion to disentangle intra-industry trade in Asia Pacific economies involves 
massive data requirements and calculations. Further, it is expected that there are no 
comparable data available for all economies in this region. Hence, an examination of 
the determinants of intra-industry trade can only be conducted at an aggregate level. 
However, it is still possible to examine the determinants by looking at the relative 
importance of vertical or horizontal intra-industry trade in total intra-industry trade. 
That is to say, if vertical intra-industry trade is dominant in total bilateral intra­
industry trade, empirical tests will reveal that the total bilateral intra-industry trade is 
explained by differences in factor endowments and vice versa.
The empirical model of the determinants of intra-industry trade therefore can be 
specified as:
IITl} = f{RD C l}, RDKtj, LNYi}, BIAStj, DUMs) + £.. (7.3)
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where
IIT^  represents total bilateral intra-industry trade between economies. 
etj represents the error term.
One of the hypotheses is changed from (7.2) so that if bilateral intra-industry trade is 
predominantly vertical, the larger the differences in factor endowments the higher the 
degree of total intra-industry trade, and if bilateral intra-industry trade is 
predominantly horizontal, the more the similar the factor endowments the higher the 
degree of total intra-industry trade.
Data description and issues
Intra-industry trade can be measured using the Grubel—Lloyd index. RDCi} is a
proxy variable indicating similarities in demand and tastes between countries. It is 
defined as the relative difference in per capita income and is given by:
RDC.
PCYi -  PCY ■
( PCYi + PCYj )
(7.4)
where PCY denotes the per capita income of the countries. We expect a negative sign 
on the coefficient of this variable.
1 See Chapter 4 for definition of, problems with and justification for the use of this measure.
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BIAS.. is the overall measure of trade resistance between economies. Drysdale (1967)
defined an index of country bias for each commodity:
where X* is a country’s exports of commodity k to country j.
A weighted average of indices of country bias for all commodities k yields an index 
Btj of country bias in i’s aggregate export trade with j :
(7.6)
where X* is the hypothetical value of X,* obtaining when Z?* equals unity, and X i} is 
the hypothetical value of X (j obtaining when all B * equal unity. The ratio X* / X(/ is 
equal to the percentage contribution of commodity k to complementarity in f  s 
exports to j. But due to data limitations, the variable distance (LDIS) is a proxy for 
the trade barriers between two countries including transportation, insurance costs and 
geograghical proximity. It is calculated as a natural logarithm of the distance (in 
kilometres) between major seaports of the two countries. The justification for this 
proximation is that relative distance is a powerful determinant of country bias in trade 
(Drysdale and Gamaut 1982).
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tRDKi} is a proxy variable representing the relative factor endowments between two
countries, which is measured by relative difference in capital stock per head and is 
given by:
where PCK denotes the per capita capital stock of the countries. This captures the 
degree of product differentiation on the supply side, based on the fact that demand for 
product differentiation can be met from the supply of such products when the two 
countries’ factor endowment are similar. We expect a negative sign on the coefficient 
of the variable when horizontal intra-industry trade dominates and a positive sign on 
the coefficient of the variable when vertical intra-industry trade dominates. But the 
relative difference of per capita capital stock is highly correlated to the relative 
difference in per capita income. The existence of multicollinearity prevents these two 
variables from being included simultaneously in a regression equation (Fukasaku 
1992). Given this problem, we will omit the RDC variable. This proposition can be 
justified in the following way: when the variable LDIS is a proxy for economic 
barriers between the two countries, as some economists argue, this variable may 
actually capture other effects, such as similarity of culture and tastes.
LNYi} is the average market size of the countries involved. It is measured by
PCKt -  PCKJ
(7.7)
LNYl} =\og(GNPi +GNPj )
(7.8)
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where GNP is Gross National Product, and the expected sign for the coefficient is 
positive.
The regression equation includes several dummy variables in order to capture the 
special features of bilateral trade relationships as well as the extent of economic 
development that are not specified by the explanatory variables noted above:
DUM1 ASEAN trade arrangements (+)
DUM2 North American trade arrangements (+)
DUM3 Australia-New Zealand bilateral trade (+)
DUM4 Developed countries bilateral trade (+)
DUM5 NIEs bilateral trade (+)
DUM6 Developing countries bilateral trade (-)
DUM7 Developed and NIEs countries bilateral trade (+)
Dummies 1-3 are intended to capture the effect of economic regional integration on 
intra-industry trade. Dummies 3-6 measure the relationship between bilateral intra­
industry trade and the development level of the economies. Australia and New 
Zealand are small natural-resource-based developed countries; the other developed 
countries in the Asia Pacific region are included in D4. Considering the dynamism of 
Asia Pacific economies and possible changes in trade patterns, D7 is set to represent 
the bilateral intra-industry trade between developed countries and NIEs.
Thus, the final test equation becomes:
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IIT1; = f(RDKtj, LNYtj, LDISIJ, DUMs) + utj (7.9)
This study focuses on the Asia Pacific region and includes 18 economies: Brunei, 
Chile, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Thailand and 
Mexico, which are regarded as developing countries; Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and 
Singapore, which are NIEs; and Japan, Canada, the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand are developed countries, among which Australia and New Zealand, which 
are natural-resource-based developed countries.
Most of the data were extracted and calculated from STARS, the International 
Economic DataBank (IEDB) at the Australian National University for the years 1975, 
1985 and 1995. The IIT index is calculated using UN industrial data from IEDB ISIC 
Trade Data on manufacturing at the 4-digit level. As shown in Tables 7.1,7.2 and 
7.3, there are 255 observations for each year (Brunei, Chile and Papua New Guinea 
cannot be found as reporters), but due to missing data for some economies, the actual 
usable data are 234 for 1975 and 1985, and 230 for 1995. The data of IIT that are 
summarised in Table 7.4 indicating that the IIT index varies over a wide range (from 
0 to 75.8). Clearly, there is an increasing trend in the level of IIT over the years 
observed.
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Table 7.4 Main statistics for the IIT index
Year Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
1975 234 11.78 11.58 0.00 64.80
1985 234 18.76 15.54 0.00 69.30
1995 230 27.04 17.35 0.00 75.80
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.
There are no capital stock data on a comparable basis available for these economies. 
Therefore, following Lowe (1991), capital stock is calculated by cumulating gross 
investment over the previous 15 years with a depreciation rate of 5 per cent per year. 
This proximation can be justified by the construction of this variable: the variation in 
relative difference between capital stock per head will almost always be insensitive to 
the depreciation rate (Due 1993).
Data on gross domestic investment and population are taken from the World Bank’s 
World Tables. They are measured in US dollars at 1987 prices, and persons, 
respectively.
GNP data are taken from the World Bank’s World Tables. For Hong Kong and 
Brunei, gross domestic product (GDP) is used, since there are no other available data. 
These data are also in US dollars at 1987 prices.
The distance data are estimated using The Times Atlas of the World.
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Model estimation and hypotheses testing
Firstly, the model specified above has been estimated with Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimations for each year using cross-sectional data. The regression results and 
selected statistics are reported in Table 7.5. R 2 denotes R-square adjusted for degree 
of freedom.
To ensure the validity of our regression results, some diagnostic tests must be carried 
out. A possible source of problems is heteroscadasticity in disturbance terms in 
conducting the regression analysis based on the cross-sectional data. In order to see 
whether the assumption of homoscadasticity holds, the Glejser test, commonly 
regarded as a more powerful test, is applied for the years 1975, 1985 and 1995, 
respectively. Comparing the calculated results with the critical value, the null 
hypotheses of homoscadasticity was rejected at the 5 per cent level for each year.
When there is heteroscadasticity there can still be unbiased coefficients from th OLS 
regression, but the estimates are no longer efficient. One commonly used method to 
correct for heteroscadasticity is to use a logit transformation of the variables in the 
model. But this raises problems for the logit tranformation of the IIT indices, since 
these calculated indices could have any value in the range between 0 and 100, and 
some of these logit indices will have a negative sign. This causes a serious problem 
when OLS is used in the estimation of the logit model and it was apparent in 
conducting these tests.
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Table 7.5 Regression results (OLS estimation)
1975
A
1985
B
1995
C
Pooled
D
1975
A’
1985
B’
1995
C
Pooled
D’
RDK -2.25
(-0.83)
-11.09
(-2.79)
-14.96
(-3.08)
-12.95
(-5.63)
-2.25
(-1.06)
-11.09*
(-2.29)
-14.96**
(-3.17)
-12.95**
(-5.41)
LNY 3.45
(3.13)
6.01
(3.84)
10.63
(6.23)
9.92
(11.49)
3.45**
(2.88)
6.01**
(3.31)
10.63**
(5.92)
9.92**
(11.04)
LDIS -1.79
(-3.11)
-4.10
(-5.21)
-6.02
(-7.30)
-4.07
(-8.70)
-1.79*
(-2.30)
-4.10**
(-5.13)
-6.02**
(-6.05)
-4.07**
(-6.92)
DUM1 13.71
(2.54)
12.33
(3.57)
21.43
(5.83)
17.29
(8.38)
13.71**
(3.62)
12.33**
(3.19)
21.43**
(5.90)
17.29**
(6.91)
DUM2 17.05
(4.00)
17.19
(2.97)
3.55
(0.60)
10.30
(3.01)
17.05**
(2.44)
17.19**
(2.95)
3.55
(0.80)
10.30**
(2.69)
DUM3 12.85
(1-94)
25.57
(2.85)
31.67
(3.41)
26.09
(4.89)
12.85**
(4.13)
25.57**
(8.27)
31.67**
(9.88)
26.09**
(5.96)
DUM4 5.01
(1.58)
-8.79
(-2.05)
-14.18
(-3.12)
-10.99
(-4.44)
5.01
(1.67)
-8.79
(-1.95)
-14.18**
(-3.24)
-10.99**
(-4.66)
DUM5 10.13
(3.47)
12.96
(3.28)
6.26
(1.40)
10.09
(4.22)
10.13**
(4.15)
12.96**
(2.35)
6.26
(0.85)
10.09**
(3.03)
DUM6 -7.34
(-4.08)
-11.67
(-4.59)
-14.37
(-4.88)
-11.30
(-7.41)
-7.35**
(-4.54)
-11.67**
(-4.86)
-14.37**
(-6.26)
-11.30**
(-8.43)
DUM7 7.15
(3.92)
3.55
(1.33)
-3.14
(-0.93)
0.73
(0.46)
7.15**
(4.55)
3.54
(1.24)
-3.14
(-0.93)
0.73
(0.48)
const. -13.19
(-1.07)
-9.09
(-0.51)
-36.24
(-1.77)
-52.52
(-5.16)
-13.19
(-0.90)
-9.09
(-0.43)
-36.24
(-1.58)
-52.52**
(-4.68)
R 2 0.43 0.42 0.51 0.44
Observations 234 234 230 698
Note: 1) Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
2) * significant at 5 per cent level.
3) ** significant at 1 per cent level. 
Source: Author’s estimation.
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Table 7.6 Test results for heteroscadasticity and misspecification
Year Glejser test ( X  2> DF= 10) Reset test (F(DF1, DF2))
1975 61.56 3.42(1,220)
1985 47.32 1.85 (1,220)
1995 42.88 2.65(1,216)
Critical value at 5% 18.3 3.84
Source: Author’s estimation.
For these reasons, White’s (1980) Heteroscadastic-Consistent Covariance matrix 
estimation was used to correct the estimates for an unknown form of 
heteroscadasticity. With correction for heteroscadasticity, the regression equations 
were re-estimated using the OLS estimations and the results are reported in columns 
D, E, F of Table 7.5. It should be noted that the regression coefficients are unchanged, 
as expected.
With correction for heteroscadasticity, the estimated coefficients of RDK  and LDIS 
all have the expected negative sign and are significant at the 5 per cent level (RDK  in 
1995 is insignificant); the coefficients of LNY all have a positive sign and are 
significant at the 5 per cent level. For dummy variables 1, 2, 3 and 5, the estimations 
are consistent for each year with the expected positive sign, and all are significant, 
except dummy variable 5. But the coefficients of D7 are positive in 1975 and 1985, 
negative in 1995, significant in 1975 and insignificant in 1985 and 1995. Coefficients 
of D6 all have a negative sign and are very significant. Coefficients of D4 are positive 
in 1975 but negative in 1985 and 1995, insignificant in 1975 and significant in 1985 
and 1995.
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tFor the 1975, 1985 and 1995 pooled sample estimations, all coefficients have the 
expected signs (except D4) and all are significant (except D7).
Another diagnostic test which was conducted is the specification of the model, since 
any misspecification of the model will lead to biased estimates. Reset tests were 
applied to examine the test for misspecification. As the results in Table 7.6 show, 
they are not statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, so we cannot reject the null 
hypotheses for all equations for each year.
Since the same regression equations were applied over two decades, a test for 
structural change with the predictive test for stability was undertaken to test the 
hypotheses for parameter constancy. The tests can be carried out by using the 
following test statistic:
j 7  _  (RSS -  RSS1) / n2 
R S S J ( n x- k - 1)
which has an F-distribution with degree of freedom n2 and nx- k  — 1. Here RSS = the 
residual sum of squares from the regression based on nx + n2 observations and this 
has (nx +n2) - ( k  + 1) degree of freedom. RSSj = the residual sum of squares from the 
regression based on the nx observation; this has nx—k — 1 degree of freedom.
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Table 7.7 Statistics for stability test
1975, 1985 1985, 1995
RSS 53926 69616
RSS1 17013 31005
F(DF1,DF2) 2.07(234, 223) 1.21(230, 223)
F-tables 1.00 1.00
Source: Author’s estimation.
These tests were conducted for the years 1975 and 1985, 1985 and 1995. We reject 
the hypotheses of stability of the parameters statistically for each case. According to 
the test results reported above, the parameters of the models vary with respect to their 
stability for different years under study and hence suggest that there is structural 
change over time.
Interpretation of results
With the use of proxy variables and regression equations including explanatory 
variables representing country characteristics, quantative interpretation of regression 
coefficients becomes rather difficult and may obscure the meaning. However, 
qualitative interpretation of the estimated coefficients still has good economic 
meaning since it comes directly from the theoretical models. Therefore we will focus 
on the qualitative interpretation of the estimated results.
The coefficients on RDK are negative and statistically significant (except in 1975), 
supporting the hypothesis that similarities in factor endowment increase the degree of 
intra-industry trade. At the same time, this result indicates that the intra-industry trade
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among economies in the Asia Pacific region is more likely dominated by horizontal 
intra-industry trade. The result, that there is a negative relationship between IIT and 
differences in factor endowment variable, is predictably consistent with that of Lowe 
(1991) given that we used his method to calculate the RDK: measuring relative 
resource endowments more accurately, we find that the link between resource 
dispersion and intra-industry trade remains strong. The insignificance of that 
coefficient in 1975 suggests that bilateral IIT among APEC economies was not 
explicitly driven by similarities in factor endowment at that time.
As discussed above, the size of the economies involved affects the extent of intra­
industry trade by allowing exploitation of economies of scale. Regression results 
show that all the LNY variables have significant positive coefficients, suggesting that 
relative economic size is an important determinant of intra-industry trade.
The coefficient of the LDIS variable suggested that if the distance between two major 
seaports of countries i and j  is longer than that of i and k countries, the IIT share of 
trade between countries i and j  on average will be lower than the intra-industry trade 
share of trade between countries i and k. This is because, on one the hand, the longer 
the distance between economies, the greater the transportation costs. This will 
certainly have a negative effect on IIT between these economies. On the other hand, 
in geographically closer economies, culture and consumers’ tastes tend to be more 
similar, and there, intra-industry trade is more likely to be driven by the demand side 
in these economies.
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fA very interesting finding from this study is that the economic integration dummies 
and economic development level dummies tend to play a important role in 
determining the extent of intra-industry trade in this region. The three coefficients of 
the dummies indicating the subeconomic groups in this region all have significant and 
positive signs and the shares explaining IIT show an increasing trend over time. More 
specifically, there is a statistically positive and significant relationships between 
economic integration and the level of intra-industry trade among these economies.
This result suggests several underlying facts. Firstly, economic integration will 
positively affect consumers’ tastes in the direction of diversification, therefore 
affecting intra-industry trade on the demand side. Secondly, FDI which results intra­
firm trade is higher in a common market than in a non-integrated market. This 
follows from the greater ease of movement of capital within an integrated market. 
Thus there are sound reasons for expecting the potential for intra-firm trade, which 
may be recorded as intra-industry trade, to be greater in an integrated market than in a 
non-integrated market (Greenaway 1987). Thirdly, increased intra-industry trade 
arising from economic integration results mainly from the reduction in trade barriers 
among economies. This implies that trade liberalisation causes industries to move 
toward an intra-industry trade pattern. One of the reasons for this phenomenen is that 
the gains from trade liberalisation under intra-industry trade specialisation are greater 
than those under inter-industry trade specialisation. Another reason is that the 
adjustment costs associated with intra-industry trade are lower than those associated 
with inter-industry trade (the main finding of this thesis). In the face of trade 
liberalisation, short-term adjustment costs resulting from the closure of industries can 
be eased when countries engage in intra-industry trade specialisation rather than inter­
industry trade specialisation.
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Regression results for the four development level dummies reveal that on the one 
hand, countries with a higher development level tend to have larger scope for the 
realisation and expansion of trade in highly differentiated products. On the other 
hand, if a group of countries has a similar level of development, it will have similar 
preference structures and factor price relations, therefore the extent of intra-industry 
trade is greater. As the regression results reveal, while the coefficients of natural- 
resource-based developed countries and NIEs are positive, the coefficient of 
developing countries has a negative sign, which supports the above argument, but at 
the same time, the coefficient of the developed countries changes from a positive to a 
negative sign and from insignificance to significance over time, and that result seems 
to be at odds with the point discussed above. However, the coefficents of D7 
indicating bilateral IIT between NIEs and developed countries change from positive 
to negative and from significance to insignificance. This contradiction may be 
explained by changes in the pattem of trade or interdependence between the 
economies, with both developed countries and NIEs increasing their intra-industry 
trade with developing countries over time.
Conclusion
This chapter examined empirically the determinants of intra-industry trade among 
Asia Pacific economies with a special focus on country characteristics. The results 
provide strong support for the hypothesis put forward to explain observed intra­
industry trade and show that the main theoretical framework which is generally
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believed to be applicable to trade among developed countries can also be applied to 
trade in this region among developed, newly industralising and developing countries.
At the aggregate level, growth in intra-industry trade can in large part be explained by 
the convergence of factor endowments. The greater the relative difference in capital 
stock per head, the lower the share of intra-industry trade in total bilateral trade, since 
a similar production structure and overlapping tastes in two countries will ensure the 
potential gains from intra-industry trade. Simultaneous economic growth or a 
lowering of transaction costs among trading partners, either due to a relative decrease 
of prices for transport and communication services or to a removal of policy-imposed 
trade barriers, tend to be accompanied by an increase in intra-industry trade. This 
chapter also demonstrates that economic integration tends to have a positive effect on 
the development of intra-industry trade in the Asia Pacific region.
The analysis identified the main determinants of intra-industry trade. The findings 
from this chapter, together with the findings from previous chapters, raise important 
policy implications for current and future economic integration within economies in 
the Asia Pacific region. This will be discussed in next chapter.
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Adjusting to Trade Liberalisation: Some Conclusions
Summary
This study examined adjustment costs associated with resource relocation under inter­
industry trade and intra-industry trade patterns in the face of trade liberalisation.
Adjustment costs are defined in this study as costs arising from the adjustment 
process where greater import penetration leads to a contraction in domestic 
production. For example, resources are displaced from domestic production and may 
become temporarily unemployed. Redeployment of resources is costly for those 
involved in terms of temporary loss of earnings, relocation, job search and retraining 
expenses. 1
It is argued theoretically that adjustment costs under intra-industry trade are likely to 
be lower than those under inter-industry trade. This argument is firstly supported 
using the specific-factors model. It is shown that from the perspective of market 
segmentation, intra-industry trade is both occupationally and geographically less 
segmented; in respect of factor price differences, the gap between factor prices before 
and after trade liberalisation for intra-industry trade is less than that for inter-industry 
trade. Therefore, under intra-industry trade, adjustment is likely to be smoother
1 Increased import penetration is, of course, only one of many potential sources of adjustment cost and 
not necessarily the most important one. Yet the task here is simply to assess which kind of import 
penetration - that associated with growing inter-industry trade or that associated with growing intra­
industry trade incurs the most severe adjustment burden. -
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because structural unemployment can be avoided and existing skilled labour and 
physical capital can be re-employed more effectively. Inter-regional mobility of 
capital and labour is not required in the process of adjustment and the adjustment 
response to price changes is faster.
The argument that adjustment costs are lower under intra-industry trade compared 
with those under inter-industry trade is also supported by the following two facts. 
Firstly, there are studies which indicate that there are linkages between intra-industry 
trade and foreign direct investment. Two aspects were taken into account when 
considering the adjustment implications from that perspective. The first is that much 
intra-industry trade is in parts and components rather than trade in final goods, which 
are horizontally or vertically differentiated. This IIT through intra-firm trade partly 
results from the fact that subsidiaries owned by multinationals are more efficient and 
competitive than the host country’s countparts. However, as the traded components 
from foreign subsidiaries and host country suppliers are produced in the same 
‘industry’ and rely upon similar skills, transferability of labour from contracting to 
expanding activities may be easier than it would otherwise be. The second aspect is 
that firms will undertake the costs of retraining labour as rationalisation takes place. 
As a result, resource relocation under IIT is quicker and smoother, significantly 
reducing the costs of dislocation and unemployment and lessening the need for 
government assistance to smooth the transition process.
Secondly, it is argued that it is possible for both factors of production to gain from 
trade liberalisation under intra-industry trade. Under inter-industry trade, a gain from 
trade liberalisation in one factor must accompanied by a loss in another factor.
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fConsequently, it is easier to manage the adjustment following trade liberalisation 
under intra-industry trade.
A survey of existing empirical studies relating to adjustment costs and intra-industry 
trade was conducted. Previous empirical studies of adjustment costs can be classified 
into five groups: the case study approach; the econometric approach; the CGE 
approach; the factor intensity approach; and the marginal intra-industry trade 
approach. All these approaches are subject to one or both of the following limitations 
in measuring adjustment costs: lack of dynamic features and indirect measurement. 
The dynamic factor demand model is therefore taken up as a possible vehicle for an 
empirical study of adjustment costs under different trade patterns.
Empirical analysis of adjustment costs associated with the intra-industry trade pattern 
and inter-industry trade was undertaken in four steps.
The first step was the introduction of a dynamic adjustment costs model. Based on 
earlier development of the adjustment costs model, Epstein (1981) has shown that by 
applying the familiar principles of duality and the envelope theorem to the value 
function, one can generate optimal solutions to quasi-fixed input and variable input 
and output supply.
Due to the fact that Epstein’s dynamic adjustment costs model is based on the price­
taking assumption of firms, the justification for the use of this model under 
economies of scale and imperfect competition was discussed. The result is that when 
economies of scale are external to firms and internal to the industry, the price-taking
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assumption of firms is maintained. When economies of scale are internal to firms, 
only when firms follow price competition can the ‘price-taking’ assumption be 
loosely attained.
The purpose of this discussion was to justify the use of the dynamic adjustment costs 
model in the case of inter-industry trade as well as intra-industry trade. The theoretical 
explanation of inter-industry trade is based on the conventional framework of perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale. But horizontal intra-industry trade involves 
product differentiation, economies of scale, monoplistic competition and oligopolistic 
behaviour, while vertical intra-industry trade is still explained under conditions of 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale.
The model provided the theoretical foundation of the empirical analysis. This model 
not only accounts for the relationships among multiple outputs, inputs and the 
exogenous shifter, it also allows for the imperfect adjustment of resources in response 
to changes in external forces.
The second step in conducting the empirical analysis was to test the hypothesis that 
intra-industry factor adjustment is associated with industries with high levels of intra­
industry trade. The test was carried out as follows:
• The use of the dynamic adjustment costs model in the case of inter-industry trade 
and vertical intra-industry trade is straightforward, but in the case of horizontal 
intra-industry trade it relies on the fact that the existence of monoplistic
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competition is rare in reality and that existing theoretical explanations of 
horizontal intra-industry trade are based on an assumption of price competition.
• Optimal solutions of factor demand and output supply were derived following the 
steps described in Epstein’s initial work on the dynamic adjustment costs model 
when the function of production is assigned in a quadratic form.
• Using data obtained from the OECD’s international sectoral database in quasi- 
fixed input demand equations, adjustment coefficents were estimated at the 
subdivision level of ISIC manufacturing industries. Due to the availability of data, 
this derivation was conducted for Canada, Germany and the United States.
• In explaining the determinants of labour and capital adjustment coefficients, two 
effects— a trade specialisation effect and structural change effect—were specified 
in the empirical model. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the higher 
the degree of intra-industry trade specialisation in an industry, the stronger intra­
industry factor adjustment.
Evidence obtained provided initial support for the central hypothesis that in the face 
of trade liberalisation, the adjustment costs of factor relocation under intra-industry 
trade specialisation are lower than those under inter-industry trade specialisation. 
From the perspective of adjustment costs, intra-industry factor adjustment means that 
there are likely to be fewer costs associated with retraining and relocating of labour, 
and that laid-off capital can be re-used more effectively.
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Thirdly, the central hypothesis that the adjustment costs for labour associated with an 
industry with a high degree of intra-industry trade specialisation are lower than those 
with an inter-industry trade specialisation is tested by using data from the US ‘Current 
Population Survey, February 1996: Displaced Worker, Job Tenure, and Occupational 
Mobility’.
The tests of this hypothesis were firstly conducted by applying a linear probability 
model (OLS estimation). The results from this test supported the hypothesis strongly: 
the six adjustment costs all have a negative and significant relationship with the level 
of intra-industry trade across industries. In consideration of the small number of 
observations used in the above test, an alternative model— a logit model— was also 
applied to test the hypothesis. The inclusion of some socio-economic variables, 
including sex, age and educational level, statistically affected the significance of the 
level of IIT in explaining labour adjustment costs. But five of the six adjustment cost 
indicators have expected and significant coefficients in respect of IIT, supporting the 
hypothesis that there are lower labour adjustment costs associated with an industry 
with a high degree of intra-industry trade specialisation.
One of the factors that supports the central hypothesis that adjustment costs under 
intra-industry trade are lower than those under inter-industry trade is related to the 
activities of MNEs and the fact that the linkage between FDI and IIT is crucial. 
Therefore, the fourth step in conducting the empirical analysis was to assess the 
linkage between FDI and IIT both theoretically and empirically.
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Theoretically, the linkage between FDI and IIT can be explained using an OLI 
paradigm by asssuming that the goods traded are differentiated vertically or 
horizontally. Mainardi (1986) also demonstrates in a theoretical model that all intra­
firm trade can be regarded as intra-industry trade. Using data on ‘US direct 
investment abroad’ from the US Department of Commerce, the patterns of and 
changes in US direct investment abroad are examined and it is found that intra-firm 
trade is growing hand in hand with FDI. A further examination, using Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficients, reveals that the relationship between US direct 
investment to European and APEC economies and intra-industry trade with these 
economies is positive and significantly correlated.
To draw policy implications based the theoretical and empirical analysis of 
adjustment costs under different trade patterns, it is necessary to examine whether the 
theoretical determinants of intra-industry trade can be verified empirically. Because 
existing empirical studies are mainly of European economies, this study tested the 
determinants of intra-industry trade among APEC economies for the years 1975, 1985 
and 1995. It was found that the main theoretical framework which is generally 
believed to be applicable to trade among developed countries can also be applied to 
trade in APEC region among developed, newly industralising and developing 
economies. Similarity in resource endowments is a strong determinant in explaning 
IIT among economies in APEC region in 1985 and 1995 although it was insignificant 
in 1975. This suggests that the pattern of intra-industry trade has become horizontal in 
the last two decades. The level of economic development and similarity in stage of 
development are important determinants of intra-industry trade in this region.
Distance also explains the development of intra-industry trade in the region because
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rof its impact on transportation costs and consumer tastes. It was also found that there 
is a statistically positive and significant relationship between economic integration 
and the level of intra-industry trade among these economies.
Main findings
The most important finding of this study is that in the face of trade liberalisation,
adjustment costs under intra-industry trade are lower than those under inter-industry
trade. More detailed findings of this study can be outlined as follows:
• If an industry has a high degree of intra-industry trade specialisation, the intra- 
industy factor adjustment is more strongly evident.
• When labour adjustment costs are measured in terms of six indicators, there are 
lower labour adjustment costs associated with an industry with a high degree of 
intra-industry trade specialisation.
• There are strong linkages between foreign direct investment and intra-industry 
trade. This linkage is mainly channelled through intra-firm trade.
• Although APEC economies are more diverse than European economies, the 
theoretical determinants of IIT are also verified in this region.
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Policy implications for trade liberalisation in Asia and the Pacific
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation process was initiated in 1989 in response to 
the growing interdependence among Asia Pacific economies. Begun as an informal 
dialogue group with limited participation, APEC has since become the primary 
regional vehicle for promoting open trade and practical economic cooperation. In the 
Bogor Declaration of Common Resolve, leaders of this region stated that the 
foundation of economic growth is open trade. They agreed that APEC member 
economies should work towards free trade and investment in the region, with the 
industrialised economies achieving the goal of free and open trade and investment no 
later than 2010 and developing economies no later than 2020.
There remain great challenges for regional economies in achieving APEC’s stated 
goals. As shown in Figure 8.1, each individual APEC economy (except Chile), has 
more than 60 per cent of its total imports sourced from the APEC region itself. If 
these imports are to be subjected to restriction, then trade liberalisation among APEC 
region will bring about adjustment pressures in domestic production.
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Figure 8.1 APEC economies’ sources of imports, 1993 (per cent)
Source: author’s calculation based on data from UN Commodity Trade in International Economic 
DataBank, Australian National University.
Table 8.1 shows that there are substantial trade barriers associated with the economies 
within the region both in terms of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Tariffs are 
probably the most transparent trade impediment and form of assistance. There are 
substantial tariffs in APEC economies. Manufacturing was the sector with the highest 
tariff levels, followed by agriculture and then mining. Almost all APEC economies, 
including high-income economies, apply tariffs.
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Table 8.1 Tariff averages and frequency ratios of core non-tariff barriers, APEC 
economies, 1993 (per cent)
Tariffs
D1 D2 D3 Total
NTBs
D1 D2 D3 Total
Australia 0.52 0.31 9.00 7.14 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.61
Canada 3.44 2.06 9.92 8.37 2.35 5.00 7.49 6.67
Chile 11.00 11.00 10.94 10.95 0.44 9.28 10.58 9.34
China 26.39 12.89 48.61 42.35 30.04 40.61 21.92 24.81
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.14 0.12
Indonesia 12.72 4.75 21.21 18.51 0.18 0.50 4.13 3.31
Japan 3.77 0.02 6.47 5.48 26.41 0.29 7.29 8.60
Korea 11.87 2.79 12.51 11.39 4.06 5.05 1.86 2.44
Malaysia 8.76 4.51 9.96 9.24 25.94 1.73 2.43 4.89
Mexico 12.11 8.80 14.01 13.24 3.01 16.67 5.18 6.19
New Zealand 1.24 0.59 10.48 8.41 0.00 0.00 1.12 0.88
Philippines 27.25 19.92 30.52 29.02 15.32 37.50 39.44 36.62
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.58 1.56 0.00 1.14 1.06
Taiwan 11.56 1.50 10.41 9.57 66.47 59.31 28.56 35.98
Thailand 30.53 19.45 41.29 37.67 3.57 2.05 16.91 13.86
USA 2.23 0.80 6.87 5.72 1.95 1.29 19.65 15.75
Notes: Data for 1993 cover all economies except Singapore (1989), Indonesia and the Philippines 
(1990), Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand (1991) and Korea and Taiwan (1992). No data were 
available for Brunei and PNG; D1 represents the division of agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing, 
D2 represents the division of mining and quarrying, and D3 represents the division of manufacturing; 
NTBs are calculated by using the UNCTAD’s NTB inventory as frequency ratios for core NTBs in the 
Survey o f Impediments to Trade and Investment in the APEC region.
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data from Appendix G in the Survey o f Impediments to 
Trade and Investment in the APEC Region, 1995.
Non-tariff measures are defined as any non-tariff instrument that interferes with trade, 
thereby distorting domestic production (PECC 1995 and Petri 1995).
There are also substantial NTBs in APEC economies. Agriculture was the main sector 
with the highest level of NTBs, followed by manufacturing, then mining. All APEC 
economies apply NTBs, including, on occasions, high-income economies.
The results of a sectoral survey conducted by the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (1995) reflect the fact that economies tend to protect sectors in which they do
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not have a comparative advantage—for example, high tariff protection is generally 
associated with areas of low comparative advantage. Under this situation, trade 
liberalisation causes the importable sector of each country to shrink, thereby causing 
relocation of labour and capital between sectors. The more an industry is protected 
before trade liberalisation, the more likely it is that the industry will contract after 
liberalisation. This relocation of labour and capital is not without cost; for example 
resources that are displaced from domestic production may become temporarily 
unemployed. The redeployment of resources will be costly for those involved in terms 
of temporary loss of earnings, relocation, job search and retraining expenses. When 
the costs are high, they can cause great disruption to domestic economic growth and 
stability. The result obtained from this study, that there are lower adjustment costs 
associated with intra-industry trade specialisation than with inter-industry trade 
specialisation, has significant policy implications for trade liberalisation in this 
region.
From the findings of this study outlined above, the following policy implications can 
be generated for APEC trade liberalisation.
Level of intra-industry trade
It has become an article of faith that the European Community’s early liberalisation 
succeeded because of intra-industry trade: few industries disappeared in any of the 
original six members, although all European economies rationalised production by 
reducing runs of the varieties of product they produced and lengthening the 
production runs of the varieties retained. Rarely is this wisdom questioned, even when
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rapplied to any other liberalisation exercises that feature large shares of intra-industry 
trade. The results obtained from this thesis that there are lower adjustment costs 
associated with resource relocation under intra-industry trade than with inter-industry 
trade, therefore give firm support to this wisdom. From that perspecive, the answer to 
the question of whether APEC’s trade liberalisation was and is taking place with 
similar ease therefore depends, among other things, on the level of intra-industry trade 
in and among economies in this region.
Table 8.2 Aggregate IIT index of manufactures, 1975,1985 and 1995
1975 Ranking 1985 Ranking 1995 Ranking
Australia 31.58 6 23.06 14 31.68 14
Brunei 0.07 18 0.49 18 33.89 13
Canada 60.44 3 70.69 2 68.97 3
Chile 9.1 15 10.74 16 23.13 17
China 18.48 11 24.08 13 38.38 10
Hong Kong 36.58 4 51.02 7 31.46 15
Indonesia 4.41 16 11.27 15 26.25 16
Korea 36.47 5 49.39 8 55.21 7
Japan 26.86 9 26.22 12 36.88 12
Malaysia 28.82 8 52.01 6 59.58 5
Mexico 25.75 10 53.91 5 60.65 4
New Zealand 17.07 12 28.38 11 37.65 11
Philippines 14.86 14 53.93 4 55.36 6
PNG 1.33 17 4.83 17 3.07 18
Singapore 61.35 2 71.27 1 77.1 1
Taiwan 30.24 7 39.97 9 54.95 8
Thailand 15.14 13 30.61 10 51.41 9
USA 61.93 1 60.53 3 70.72 2
Unweighted average 26.69 36.80 45.35
Notes: These trade-weighted averages of IIT are calculated using the SITC International Trade Data of 
5-9 manufactured products; Hong Kong’s trade data include domestic exports only whereas 
Singapore’s trade data include both domestic base trade and re-exports.
Source: Author's calculation using data from UN Commodity Trade in International Economic 
DataBank, Australian National University.
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Table 8.2 presents the aggregate IIT index of manufactures for 18 Asia Pacific 
economies. This is a trade-weighted average IIT index calculated at the SITC 3-digit 
level. These figures reveal a number of interesting characteristics of the development 
of IIT among Asia Pacific economies. First of all, over two decades, the level of IIT 
has increased significantly, especially in some developing economies. In Brunei, 
Chile, China, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines and Thailand, the level of intra­
industry trade was negligible in earlier years but had increased greatly by the mid 
1990s.
In newly industrialised economies such as Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Malaysia, the level of intra-industry trade is increasing; up to the 1990s the level is 
over 50 per cent of total trade (except in Hong Kong). The very high level of IIT in 
Singapore is associated with the special position of this economy as the entrepot for 
China and the ASEAN countries. Entrepot trade usually involves minor processing 
and/or services such as packing and marketing.
Among developed countries in the region, while USA and Canada’s IIT level 
increases from an initially high level, Australia and Japan’s IIT has not increased 
greatly and their trade is still dominated by an inter-industry trade pattem. This is 
because these two economies have a strong revealed comparative advantage, in 
natural resources in the case of Australia, and manufacturing in Japan.
In the past two decades, the pattem of international trade within this region has seen 
significant changes. In 1975, there were only three economies whose trade was 
dominated by intra-industry trade. In 1994, nine out of 18 economies had a trading
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pattem dominated by intra-industry trade. The rest had a trade pattem still dominated 
by inter-industry trade.
Further examination of bilateral intra-industry trade reveals that a significant degree 
of intra-industry trade is among developed economies and NIEs. Among developing 
countries the level of intra-industry trade is not significant at all.2
In summary, in Asia Pacific economies, the intra-industry trade level among 
developed economies is relatively high but among less developed countries (LDCs), 
the level is still relatively low, although in the last few years the level of intra-industry 
trade has grown within the most dynamic group of LDCs— Asian newly 
industrialising economies (NIEs). The trade pattem of Asia Pacific economies was 
and still is characterised by inter-industry trade between economies, in contrast to 
Europe. Compared with relatively painless industrial adjustment to trade liberalisation 
in Europe, Asia Pacific economies might be expected to suffer higher adjustment 
costs in the face of trade liberalisation.
Despite the difficulties in adjusting to trade liberalisation for APEC economies, there 
are still some policy measures that can help smooth the path of trade liberalisation. 
Assuming that relocation of labour from one industry to another requires each worker 
to pay a fixed cost, a country has to bear a total adjustment cost which is linearly 
related to the number of workers relocated. Furusawa and Lai (1996) found in their 
study that the most cooperative and hence most efficient self-enforcing trade 
liberalisation path is the one of gradual trade liberalisation. They also found that an
2 See Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.
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increase in trade adjustment assistance, in the form of compensation for workers 
relocating out of the protected sector, will accelerate the pace of trade liberalisation 
and is welfare-improving. Based on these results and the current situation of APEC 
economies—large adjustment costs expected in the process of trade liberalisation— 
the introduction of trade adjustment assistance and gradual trade liberalisation is 
likely to smooth the path of trade liberalisation.
Growth of intra-industry trade
Since adjustment costs under intra-industry trade are lower than those under inter­
industry trade, facilitating the development of IIT in Asia Pacific economies will help 
ease the adjustment process in further economic integration; and industrial structural 
adjustment will be less painful in future trade liberalisation. The following measures 
are considered to be important in facilitating the development of IIT.
Economic development
From previous empirical studies and the study in Chapter 7, it can be seen that 
economic development levels are important determinants of intra-industry trade in 
general. This is because the higher the level of development among economies, the 
higher the capability to develop and produce highly differentiated manufactured 
goods. These economies are characterised by highly differentiated demand which 
allows for the exploitation of economies of scale in the production of a wide variety 
of individual commodities. Further, the more similar the level of economic
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development, the more similar the consumers’ tastes will be and the more likely it is 
that markets for differentiated products will be created.
The most notable feature of GDP levels in the APEC economies as a group is their 
diversity. APEC comprises very large and small economies; developing and 
developed economies; slowly and rapidly growing economies. It is made up of 
economies vastly different in size and at different stages of development.
The rapid growth of many Asia Pacific economies was led, particularly in the early 
years, by a rapid expansion in exports. This was especially the case in East Asia in 
respect of goods whose production required intensive use of their abundant labour. 
China and the more populous Southeast Asian economies are still at this stage. Some 
more advanced economies have come to rely more heavily on expanding and 
maturing domestic demand. Even so, trade expansion is important in terms of 
improving industrial structures and incomes (PECC 1995). Further expansion of 
exports and domestic demand will create new markets for differentiated products and 
consequently intra-industry trade.
Reconciling the diversity in development among APEC economies will also be 
important for the development of IIT in this region. As agreed at the summit in Bogor 
by economic leaders, industrialised economies will provide opportunities for 
developing economies to increase their economic growth and level of development. 
Developing economies are committed to aiming for high growth rates. If the 
development gap is narrowed in ways consistent with sustainable growth, equitable
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development and economic stability, the development of IIT is likely to be
encouraged from the demand side.
Figure 8.2 Per capita GDP levels and GDP growth in APEC economies
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The recent financial crisis in East Asian economies will undoubtedly hamper 
economic growth, not only in those economies experiencing the crisis. This might 
obscure the development of IIT in the region. Early recovery from the crisis is 
therefore important for sustained economic growth and smooth adjustment in regional 
trade.
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Convergence of factor endowments
One of the characteristics of Asia Pacific economies is their economic
complementarity.
As Table 8.3 indicates, among the 18 economies of APEC, exports from Canada, 
China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the 
United States are mainly in manufactured goods, while others mainly export primary 
goods. A detailed calculation of the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) shown 
in Figure 8.3 reveals that there are strong complementarities in this region’s exports. 
These complementarities give rise to the pattem of trade in this region, which is 
primarily of the Heckscher-Ohlin type in which the structure of exports among 
economies reflects differences in relative factor endowments.
Table 8.3 Structure of exports, 1992 (per cent)
Manufactures Primary
Australia 31.5 68.5
Brunei 0.0 100.0
Canada 63.2 36.8
Chile 14.5 85.5
China 79.2 20.8
Hong Kong 24.1 75.9
Indonesia 47.3 52.7
Japan 97.4 2.6
Korea, Rep. 92.6 7.4
Malaysia 64.9 35.1
Mexico 51.7 48.3
New Zealand 25.2 74.8
Papua New Guinea 7.2 92.8
Philippines 73.2 26.8
Singapore 77.9 22.1
Taiwan 91.9 8.1
Thailand 67.8 32.2
United States 75.5 24.5
Sources: World Bank: World Tables in International Economic DataBank, Australian National 
University.
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These differences in relative factor endowment among economies in the region imply 
that there is significant scope for the development of horizontal intra-industry trade 
through the convergence of factor endowment among these economies. The policies 
adopted to achieve this development might include the removal of barriers to the 
mobility of factors including labour and capital, for example migration restrictions 
and impediments to investment.
Economic integration
It is observed that lower transaction costs among trading partners, be they by a 
relative decrease in prices for transport and communication services or by a removal 
of policy imposed-trade and investment barriers, tend to be accompanied by an 
increase in intra-industry trade. That is, economic integration influences intra-industry 
trade among integrated economies positively.
Economic integration, evidenced by a growing share of trade and investment among 
all member economies with other APEC members, is being driven by the private 
sector, which is seizing the opportunities created by the complementarity of the 
region’s economies (PECC 1995).
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Figure 8.3 Revealed comparative advantage, APEC economies, 1993
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Increased IIT from economic integration results mainly from reductions in trade 
barriers and increased foreign direct investment among economies. The commitment 
to liberalising trade and investment in the region by 2010 for the forum’s developed 
economies and by 2020 for its developing members promises good prospects for the 
growth of intra-industry trade in economies within this region. But along the road to 
the achivement of this goal, the continued gradual reduction of trade and investment 
barriers will lead to trade expansion within the region and with the world. Goods, 
services, capital and investment will flow more freely among APEC economies in an 
incremental, positive manner and intra-industry trade will grow in a continuous and 
gradual manner. Adjustment to trade liberalisation at each stage will be smoother as 
this process proceeds.
However, there are also second-round (feedback) effects flowing from economic 
integration. If the spirit of openness and dynamic economic growth of APEC 
economies continues, people in APEC economies will share in the benefits of 
economic growth through more highly skilled and higher paying jobs and increased 
mobility. Improved education and training will produce rising literacy rates and 
provide the skills to maintain economic growth. Advances in telecommunications will 
shrink the barriers of time and distance in the region and link APEC economies so 
that goods and people move more quickly and efficiently. These developments will 
further encourage the growth of intra-industry trade.
In summary, there are significant impediments to trade growth among Asia Pacific 
economies. For this reason, there are large adjustment pressures to achieve the goal of 
free trade and investment in this region. Because of the lower adjustment costs
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associated with intra-industry trade compared with inter-industry trade, it is expected 
that APEC economies will experience a more difficult adjustment process than was 
the case for European economies, given that the level of intra-industry trade among 
APEC economies is still low. Thus, policies like gradual liberalisation and adjustment 
assistance are recommended in the pursuit of trade liberalisation. Further, it is 
recognised that the most significant characteristics of these economies are the 
remarkable diversity, complementarity and the increasingly interdependence they 
display. These characteristics provide challenges and opportunities for the further 
growth of intra-industry trade so that the pain from further trade liberalisation is likely 
to be minimised.
Directions for future research
There are three main directions in which future research might contribute to study in 
this field.
In analysing adjustment costs under different trade patterns, previous studies have 
been limited by two shortcomings: indirect measurement and lack of dynamic 
features. This study overcame these problems by using the dynamic adjustment costs 
model to test the hypothesis that, under intra-industry trade, intra-industry factor 
adjustments dominate. Further, labour adjustment costs, measured by means of six 
adjustment cost indicators under different trade patterns, were examined. The direct 
incoporation of adjustment cost measures into the dynamic adjustment costs model 
could therefore be a fruitful area for future study.
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Secondly, labour adjustment costs in this study are measured in terms of several 
adjustment cost indicators. An overall measure of labour adjustment costs is not 
constructed due to the unavailability of information. Constructing an overall measure 
and test of labour adjustment costs under different trade patterns would offer an more 
complete assessment of the argument that adjustment costs under intra-industry trade 
are lower than those under inter-industry trade.
Finally, CGE modelling is often used to conduct welfare analyses of both economy­
wide and global policy changes. Current studies using this framework measure 
welfare changes in terms of net gains. To set out the adjustment costs of factor 
relocation explicitly and measure them under different trade patterns in the face of 
trade liberalisation under this framework would be another fruitful direction for future 
research.
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